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ABSTRACT 
 
ELISSA ZELLINGER: Lyrical Strains: 1820-1920 
(Under the direction of Eliza Richards) 
 
 
Following John Stuart Mill, one important strain of contemporary scholarship has 
understood lyric poetry to convey the voice of an “overheard” subject who expresses 
private thoughts and emotions, either to herself or to an unavailable other. This work thus 
assumes, with Mill, that the lyric speaker is a model liberal subject (self-enclosed, self-
reliant, self-possessed) and that lyric poetry merely communicates this subject’s natural, 
preexisting interiority. “Lyrical Strains: 1820-1920,” however, argues that lyric poetry 
does not merely reflect liberal subjectivity but also helps to construct it, fashioning what 
it means to be a self in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, because this was a dynamic, 
historically contingent process rather than a static given, lyric was constantly in crisis, 
bearing the strains of trying to create an unchanging, universal ideal of selfhood. By 
examining poetic efforts to fashion the self while assuming its stable existence, I 
demonstrate that lyric engenders its own impossibility. In chapters pairing Henry 
Wadsworth Longfellow and Stephen Crane, Walt Whitman and Edwin Arlington 
Robinson, Frances Sargent Osgood and Edna St. Vincent Millay, and George Moses 
Horton and Paul Laurence Dunbar, this project offers an insight into both genealogies of 
the modern self and an anticipation of its deconstruction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
LIBERAL AND LYRIC SUBJECTS 
This dissertation chronicles the simultaneous and interdependent consolidation of 
the modern lyric and the liberal self from 1820 to 1920. In this period, lyric guided 
readers in self making, while the political, economic, and social pressures influencing the 
self shaped lyric expression. By investigating the reciprocal relationship between 
American lyric poetry and liberal selfhood, this project forges a new understanding of 
lyric studies that creates connections where current criticism sees division.  
Following John Stuart Mill’s famous declaration “eloquence is heard, poetry is 
overheard,” one substantial trend in contemporary scholarship has understood lyric 
poetry to convey the voice of a fictional subject who expresses private thoughts and 
emotions, either to herself or to an unacknowledged other (“What is Poetry?” 12). Sharon 
Cameron, for example, explains that lyric poetry possesses an imaginary speaker who 
“plots out his concerns in the absence of both action and others”; this voice “is solitary 
and generally speaks out of a single moment in time” (22, 23). More recently, Mutlu 
Blasing argues that in lyric “an ‘I’ talks to itself or to nobody in particular and is not 
primarily concerned with narrating a story or dramatizing an action” (2). Scholars who 
define lyric as such believe that these subjective musings evoke a timeless mode of 
artistic expression that constitutes a universally recognizable human subject. Jonathan 
Culler concurs that “the historical study of different poetic practices should be joined to a 
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revival of the idea of the lyric as a poetic activity that has persisted since the days of 
Sappho, despite lyric’s different social functions and manifestations” (202). Likewise, 
Blasing argues “the lyric is a foundational genre, and its history spans millennia; it 
comprises a wide variety of practices, ranging in the West from Sappho to rap” (4).  
 A counter strain of modern scholarship argues directly against lyric’s universality. 
Virginia Jackson, for example, finds that such transhistorical accounts of lyric are a 
modern construction projected backwards onto all poetry; she argues lyric is “a 
retroprojection of modernity, a new concept artificially treated to appear old” (Misery 8). 
By collapsing poetic genres with historically distinct purposes into the idea of lyric, this 
retroprojection enables critics to read all poems as “a short, nonnarrative poem depicting 
the subjective experience of a speaker” (Jackson “Who Reads” 183). Through the 
example of Emily Dickinson’s poetry, Jackson shows that modern notions of lyric did not 
exist until the end of the nineteenth century. She finds that Dickinson’s poetry, which has 
long been read as a contextless and self-enclosed lyric utterance, actually had a 
historically specific mode of address. For modern critics to call this work lyric is thus 
anachronistic, limiting, and incorrect. Rather than countering universalizing theories of 
lyric, Jackson and other scholars such as Michael Cohen, Mary Loeffelholz, Yopie Prins, 
Elizabeth Renker, and Eliza Richards historicize the communicative function of 
nineteenth-century poetic genres. Because twentieth-century scholarship has persistently 
linked lyric to a universal form, these scholars turn to nineteenth-century poetic genres 
and poetry more broadly in order to study the history of poetic communication as it 
changes over time. 
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While these critical positions appear to be diametrically opposed, they share 
significant common ground. By arguing for lyric’s transhistorical self-enclosure, the first 
group of critics ignores the ways this model works differently in different historical 
periods. Meanwhile, historicist scholarship, such as Jackson’s, disallows the possibility 
that lyric’s ideal universality was a historical construction serving poets throughout the 
nineteenth century. Taking Jackson’s insight that lyric was historically constructed, I 
argue that lyric was not just a late-nineteenth-century creation. I see this historicism as 
incomplete; by looking to an earlier period, I trace the historical development of lyric 
universality. In other words, both groups fail to take into account that lyric changes over 
time, and that these changes are related to changes in the idea of the self. I argue that the 
ideal of a universal, self-enclosed lyric subject is crucial to historical transformations of 
selfhood in the nineteenth century. Specifically, the consolidation of liberal selfhood in 
the nineteenth century is inflected by lyric’s fantasy of transhistorical subjectivity. The 
lyric ideal communicates a historically situated form of liberal selfhood.  
Returning to Mill, it is then no accident that he provides the foundation of lyric 
theory in addition to the foundation of liberal political theory. But by overlooking the 
liberal subjectivity that Mill’s definition of poetry presumes, contemporary scholars 
neglect lyric’s important role in histories of the self. As Mill explains in On Liberty 
(1859), “over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (Basic 
Writings 12). In order to foster the individual’s sovereign right to self-construction, 
liberalism “constructs and relies upon a strong definition of the modern subject as one 
who is free, autonomous, and capable of self-government and rational behavior” (Dillon 
2). Hence the “overheard” lyric presents an independent subject who, through this 
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expressive utterance, constitutes sovereign selfhood in private. Lyric’s representations of 
self-enclosure and self-possession promoted liberalism’s belief in the individual’s 
fundamental right to construct and govern oneself. Likewise, liberalism’s notion of 
sovereign privacy drew from the lyric expression of interiority.  
Yet by virtue of being “overheard,” this profession of privacy had to be staged in 
front of a readership who helped constitute the interiority of the speaker. Mill’s 
formulation indicates a communicative exchange in which the speaker performs 
interiority for an unacknowledged eavesdropper in order to construct subjectivity. The 
self-enclosure of the lyric subject occurs through a seemingly inadvertent exchange with 
an unavailable addressee that reflects the self back to itself. The liberal self also relies on 
a social, public space to recognize and affirm the self’s autonomous enclosure. When we 
recast Mill’s “overhearing” as an excuse to draw the listener closer, we can see that lyric 
address implies that the self only exists through its tacit need for communication and 
recognition. Lyric thus communicates and is communicative of liberal selfhood. Through 
its profession of self-possession, evinced by the performance of interiority, lyric is the 
primary technology for shaping and transmitting liberal subjectivity. Yet recent 
scholarship in the pattern of Mill (Blasing, Cameron, Culler) discounts this 
communicative imperative in lyric poetry by instead accepting the fiction that lyric 
expresses a universal subject. While these works do not mention the liberal self, their 
model of universal lyric subjectivity is compatible with nineteenth-century philosophical 
understandings of liberal subjectivity. On the other hand, scholarship in historical poetics 
(Jackson et al.) employs lyric’s historically specific communication of selfhood and in 
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doing so overlooks a model of selfhood that aspires to a timeless, impenetrable, self-
containment. 
 Mill’s American contemporaries developed the longstanding relationship between 
the liberal self and the lyric subject. As participants in the so-called American democratic 
experiment, in which citizens’ fundamental equality presumably ensured the same 
fundamental right to freedom, American poets were especially invested in liberalism. 
They elaborated the self-enclosure of Mill’s overheard lyric and liberal self by depicting 
a self-made subject impervious to social influences. This American self forged identity 
through the examination and expression of interiority. The “power of liberal 
individualism” in the United States created “an ideology that privileges the individual; 
that imagines the private life as a protected zone of intimacy that is immune from 
politics; that assumes freedom of movement, contract, and belief; and that grants a shield 
of abstraction in the public sphere” (Margolis 4). Like Mill, Ralph Waldo Emerson 
composed both a theory of poetry and a theory of liberal selfhood. Emerson’s writings 
are at the center of both American literary traditions and American liberal philosophy. In 
Emerson, liberalism and lyric are always linked, yet scholarship has only focused on one 
side of the relationship. Whether they address poetry or personhood, Emerson’s essays 
articulate a model of rugged American individualism. According to Neal Dolan, 
“Emerson preached self-reliance because the self was the locus of reason as he 
understood it. It was only through the independent exercise of reason that one could free 
oneself from the falsehoods promulgated by tradition and come to grasp real truths about 
nature, the self, and the cosmos” (13). In “Self-Reliance,” Emerson reaffirms the liberal 
subject’s freedom to construct interiority by advising us to disregard external influences 
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and “to believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private 
heart is true for all men” (121). Like Mill, while Emerson encourages self-enclosure, he 
nevertheless retains the communicative imperative of lyric’s “overheard” self. Originally 
delivered as public lectures, Emerson’s essays were directed to an audience. Rather than 
apostrophizing to an imaged other, Emerson addressed people. As a result, his prose 
communicated a strong selfhood in order to assist “you,” his listeners. It was Emerson’s 
civic duty to inspire the public’s belief in the ideal, autonomous self.  
As George Kateb comments, “the idea of self-reliance is everywhere present in 
Emerson’s thought” (1). We can locate the liberal subject of “Self-Reliance” in the lyric 
subject of “The Poet,” in which Emerson aggrandizes the Poet into the ideal expression 
of liberal selfhood. Poetry is, for Emerson, the primary technology for communicating 
autonomous individualism. Like the self-reliant liberal individual, the Poet “knows and 
tells” (185). “By an ulterior intellectual perception,” the Poet gives those symbols that 
name and deaden the world “a power which makes their old use forgotten, and puts eyes, 
and a tongue into every dumb and inanimate object” (189). By relying on his own 
perception, he constitutes himself through self-enclosure. Emerson’s self is permeable yet 
circumscribed; the Poet sees the world as an extension of his sovereign self by 
maintaining boundaries between interiority and exteriority. As Emerson argues in Nature, 
“I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal 
Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God” (29). While transparent, the 
eyeball nevertheless creates boundaries to establish itself as an “eye” or “I.” Yet Emerson 
recognizes that communication is key to the creation of the self-possessed lyric and 
liberal self when he argues “the man is only half himself, the other half is his expression” 
 ! 7!
(“The Poet” 184). The Poet’s successful self-construction makes him “representative. He 
stands among partial men for the complete man” (184). The Poet thus communicates to 
audiences a model of autonomous selfhood that Emerson saw largely lacking in 
antebellum American life. In “Self-Reliance,” Emerson laments that “we are become 
timorous desponding whimperers . . . Our age yields no great and perfect persons” (131). 
Conversely, Poets “are free, and they make free” through their poetic expression (“The 
Poet” 194). These “liberating gods” assert the liberty that makes strong selfhood possible 
(“The Poet” 194).  
Responding directly to Emerson’s call for an American bard, Walt Whitman made 
himself emblematic of the Poet’s rugged individualism when he notably declared himself 
“one of the roughs, a kosmos” (Leaves 29). Whitman’s work demonstrates the 
coincidence and codependence of lyric and liberal subjectivity. His “Preface” to the 1855 
Leaves of Grass rearticulates an ideal poetic individuality that shares with Emerson’s 
Poet a foundation in liberal self-possession and self-reliance: “The greatest poet is a seer . 
. . . he is individual . . . he is complete in himself” (v). Whitman uses lyric poetry as a 
technology to model the making of heroic selfhood for others. He forms and 
communicates this subjectivity by radically expanding the convention of lyric address. 
Whitman rejects the implicit eavesdropping of Mill’s formulation; by directly and 
insistently addressing a “you” who is very much present, Whitman shatters the frame of 
performed solitude. The forcefulness of this address breaks through the fiction of an 
unavailable “you” to invoke the reader. His poetry nevertheless created a self-enclosed 
and self-possessed subject because he drew us into his “I.” Hence, Whitman famously 
declares in his opening lines to “Song of Myself”: 
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I CELEBRATE myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume, 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. (Leaves 1-3) 
 
Whitman’s extension of lyric technology reveals that the self-enclosed subject constitutes 
itself through its reliance on a communicative function. In this poem, “I assume[s] you”; 
in other words, the “I” generates subjectivity by adopting and enclosing “you.” The self-
possessed lyric “I” and the liberal subject both rely on an implicit exchange that reflects 
the self back to itself. In his study of how poems say “you” in order to invoke their 
readers, William Waters explains “sounding us, poetry resonates within the particular 
quality of hearing we offer to it; moreover, it ‘listens’ to our response. The unfamiliar 
idea here is that our response matters, that we are heard when we had thought to be alone, 
connected when we imagined ourselves separate” (65). In order to celebrate his self, 
Whitman demonstrates that “you” “matters,” that “you” is as much a part of himself as 
the atoms composing his body. By assuming “you” into his self, Whitman created a 
community of believers in strong liberal selfhood that is exemplified, most notably, by 
his expansive lyric self. This Whitmanian recognition of “you” is important to this 
project. Since I focus on the lyrical communication of liberal subjectivity as a historical 
phenomenon, the “you” is not only implied but also necessary for communicating those 
particularities. 
So far, I have treated liberal subjectivity as a reality when in truth it was an 
unachievable concept. The self-enclosure and self-possession of liberal selfhood was 
unfeasible because the self was always permeable by influences beyond the individual’s 
control. While the sovereign right to freedom was only really enjoyed by those white men 
who were politically recognized as equals, the perfect self-enclosure and self-possession 
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such liberty would ensure were unfeasible. The self was open through a constitutive, 
communicative exchange with others and always subject to powers exceeding the 
individual’s command. Such paradoxes are especially poignant in the U. S., which 
championed the contradictory ideals of individualism and democratic union—all while 
actually limiting these supposed universals, and the subjectivity that subtends them, to 
white men. Liberal subjectivity was not a universal right; in fact, its autonomous 
individualism was created by excluding women and slaves. Because they did not have 
access to the liberty that liberalism promised, they were not granted the status of 
selfhood. Through chapters that chart the development of the liberal self by depicting 
struggles to establish the boundaries of or gain access to this ideal, I demonstrate how 
lyric formally bears the marks of such strain. My project thus concerns “Lyrical Strains”: 
by examining poetic strains against and struggles to achieve ideal selfhood, I demonstrate 
that lyric shapes and transmits a socially useful fantasy of liberal individualism meant to 
encourage union. In order to depict this endeavor across the nineteenth century, I pair 
four turn-of-the-century poets—Stephen Crane, Edwin Arlington Robinson, Edna St. 
Vincent Millay, and Paul Laurence Dunbar—with figures not conventionally considered 
to be their predecessors—Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Walt Whitman, Frances 
Sargent Osgood, and George Moses Horton. These pairings reveal that nineteenth-
century poetry offered a subjectivity in dynamic relation to history. 
Antebellum Liberal and Lyric Selfhood 
Moving from the mutual constitution of liberal and lyric subjectivity, let us now 
examine how these subjects developed in response to antebellum historical influences. 
Lyric reveals an ongoing crisis of selfhood across the nineteenth century in which 
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fantasies of autonomous individualism were constantly under threat due to an ongoing 
tension between the sanctity of interior identity and marketplace pressure. This threat, in 
turn, contributes to the definition of lyric: lyric reflects the fantasy of liberal selfhood that 
was envisioned as a solution. Yet this problem was not new or unique to this specific 
historical period. By the end of the century, powerful changes in the U.S. public sphere 
continued to throw notions of the liberal self into doubt. 
The early- to mid-nineteenth century experienced economic, political, and social 
shifts that challenged inherited notions of self. Massive changes such as banking reform, 
the establishment of an industrial economy, and an economic crash in 1837 shook notions 
of individual autonomy. In “the Jacksonian era in which Emerson emerged,” “market 
forces tend to undermine authority, thwart tradition, and throw the burdens once borne by 
these onto the individual. Once freed from such superegos, the self can be seen to be a 
rather contingent, arbitrary, and instrumental affair” (West 26). Emerson’s call for self-
reliance may be understood as a response to this sense of lost control. An ideal selfhood 
that did not rely on market forces was imagined to combat this instability, constituting a 
fantasy of perfect privacy and enclosure. 
The shift from Republicanism’s philosophy of public virtue and civic interest to 
liberalism’s pursuit of individual interests at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
reflected this effort to envision a subject sheltered from external influences. Antebellum 
culture expected a public person to have a private side; “nineteenth-century self-
definitions . . . locate the individual in his or her interiority, in his or her removal from the 
marketplace” (Brown 3). According to Milette Shamir, “in the course of the eighteenth 
century, liberalism as a political philosophy reversed the republican hierarchy of public 
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over private, elevating the private to a position of primacy and endowing privacy with its 
present meaning as a moral good, a natural right, and a constitutive condition of 
personhood” (2). By the 1830s, middle-class values shifted “from the common good to 
individual pursuit of happiness and from private homogeneity to private difference, 
protected by a political code of public noninterference” (Shamir 233 note 4). Of course, 
the natural right to privacy that constituted selfhood did not apply to everyone. Thus the 
selfhood articulated by antebellum poets such as Emerson and Whitman was essentially 
identified with white, middle-class men who had a legal right to privacy and private 
property; according to Shamir “the disembedded and disembodied public voice favored 
by liberalism, the privilege of abstraction afforded first and foremost to white, propertied 
men, meant that other voices, belonging to ‘overembodied’ and excluded subjects, were 
privatized and silenced” (15). African Americans under chattel slavery and women were 
denied full personhood, and while both groups composed poetry of the self, they had to 
contend with an ideal of selfhood only applicable to white men. Their literature asserted 
the right to embody full personhood by asserting the privacy that personhood supposedly 
entailed; “[subaltern literature] simultaneously seeks to extend the right to privacy to 
those to whom it has been historically denied, realizing that the claim to full humanity 
involves the privilege to disappear from, not just to appear in public” (Shamir 16).  
Yet fantasies of perfect privacy expressed by the antebellum lyrics of white men, 
women, and slaves evinced the constitutive influence of social, political, and economic 
pressures on the idea of the self. In other words, the antebellum self created a fantasy of 
enclosure and autonomy due to external energies influencing the epistemology of 
selfhood. According to Chris Castiglia, in the antebellum period “society was diversified 
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and at times disrupted by the often colliding ideological regimes—and the resulting social 
associations—of slavery, immigration, industrialization, urbanization, imperialism, 
market capitalism, and liberal humanism” (4). Liberal selfhood emerged from these 
conflicts by creating a fantasy of enclosure that obscured the permeability of its 
boundaries because, regardless, “the interior became a micro-version of the social, not 
simply as an individual’s ‘private’ realm of desires, affects, and appetites, but as a realm 
of disruption and attempted order” (Castiglia 3). The ideal coherence and cohesion of the 
self-enclosed, self-possessed subject became increasingly desireable even as it was 
recognized as a fantasy. Castilgia argues “few seemed to believe, in the antebellum 
period, that the divided interiors of the antebellum citizen could be integrated once and 
for all into an orderly and unified whole, a psychic e pluribus unum” (4). While it 
inspired people to its achievement, the antebellum self became a myth of self-creation 
and self-reliance.  
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, the “poet professor,” and Walt Whitman, the self-
titled “American bard,” were two poets who believed in and communicated this mythical 
strong selfhood (Gioia 76, Whitman vii). Through these roles of representative 
personhood, they hoped to provide each reader with an individual national identity. 
Because Longfellow was adept at addressing the status of selfhood in an environment 
that appeared to threaten it, he was especially popular. For example, W.D. Howells, 
discussing Longfellow’s popularity in the New York Times in 1907, comments: 
. . . when he first sang we were in our youth as a nation. Longfellow became at 
once the mouthpiece of this National efflorescence, the poet who, more than any 
other of his great literary contemporaries, was essentially of his time and of the 
American Republic whose message was awaited wherever there were human 
problems to be solved. “Longfellow Centenary” PS4 
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Fulfilling his role as the “poet professor,” Longfellow’s works instructed readers with 
examples of coherent, heroic selfhood drawn from an idealized American history. By 
engaging a national past, Longfellow encouraged readers to understand their own 
selfhood as connected to others through a shared history. In other words, Longfellow’s 
poetry communicated belief in a strong selfhood through a nostalgic fantasy of cohesive 
and autonomous individuality.  
Longfellow’s poetry modeled antebellum American subjectivity as it set up an 
ideal of self-reliant selfhood. Whitman likewise articulates this strong self, but while 
Longfellow taught readers how to cultivate it, Whitman declared that his readers 
possessed it. David Haven Blake argues that Whitman’s declaration acts as “an agent of 
conversion” that instills individuality by drawing readers into Whitman’s own self: “the 
poems can inspire a miraculous rebirth, a transformation that will bring readers into a 
fuller sense of their own identity” (7). Whitman enclosed his reader in a selfhood of his 
making, and such enclosure allows Whitman to foster a union of people under his “I.” As 
Peter Coviello argues, “to be properly American is thus, as Whitman conceives it, to feel 
oneself related in a quite intimate way to a world of people not proximate or even 
known” (87). Whitman cultivated a strong presence in his poetry in order to join all 
selves with his self; “many individuals and groups thus achieve unity with one another 
not by themselves but only through Whitman’s identification with all of them” (Maslan 
113). 
Despite Whitman’s professed openness, the selfhood that he constructed modeled 
the enclosure that constituted an ideal liberal self. By declaring “what I assume you shall 
assume,” Whitman usurps the autonomy of “you” to enclose it within his own “I.” 
 ! 14!
Although he joins all people together within his expansive “I,” Whitman addresses “you” 
in order to constitute his “I.” Addressing “you” reflects “I” back to itself; in a sense the 
lyric “you” is consumed to constitute “I.” Whitman circumscribed all other voices, 
speaking through and for them to create a nation of one. While Whitman encouraged the 
exchange between his self and others—“every atom belonging to me as good belongs to 
you”—this transference occurred within his own self. 
The poetic efforts of women and slaves simultaneously problematized the liberal 
selfhood that Longfellow and Whitman articulated. These groups posited models of 
selfhood that disputed the poetics of nostalgia and address that constituted Longfellow 
and Whitman’s American subjects, revealing what Longfellow and Whitman overlooked. 
The constitutive privacy of selfhood proved problematic for women and slaves in ways it 
was not for white men. Because female identity was equated with private and domestic 
development, women lacked the ability to be recognized as public, autonomous selves. 
Meanwhile slaves were considered private property; as a possession, slaves could only 
constitute the selfhood of their owners. In order to locate a space for their selfhood, 
women and slave poets had to render public their perceived overabundance of privacy. 
Figures such as the poetess Frances Sargent Osgood and the slave poet George Moses 
Horton poetically exposed privacy in order to communicate a seemingly sincere and 
strong selfhood. But their public poetry was not the free expression of their innermost 
selves. Osgood’s poetess poetry “was subject to moral expectations of white, middle-
class conduct, including the ideal of femininity as a site of untainted ‘privacy’” 
(Rosenbaum 93). As a slave poet, Horton had to prove his possession of an emotional 
interior in order to “try to maximize his appeal to multiple audiences, both Northern and 
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Southern, white and black, military and civilian” (Barrett 340). As Osgood and Horton 
used lyric to assert their personhood, they simultaneously employed lyric in order to 
illuminate the limits and problems of liberal subjectivity. In doing so their poetry 
articulates “companion impetus” that located not just a public space for their selfhood but 
a revised privacy that constituted their autonomy (Shamir 15). Instead of offering their 
privacy up for public consumption, they register “the desire to find shelter from visibility 
and social identity, to carve out a niche of empowered privacy for the disenfranchised 
subject” (Shamir 15-16).  
 Osgood’s poetess poetry reflected the vexed selfhood of antebellum women. A 
concealed core and psychological complexity were necessary in the construction of 
autonomy; however, female poets were required to reveal their interiors if they wanted to 
be published. According to Eliza Richards, “women were imagined to be receptacles of 
emotion untainted by worldly concerns”; antebellum women who wrote poetry “were 
portrayed as fonts of unmediated emotion . . . . Their poems were cast as identical 
offspring, incarnations of the poetess’ intimate feelings” (Richards 16). Any sense that 
she was holding something back would suggest personal corruption. Such a public, poetic 
profession of her “soul” as dictated by the genre dispossessed the antebellum female poet 
of privacy precisely because she had to serve as a public figure for privacy. And yet this 
personal or individual privacy was necessary to create an abiding, autonomous literary 
figure. Nineteenth-century lyric expression was predicated on self-possession, on the 
understanding that a poet had sovereignty over the privacy he or she expressed. However, 
the poetess’s privacy was consumable and forgettable.  
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Osgood’s poetry, however, tried to create a public space for female selfhood by 
alluding to a privacy that was not consumed, but existed beyond the page. She suggested 
that women poets could publicly acknowledge but not expose some of the privacy 
necessary in constituting the self. For example, in the poem “To My Pen,” the speaker 
scolds her pen to “Let not a thought escape you lightly, / But challenge all before they go, 
/ And see them fairly robed and rightly” (Poems 14-16). By scolding her pen to robe her 
thoughts “rightly,” Osgood reinforces the fact that the proper female is not free to say 
whatever she wants in public. All this robing or concealing, however, conflicts with the 
sincerity expected of the female self. But Osgood is able to protect her privacy by 
attributing autonomy to the pen. Instead of offering the female poet’s privacy for 
consumption by the reading public, Osgood instead offers the pen while concealing the 
contents of the private thoughts that the naughty pen would transcribe. 
On the other hand, Horton hoped to convincingly profess his privacy to prove his 
personhood. Horton wanted his poems to be read as reflection of his self in order to 
convince readers of his humanity, and therefore, his unjust enslavement. In other words, 
Horton required public recognition of his personhood in order to gain his freedom. While 
he was not freed until the Emancipation Proclamation, his early poetry had to model ideal 
selfhood in order to solicit the external recognition, or “overhearing,” that would 
hopefully result in his manumission. For example, the 1829 collection of his poetry, The 
Hope of Liberty, was prefaced by an “Explanation” confirming that the poems were in 
fact composed by Horton. This preface legitimates Horton by fitting him to ideals of 
liberal selfhood. Horton was self-reliant while possessing an emotional interior and; he 
was “a faithful, honest and industrious” and his “heart has felt deeply and sensitively in 
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this lowest possible condition of human nature” (Hope 3). The funds raised by the 
collection, in addition to freeing Horton, were meant to send him to Liberia. As the 
“Explanation” details the work that he would do there, it outlines the myth of American 
self-uplift: in Liberia Horton hoped to “apply his industry and mental abilities to the 
promotion of its prospects and his own” (Hope 3). To prove Horton’s personhood, the 
“Explanation” depicts Horton according to white, middle-class masculine ideals of 
interiority, autonomy, and (future) nationality. 
Indeed, Horton’s poetry strives to assert these qualities, but his attention to the 
mediation of the page suggests an alternative model of liberal self-possession and self-
enclosure. Thought of as a possession, not a person, Horton emphasized and exploited the 
conventions of the lyric “voice” in order to communicate autonomous individualism to 
readers. Building on the assumption that the poem is the spoken utterance of an 
imaginary person, Horton used the poem to affirm to his own selfhood. But Horton’s 
poetry had to contend with the fictional status of this “voice” while employing voice as 
the tool to communicate his very real self. There is no literal “voice” in the poem, no 
person speaking, just words printed on the page. In order to overcome the dislocation of 
voice from the speaker due to the mediation of the page, Horton emphasizes embodiment 
and phenomenological experience in the lyric to communicate his selfhood. Horton’s 
poetry thus draws his words back to his physical experience, revising liberal subjectivity 
to include the black body. 
Turn-of-the-Century Liberal and Lyric Selfhood 
These four poets offer insight to the historical development of liberal subjectivity 
as shaped and transmitted by lyric from the antebellum period to Reconstruction. At the 
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end of the century, a new generation of poets takes up their examples in order to continue 
grappling with American individualism in the face of unmooring change. The crisis of 
selfhood extended to the end of the century, and the poetic practices that previously 
bolstered liberal self-possession and self-enclosure proved useless against the era’s 
massive social, political, and economic changes. The self-doubt of the Gilded Age 
echoed many of the components causing antebellum instability; people still felt “the 
power to affect one’s own destiny had been removed from the individual, the family, and 
the local community and concentrated in a complex maze of interdependent, impersonal 
forces” (Hilkey 8). The establishment of corporate capitalism by the late nineteenth 
century shifted the parameters within which Americans envisioned their selfhood. T. J. 
Jackson Lears argues “as more and more people became enmeshed in the market’s web 
of interdependence, liberal ideals of autonomous selfhood became ever more difficult to 
sustain. For entrepreneurs as well as wageworkers, financial rise or ruin came to depend 
on policies formulated far away, on situations beyond the individual’s control” (“From 
Salvation” 7). In other words, “the crisis of capitalism manifested . . . a deeper crisis of 
autonomous selfhood” (Sklansky 138). A growing divide between “individual moral 
agency” and “a material world that seemed increasingly governed by the impersonal laws 
of supply and demand and survival of the fittest” suggested the world’s indifference to 
heroic selfhood, warranting new definitions of the self (Sklansky 138). Instead of 
changing the political-economic system, notions of autonomy had to change in order to 
fit the material interdependence, abundance, and inequalities of the Gilded Age. To do so, 
culture looked backwards in order to move forwards. 
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A nostalgic ethos affected Gilded Age institutions, from the public school system 
to academia, from popular publishing to the growing field of psychology. This was a 
culture that “that speculated on the future even when it appeared to be mourning the past” 
(Sorby xxiii). For example, W. D. Howells, discussing Longfellow at the centenary of his 
birth in 1907, commented that:  
. . . in those happy years before the great Civil War . . . men thought they had 
found the promise of all good in the lasting peace which was to be the solvent of 
every grief and every fear. The hard old creeds had softened from duty to God 
into duty to man; the affirmation of justice in the Judge of all earth had become 
the affirmation of love among men. “Art” 474  
 
Howells articulates a characteristic nostalgia for antebellum social relations, but at the 
same time these supposedly lost nostalgic ideals were being imported into turn-of-the-
century American lyric. As demonstrated by the continued popularity of Longfellow’s 
works in the Gilded Age, approaches to the future were bolstered by a stabilizing and 
exemplary ideal of the past. The solution to the crisis of autonomous selfhood “appeared 
to leading American mental philosophers as a question of will power rather than labor 
power, much as it has in Emerson’s Romantic psychology of self-reliance” (Sklansky 
138). Turn-of-the-century culture relied on a nostalgic look backwards, presenting liberal 
selfhood as existing in the idealized past in order to inspire individual American 
autonomy in the present. Selfhood was constituted through what was thought to be old-
fashioned “action, practice, and willpower” (Sklansky 141). For example, success 
manuals echoed the strong and inspirational self articulated by Longfellow and Whitman. 
Judy Arlene Hilkey argues that success manuals: 
. . . articulated a moralistic view of the world that projected the values and virtues 
of an earlier preindustrial era as the means to success in the new age of industrial 
capitalism. By the diligent application of virtues such as honesty, frugality, 
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industry, reliability, and loyalty, buttressed by the force of character and true 
manhood, any poor boy could find “a way to win.” 5  
 
Because lyric and liberal subjectivity were caught up in each other, poetry was likewise 
believed to be in crisis. According to contemporary critic Edmund Clarence Stedman, the 
death of many of the “elder poets,” created “a cry of foreboding” (787). Conservative 
literary elites mourned the death of Fireside figures such as Longfellow and in doing so, 
articulated a nostalgia for the ideal selfhood illustrated by their poetry. Noting “a period 
of decline,” in 1885 Stedman dubbed the era the “twilight of the poets” in his essay of the 
same name (787). Yet the reason for the perceived twilight of poetry was not merely the 
loss of great poets; the crisis affecting poetry was the same one affecting selfhood at the 
turn of the century. Stedman explains that: 
the influences . . . which brought poetic aims and methods into doubt” included 
“the radical change in the course of imagination, enforced by the advance of 
science,— the disturbance of tradition and convictions, — the leap from romance 
to realism. We must allow, too, for the diversion of genius to material conquests, 
adventure, the creation of fortunes. 787  
 
Stedman’s concern about the current influences affecting poetry echoes the current 
influences affecting the autonomous self. 
The period was not an era of decline for all poetry, however, just for “a particular 
elite definition of the genre” (Renker 136). Elizabeth Renker explains that “the twilight 
simulacrum that Stedman created from his highbrow perch in fact bore little relation to 
the lively life of poetry in other spheres of literacy . . . the genre of poetry was vital to 
American culture at all social levels during this era” (136). Stedman was a member of a 
group of literary elites who had created and tried to continue a “genteel” culture that was 
entering its own twilight. Genteel taste sought to preserve a morality and propriety in 
literature that seemed under threat after the Civil War; “the genteel endeavor was to 
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create a culture for the public . . . Above all it was a reflexive culture, a culture thrown up 
in defense against the mobility of America” (Tomisch 24). The genteel “endeavor” was 
adamantly conservative; “not a single major development in American society was 
reflected in the literature of the genteel tradition; it remained in 1900 what it had been in 
1850” (Tomisch 120). Thus, Stedman’s perception of a twilight indicated the decline of 
genteel values and genteel ways of thinking about the self. The “twilight” that Stedman 
lamented actually indicated a period of innovation and realism in poetry, in which poets 
rearticulated the ideal, genteel self in order to fit it to the modern era. 
Indeed, Gilded Age poets expanded inherited notions of liberal subjectivity to 
accommodate the social, political, and economic influences of turn-of-the-century life. 
By examining how these poets conserve and rearticulate their poetic predecessors, we can 
trace a genealogy of nineteenth-century selfhood in the decades that usher in the 
Modernist era. Ignored by Modernists and subsequent critics alike because they retain 
traces of nineteenth-century conventions, they make legible an overlooked continuity of 
lyric selfhood. Directly preceding and even coexistent with Modernism’s poetics of 
rejection and innovation, these poets inherit and conserve nineteenth-century poetic 
practices in order to keep working out a strain of the ideal American self. 
Stephen Crane and Edwin Arlington Robinson revealed that the heroic self that 
Whitman and Longfellow thought achievable was in fact a fantasy with problematic 
limitations. Nevertheless, they found the fiction socially useful. By emphasizing the 
understanding implicit in Longfellow and Whitman’s poetics that the self cannot exist in 
isolation, Crane and Robinson employed the illusion of strong selfhood to foster poetic 
fraternity in a modern environment that appeared to ruin human connections.  
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Rather than Longfellow’s shared past, Crane demonstrated that people had in 
common a shared fantasy of nostalgic selfhood. Crane expanded Longfellow’s nostalgic 
selfhood to make room for the acknowledgement of nostalgia’s fantasy. Yet Crane 
upheld Longfellow’s strong selfhood because it helped people find comfort and 
community in the face of the world’s indifference. For example, in this fragment from 
Crane’s uncollected poems, he parodies the opening of Longfellow’s “Psalm of Life”:  
Tell me not in joyous numbers 
We can make our lives sublime 
By—well, at least, not by 
Dabbling much in rhyme. (Poems 81) 
 
While it has been read as a wholesale indictment of Longfellow, the fragment does not 
dismiss Longfellow’s ethics of the self. Rather, Crane takes issue with “dabbling in 
rhyme,” or the conventional meter and rhyme of nineteenth-century lyric. Indeed, Crane’s 
innovative free verse poetry may reject Longfellow’s form, but not his epistemology of 
selfhood. In this fragment, Crane preserves the ideal of “sublime” selfhood but argues 
that rhyme is not the way to achieve it. Such strong selfhood helps parry the world’s 
dangers and indifference by creating a shared fantasy of the self that joins others in a 
human fraternity. When Crane conserves Longfellow’s poetics of the self, he also 
conserves a shared sense of community that Longfellow’s nationalism hoped to create. 
Crane thus expanded Longfellow’s strong self to acknowledge the mutual recognition 
that constitutes selfhood. The surprising tenderness and concern for the human condition 
in Crane’s poetry reflects the fact that no self is created in isolation. 
Crane and Robinson’s poetry possessed an investment in community inherited 
from their antebellum predecessors. Hence Robinson and Whitman index a struggle 
across the nineteenth century to create union through poetic communication. While 
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Whitman essayed to constitute a democratic union of disparate individuals, Robinson is 
concerned with the interpersonal relationships between these individuals. Whitman 
expanded his “I” to attract and encompass all voices within a poetic union of his making. 
However, Whitman recreated an enclosed lyric self by circumscribing all other voices, 
speaking through and for them to create a nation of one. Robinson takes Whitman’s 
power to “assume” and shows that it has the power to usurp, rather than create, selfhood. 
Whereas Whitman’s poetic “I” encompassed all in one, Robinson disassembles this self 
into limited, flawed characters, who break the speaker’s solipsism because they speak not 
for but to other voices. He revises Whitman’s capacious voice by condensing it, limiting 
the scope of “I” and “you”: “I” is no longer capable of speaking for and channeling 
“you.” In the spirit of Whitman’s democratic union, Robinson thus revises the terms of 
address, shifting “I” to “we.” “We” illustrates the position of Whitman’s unified poetic 
self, but warns against the tyranny of the “I’s” ability to speak for others as an act of self-
enclosure. This innovation expands the ideal of the enclosed self by allowing the voices 
that Whitman speaks for to speak for themselves. Whitman inspires in Robinson a faith in 
the lyric self: despite ideals about the self’s enclosure, consensus and connection are 
possible 
While Crane and Robinson expressed a concern for community, the union they 
depict was not as easily achievable for minorities at the turn of the century. Edna St. 
Vincent Millay and Paul Laurence Dunbar addressed the selfhood of women and African 
Americans who still did not quite fit into a union of American selves. Their poetry 
registered the recent historical past as they traced a genealogy from antebellum non-
personhood to their struggles in the Gilded Age to secure this personhood. 
 ! 24!
 Millay complicated the privacy associated with women in order to deflate the 
expectation that a private interior underpins the self’s composition. To do so, Millay 
conserved the expectation that the poetess offered public access to her supposed private 
self. This expectation continued to burden poets such as Millay; antebellum 
understandings of the poetess and her transparent soul supplied the preconditions for the 
twentieth-century female poet. Millay directly addressed this tradition by mobilizing the 
model of the poetess presented by Osgood in order to confront the impossible and self-
diminishing practice of professing privacy. By complicating Osgood’s examples of 
female privacy and sincerity, Millay demonstrated that that privacy is a fantasy promised 
by the lyric. She deployed the poetess’s conservative form and ostensible open spirit to 
illustrate the emptiness of privacy in a genre that staked itself on the public presentation 
of the private. Millay picks up on Osgood’s coy and flirtatious poetess figure, but revised 
it so that the poetess only appears to offer her interior to her readers. While Osgood’s 
poetry argued that a private female self could exist and struggled to assert that space for 
selfhood in her poetry, she could not locate that privacy due to the poetess’s complete 
transparency and consumablility. By the early twentieth century, Millay demonstrated 
that the perfect privacy that constituted selfhood is a fantasy. She thus revised notions of 
selfhood for the modern era, demonstrating that the self is a permeable entity in which the 
distinctions between public and private, interior and exterior, blur. For example, in the 
sonnet “Not in this chamber only at my birth,” the lines “never shall one room contain me 
quite / Who in so many rooms first saw the light” uses the metaphor of a room to expose 
the ideal of interiority in constituting selfhood (Poems 6-7). The poem explains that the 
constitution of a self that does not rely on the privacy of one interior space, but multiple 
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public places and people. Beginning the poem with her own birth, the speaker declares 
that the “chamber” into which she was born did not constitute her interior. Thus, the 
interior space is not in fact the creative space of female selfhood. The speaker explains, “I 
cried, but in strange places, steppe and firth / I have not seen, through alien grief and 
mirth” indicating that perfect privacy does not constitute expressive selfhood (Poems 4-
5). Instead, experiences outside the self are necessary to “birth.” The female poet 
transverses other people and other places in order to create a permeable selfhood instead 
of a pure, private, and singular interior.  
Like Millay, Dunbar complicated the inherited ideals of liberal selfhood. Whereas 
Millay illustrates the emptiness of the privacy associated with the female self, Dunbar 
demonstrated that the sincerity necessary in constituting the African American self was a 
fantasy. Dunbar’s poetry revised the practice of earlier slave and black poets such as 
Horton who had to convince readers of their personhood by being perceived as sincere 
and authentic. Horton struggled to associate the page’s dislocating textual mediation with 
his personal voice. For Dunbar, the voice was a fiction and a limitation; he wrote lyrics 
with disappearing speakers or polyvocal fictional characters who did not correspond to an 
actual self. Dunbar did this in order to avoid the restriction of his identity to page, 
demonstrating that the self is not singular, but polyvocal and permeable. The real self is 
not apparent even to one’s own self, and Dunbar used this ambiguity to avoid the rigid 
essentialization of “authentic” race. 
Dunbar’s poetry exposed hypocritical evaluations of turn-of-the-century racial 
identity by writing poetry about the oppressive masks, cages, and rigid fictions of race. In 
this era, both legal and social identifications of racial “essence” relied on a performance 
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of racial signifiers; “in the 1880s . . . the belief that language can be representational 
allowed for the construction of a language supposedly representative of race. The ‘negro 
dialect’ came to signify a self-evident and homogenous speech community” (Birnbaum 
37). Dunbar wrote poems in this vernacular dialect, “minors,” to trouble the speech that 
supposedly signifies race, depicting a double “voice” in his own poetry with larger 
implications for the double voice of lyric. The printed “voice” of the poem doubles 
because “the absence of clearly indicated sound from the silence of the written word 
creates a double nature in printed poetry, making it both itself and something other” 
(Griffiths 60). Through this doubling, Dunbar dislocated selfhood from the poem’s 
printed single voice in order to prove that the authentic African American self could not 
be reduced to a linguistic signifier. 
Lyrical Strains 
Each chapter in this project documents efforts to refigure the poetic self by 
identifying a lyric convention that struggles against itself. Thus “strain” takes on a dual 
significance—a struggle with selfhood, as well as a struggle against poetic convention. 
Chapter One pairs Crane and Longfellow to discuss the ability of lyric to ground ethical 
norms that contributed to the constitution of the self. I introduce nineteenth-century 
heroic selfhood as modeled by Longfellow, whose “Paul Revere’s Ride” and “Psalm of 
Life” employed chivalric values to exemplify moral, inspirational selves. By the end of 
the century, Crane picked up on Longfellow’s nostalgic chivalry to assert that, despite 
individual aspirations to goodness, such heroism was a fantasy because all selves contain 
cowardly, malicious sides. While recognizing that Longfellow’s nostalgia created 
fictions, Crane’s poetry implied that its figments served a crucial communicative 
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purpose: the constitution of human fraternity despite the failures of ideal selfhood. 
Chapter Two pairs Whitman and Robinson to discuss the inheritance of the lyric “I” as it 
extends beyond Romantic understandings of the solitary, self-enclosed speaker. By 
rejecting lyric’s eavesdropping in order to directly address, and thereby encompass, his 
readers, Whitman erased difference to include all within the union of his expansive “I.” 
The chapter then turns to Robinson, who recognizes that the self can never be 
circumscribed because it is defined by the actions of others, thereby disassembling 
Whitman’s all-consuming “I” into limited characters who are always in the process of 
being formed.  
By trying to create order from a problematic model of the self, Longfellow and 
Whitman employed lyric as a productive technology to inspire a nation of self-reliant 
individuals. Their turn-of-the-century counterparts recognized that their efforts were not 
blind, idealistic attempts by articulating both the impossibility and the social utility of 
such beliefs. In the next two chapters, I move from the production of the national liberal 
self to the poetics of the excluded, discussing women and slave poets who were socially 
denied the status of selfhood. Because slaves and women poets were considered overly 
private figures in the antebellum period (indeed, private possessions in the case of 
slaves), they were deemed incapable of rational and autonomous participation in the 
public sphere, and were thus denied the full status of liberal subjectivity. Because these 
expectations adhered to women and African Americans in the years following the Civil 
War, these groups engaged lyric’s technologies across the nineteenth century in order to 
create a space for selfhood that renegotiated the division between private and public. 
Chapter Three explores how Osgood’s poetry navigates the paradox of publically 
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performing the social imperative of feminine privacy. I then discuss how Edna St. 
Vincent Millay later revamps this model in order to prove that the essential gendered self 
never existed in the first place; the public performance of female privacy was only ever a 
consumable fiction. While Chapter Three examines how gender revealed the false 
promise of the ideal self’s privacy, Chapter Four examines how race exposed the fantasy 
of the self’s authenticity through the perception of a racialized “voice.” Chapter Four 
focuses on the perception of a “voice” in poetry to question the lyric ideal of 
communicative sincerity. Horton’s slave poetry deployed the illusion of his own voice 
speaking through the printed page in order to convince readers that he was not a 
possession but self-possessed. At the end of the century, Dunbar likewise engaged the 
poetics of voice in order to create a national subjectivity that embraced a new generation 
of African Americans. Dunbar, however, strove to divorce “voice” from sincerity in order 
to prove that the seemingly sincere self proven by the printed lyric was a fiction. African 
American selfhood was not subject to the enclosing and enslaving power of print. 
My conclusion addresses these fictions of selfhood to examine instances of lyric 
“failure” in which poetry fell short of and struggled with unattainable self-enclosure. 
Despite its impossibility, these poets contend with a shared ideal of selfhood in order to 
encourage a communicative union. The juxtapositions examined here create a variant of 
American exceptionalism in which failure constitutes the grounds of a meaningful human 
fraternity. 
CHAPTER 1 
STEPHEN CRANE AND THE POETICS OF NOSTALGIA 
Although repeatedly singled out for its anticipation of the modernist movement, 
Stephen Crane’s poetry participates, I argue, in a nineteenth-century tradition of longing 
for heroic selfhood. In fact, the subjects of Crane’s poetry bear a distinct resemblance to 
those in Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s works. While this might seem an unlikely 
pairing, Longfellow’s late-nineteenth-century ubiquity provides the grounds for the 
comparison.1 Although he died in 1882, Longfellow, one of the most widely recognized 
and revered nineteenth-century poets, remained highly popular well into the twentieth 
century. Longfellow’s works were in Crane’s Sussex house library (Hoffman 32). Among 
Crane’s uncollected lines, moreover, is a brief parody of Longfellow’s platitude-heavy 
“A Psalm of Life,” in which the speaker insists that “we can make our lives sublime” in 
spite of contemporary cynicism and disillusionment. Crane riffs on Longfellow’s 
opening, “Tell me not in mournful numbers / Life is but an empty dream” before directly 
quoting his most exhortatory line: 
Tell me not in joyous numbers 
We can make our lives sublime 
By—well, at least, not by 
Dabbling much in rhyme. (Poems 81) 
 
A number of critics have understood this parody as a wholesale rejection of Longfellow’s 
poetic project, arguing that Crane condenses the message of Longfellow’s metered, 
optimistic poem in order to refute it. Judith Saunders, for example, argues that this piece 
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reveals that Crane’s poetry “strives for genuine rather than contrived sublimity,” and that 
“a preoccupation with the melodious effects of meter and rhyme tends to undermine—
indeed, impede—the expression of harsh truths or tragic insights” (186). I want to argue, 
in contrast, that while Crane may reject Longfellow’s formal practices, he actually 
embraces his nostalgia for the “sublime” self. By not “dabbling much in rhyme,” Crane 
develops new formal strategies in order to resurrect the strong individualism that 
Longfellow’s “Psalm” hoped to inspire. Here I take issue with the critical tendency to 
equate Crane’s formal innovation—and, indeed, formal innovation more generally— 
with a depersonalized, proto-modern sensibility. In Crane’s case, the opposite is true: his 
formal innovation continues commitments to sentimental longing for sublime selfhood 
that we associate with Longfellow’s poetry.  
Because he breaks with formal traditions of nineteenth-century poetry that seemed 
outmoded by the 1890s, Crane has been too easily understood as a harbinger of modernist 
depersonalization. The 1890s, the decade in which Crane published his two poetry 
collections, were considered a problematic period in American poetry by late-nineteenth 
and twentieth-century critics alike. Noting “a period of decline,” in 1885 Edmund 
Clarence Stedman dubbed the era the “twilight of the poets” in his essay of the same 
name. The term “twilight” “spread rapidly through literary culture and became an almost 
instant catchphrase, a sensationalist coin that writers enjoyed trading amidst their broader 
discussions about the degraded literary status, or status in general, of the modern era” 
(Renker 135). Stedman thus coined a characterization with important ramifications for 
how critics have since thought about late-nineteenth-century American poetry: if poems 
weren’t evidence of decline then they were, like Crane’s works, proto-modernist, 
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breaking with nineteenth-century practices to herald the modernists’ salvation of the 
American poetic tradition. 
As Sarah Ehlers has recently pointed out, however, “twentieth-century critics 
tended to read the narrative of US poetry’s turn-of-the-century decline too literally” (38). 
By examining the era’s poetry and literary criticism, recent scholars have dispelled the 
myth of a poetic breakdown between the nineteenth and twentieth century.2 Rather than 
charting a genteel decline or identifying protomodernist exceptions to the trend, they 
have demonstrated that the poetry and criticism of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries illustrate an important “dialectical relationship between the old and the new” 
(Ehlers 39). US poetry did not die in the 1890s, nor did Modernism revive and rescue 
American poetry: works within the “twilight” period reveal that the American poetic 
tradition was both more complicated and continuous. By adapting nineteenth-century 
conventions to a modern poetic landscape, the era’s poetry generated a newness that did 
not necessarily presage modernism’s innovations.3  
So far, this trend in recent criticism to explore and chart the continuities between 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century poetry has bypassed Crane. Because of his formal 
innovations, scholars continue to consider him an exception to his turn-of-the-century 
poetic milieu.4 Saunders characterizes Crane as “an important precursor to the generation 
of the modernists,” and Keith Gandal even claims that Crane’s “raucous wanderings and 
his visionary poetry are a sort of prophecy” of “something new and disturbing in 
American life” (Saunders 185, Gandal “Autopsy” 506). Understanding Crane’s avant-
garde forms to communicate emotional objectivity, critics perpetuate the assumption that 
formal and emotional innovation go hand-in-hand. Max Cavitch suggests as much when 
! 
32!
he notes “how remarkable then to recognize in the irregular form of Crane’s ‘In the 
desert’ what may already be—in what was one of the first volumes of free verse ever 
published in the U.S.—a kind of immanent critique of free verse as a manifestation of 
identity and personal freedom” (38). Yet by asserting the proto-modern exceptionality of 
Crane’s works, such scholarship implicitly upholds the notion of a death or “twilight” in 
late-nineteenth-century poetry. When we read Crane not as a prophet introducing 
modernist salvation but as a poet bridging the supposed gap between nineteenth-century 
poetic traditions and modernist practices, we can see that his formal innovation does not 
necessarily entail a break with the emotional imperatives of the nineteenth century. On 
the contrary, Crane’s formal innovation signifies an effort to conserve Longfellow’s 
insights about nostalgia. Precisely by puncturing the “numbers,” Crane commits to a 
nostalgia for the strong individual. In the case of Crane, in other words, I contend that the 
reflexive relationship between formal innovation and modernist depersonalization should 
be severed. 
Crane is writing at the moment when the definition of “nostalgia” shifts from a 
medical condition to an aesthetic term. Previously an ailment common in young soldiers 
who suffered from a homesickness so severe it was believed to cause death, nostalgia 
takes on its more “poetic meaning” around 1900, when it begins to allude to “the useless 
yearning for a world or for a way of life from which one has been irrevocably severed” 
(Clarke 253, 270-1; Starobinski 101). While his parodic fragment may express nostalgia 
for the strong individualism invoked by Longfellow’s poetry, Crane rejects Longfellow’s 
poetic forms in order to acknowledge that this sublime “way of life” never existed in the 
first place. For Crane, Longfellow’s yearning for individualism signified a nostalgic 
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“romance with one’s own fantasy” in which the loss that initiates nostalgia has no basis 
in experience (Boym xiii). The loss is “real” because people feel it, but nostalgia can only 
exist for that which cannot and did not exist. Put simply, absence is the necessary pre-
condition for nostalgia. As Susan Stewart argues, “nostalgia is sadness without an object” 
that seeks a past with “only ideological reality” (23). At the end of the century, Crane 
renovates a nostalgic poetics that not just Longfellow, but all so-called Fireside Poets—
William Cullen Bryant, John Greenleaf Whittier, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and James 
Russell Lowell—practiced. Of course, the Fireside Poets did not use the word 
“nostalgia,” since the etymological shift occurred at the turn of the century, but its 
constitutive elements were present, if inchoate, in their ethos of yearning. Still popular at 
the end of the nineteenth century, Fireside poetry created an idealized American past that 
provided readers with emotional and national stability in a quickly modernizing and 
expanding country; it summoned an imaginary past to mobilize the present.5 Crane’s 
poems radically condense what were by his time identified as nostalgic practices in order 
to lay bare and confront nostalgia’s reliance on fantasy. Indeed, Crane’s reinterpretation 
of Longfellow’s most famous poem recognizes nostalgia’s false promise, the comforting 
yet unreal selfhood that nostalgia offered. At the same time, however, Crane was 
nostalgic for nostalgia, for a time when its illusion could still inspire readers to aspire to 
the heroic individualism summoned by Longfellow’s poetry. While Longfellow’s poetry 
trusted in the power of the illusory past to institute the dauntless selfhood of a bygone 
era, Crane admitted that heroic individualism would fail: his nostalgic poetics foreground 
the absolute absence that initiates the desire for a heroic ideal of selfhood. But Crane 
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nevertheless promoted the fantasy, because despite its emptiness, the nostalgic self 
generated a fraternity whose usefulness outweighed its impossible origins. 
While recognizing that nostalgia created fictions, Crane’s poetry implies that its 
figments served a crucial communicative purpose: the creation of human fraternity 
despite the failures of selfhood. While recent criticism reads a pessimistic determinism 
into his proto-modernism, older studies have recognized what Crane himself described as 
a commitment to “Human Kindness.”6 Calling pessimism “ridiculously cheap” and “the 
cynical mind” an “uneducated thing,” Crane declares: “I strive to be as kind and as just as 
may be to those about me and in my meager success at it, I find the solitary pleasure of 
life” (qtd. in Wertheim 180).7 David Halliburton explains that “Crane has . . . a passion 
for earthly fraternity, and something even beyond that,” while Daniel Hoffman claims 
that “despite his passivity, his crippling introspection, Crane’s ultimate commitment is to 
an heroic ideal” (Halliburton 321, Hoffman 10). Crane only displays this belief in human 
tenderness, however, in the midst of catastrophic conditions, barren landscapes, and the 
seeming absence of all hope.  
In what follows, I return to “A Psalm of Life” in order to trace a genealogy of 
Crane’s nostalgic poetics. Longfellow’s poem inspires heroic selfhood by encouraging 
readers to take or have “heart.” By recalling illusions of heroic individualism from an 
idealized past, “A Psalm of Life” models the discovery of an inner courage. In turn, I 
discuss the strategies by which Crane translates Longfellow’s hearts into his own poetry. 
While Crane condenses and exploits Longfellow’s use of “heart” in order to reveal 
nostalgia’s historical emptiness, he employs this emptiness for a socially useful purpose 
analogous to Longfellow’s original goal: the constitution of a meaningful human 
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fraternity via a shared ideal of selfhood. Despite what Crane regarded as its excesses, 
nostalgia generated the fantasy of a shared past capable of combating modernity’s 
dislocations. Thus, Crane’s poetry produces the unexpected; his nostalgia for nostalgia 
renovated Longfellow’s attempts to establish bonds between people in the face of 
isolation and helplessness. In Crane’s case, a fantasy of the self becomes a comforting, if 
not therapeutic, solution to modern life’s absurd indifference to the human condition. 
Nostalgic Hearts 
Crane participates in a tradition of poetry that appeals to heroic individualism as a 
salve for doubts about stable selfhood in a modernizing, industrializing world. He 
employs a nostalgic poetics in order to represent an imaginary “self” in his poems, and I 
will trace how these works expand nineteenth-century poetic considerations of socially 
useful selfhood. The projection of a poetic self in nineteenth-century poetry has been the 
subject of recent work on lyric poetry. Literary critics and editors since the second half of 
the nineteenth century have defined lyric as a “short, nonnarrative poem depicting the 
subjective experience of a speaker” (Jackson 183). Indeed, according to Virginia Jackson, 
this has become the “normative definition” of all postromantic poetry, resulting in what 
she has recently termed “lyricization” (183). In this mode of reading, “the stipulative 
functions of particular genres are collapsed into one big idea of poems as lyrics” (Jackson 
183). Lyricization constitutes a culturally removed, idealized subjectivity at the expense 
of poetry’s historical specificity. While my investigation of Crane’s projection of a poetic 
self may appear to participate in such idealizing of a transhistorical subjectivity, I do not 
read Crane’s poems as a means of establishing the “subjective experience of a speaker”; 
rather I discuss how their engagements with nostalgia revise the formation and 
! 
36!
communication of nineteenth-century conceptions of the “self.” While poetry is not 
always the lyrical expression of a self, it can be used to discuss or question what the self 
is.  
While Crane eventually produces poetic selves distinct from those imagined by 
Longfellow, both poets use nostalgia to assuage the tensions produced by a political 
economy that threatened the self’s constitution and expression. The antebellum period 
was marked by changes such as massive banking reform, the establishment of an 
industrial economy, an economic crash in 1837, and the consolidation of Presidential 
power. Some American thinkers and authors reacted by reflecting on a past ideal of the 
civic-minded, self-reliant man free from the entanglements of money and politics. 
Longfellow and Emerson’s “Jacksonian contemporaries” “considered themselves heirs to 
the Jeffersonian tradition”; in order to combat “fears of a world out of control,” these men 
“appealed to the yeoman ideals of the Old Republic” (Gilmore 21).8 By regarding an 
idealized strength-in-simplicity as historical reality, these thinkers employed a nostalgic 
logic in order to cope with those forces they could not regulate. They identified “moral 
agency with the ‘inner self’ rather than with political and economic sovereignty” 
(Sklansky 37). Indeed, Longfellow’s poetry does no less when it draws upon “yeoman 
ideals” to inspire a heroic self-reliance capable of embracing messy markets and 
economic factors beyond the individual’s control. 
This reaction would be repeated at the turn of the century when “the crisis of 
capitalism manifested . . . a deeper crisis of autonomous selfhood” (Sklansky 138). While 
a corporate economy had established itself by the Jacksonian era, corporate capitalism 
appeared even more pervasive and problematic at the century’s end (Sklansky 3). Hope 
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for a “spirit of free agency,” for a sovereign self that could exist beyond the market’s 
reach, affected literature and psychology alike (Sklansky 143). When William James 
tried to account for the self’s constitution in his Principles of Psychology (1890), he 
attributed the “central part of the Self” to an abstraction of the stream of consciousness, 
one distinct from the social or material self (285-286). Other thinkers, contrary to 
James—who maintained belief in a unified self that was impervious to social and 
material conditions—returned to the power of nostalgic fantasy that Longfellow and his 
peers had explored decades earlier, in a parallel situation. Popular authors applied 
nostalgic strategies in order to figure autonomous self-reliance; by privileging the 
“diligent application of virtues such as honesty, frugality, industry, reliability, and 
loyalty,” success manuals—book-length, non-fiction, didactic works, popular between 
1870 and 1910—“articulated a moralistic view of the world that projected the values and 
virtues of an earlier preindustrial era as the means to success in the new age of industrial 
capitalism” (Hilkey 5). Here Crane’s nostalgic poetics generates its critical salience. 
Without believing that the self could be restored, he nevertheless used nostalgia to evoke 
a traditional poetic emphasis on heroic self-creation and self-reliance, even as he 
acknowledged that such ideals do not exist. Crane saw that the nostalgia supporting 
Longfellow’s heroic selves emerged from an empty and imaginary past. Regardless, for 
Crane, sustainable notions of the self can be staked on fantasy. 
While Crane’s deployment of nostalgia differs from Longfellow’s, a nostalgic 
tradition works through both. Indeed, the popular reception of Longfellow registers a 
genealogy of nostalgia from the antebellum era to well within the twentieth century. 
Longfellow was popular across two centuries because his poetic nostalgia encouraged 
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readers to take “heart” in an economic environment that seemed persistently indifferent to 
the individual’s actions and desires. By relying upon an ideal of past unity and autonomy, 
Longfellow’s poetic hearts allowed readers to fortify their sense of self by projecting that 
figured past into the present. But precisely because Longfellow encouraged such a 
fantastical vision of the self, his poetry unravels the very fortification it would build. 
While Longfellow’s nostalgia inadvertently revealed its own imaginary past to readers, 
the force of its solacing construct obscured the emptiness underpinning nostalgia’s 
promise—that is, until Crane’s reinterpretation exploited that same imaginary past. 
Let us again place Crane’s work in relation to Longfellow—in particular, “A 
Psalm of Life,” the poem Crane parodies—in order to better understand how Crane 
rearticulates Longfellow’s inspirational fantasy. With its subtitle “What the Heart of the 
Young Man Said to the Psalmist,” “A Psalm of Life” is framed as an imaginary but 
earnest outburst from the very depths of the self. The poem’s inspirational message 
contributed to its persistent popularity across the nineteenth century; it attempts to dispel 
existential doubts and fears with a call to action. It was successful in doing so: the New 
York Times special section commemorating the Longfellow Centenary in 1907 
commented that the poem’s “moral lesson, conveyed in simple but musical verse, was 
accepted by its readers as the teaching of their own experience which they had failed to 
formulate for themselves. It was a help and an encouragement to depressed souls and a 
stimulus to the ambitious and the hopeful” (“Longfellow Centenary” PS2). In the absence 
of convincing moral interpretations of life’s purpose, the poem’s inspirational message 
secularizes religious rhetoric about otherworldliness in order to inculcate heroic 
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individualism. Rather than the promise of a reward beyond, the poem proves this world’s 
worth by encouraging action, progress, and self-reliance in the present moment: 
TELL me not, in mournful numbers, 
 Life is but an empty dream!— 
For the soul is dead that slumbers, 
 And things are not what they seem. 
 
Life is real! Life is earnest! 
 And the grave is not its goal; 
Dust thou art, to dust returnest, 
 Was not spoken of the soul. 
 
Not enjoyment, and not sorrow, 
 Is our destined end or way; 
But to act, that each to-morrow 
 Find us farther than to-day. (Selected Poems 1-12) 
 
The speaker—the speaking heart—refuses the claim that “life is but an empty dream,” or 
that the “real” life is to be lived beyond this one. He instead insists that “the grave is not 
its goal” or the “destined end”; rather, life is authentic and “earnest” in the moment it is 
being lived. By focusing on the present moment, the opening suggests that a nostalgic 
emphasis on the past can have no place in subsequent stanzas. However, these stanzas 
actually propose a “real” life that hinges on a nostalgic ideal of autonomous 
individualism. Although he denies nostalgia, Longfellow invokes longing for a time 
when the promise of the afterlife motivated us “to act” with integrity in the present. He 
de-emphasizes Christianity’s immortal reward while maintaining that right action in this 
life will imbue the present’s “empty dream” with noble possibilities. 
The repulsion of a figured past becomes more pronounced as the poem 
progresses; yet “Psalm” employs nostalgia to motivate its insistence on “to-day.” 
Through their appeals to the past and present, stanzas six and seven clarify the strategies 
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of Longfellow’s nostalgic poetics. Stanza six, the exclamatory climax of the poem, re-
emphasizes the present moment: 
Trust no Future, howe'er pleasant! 
 Let the dead Past bury its dead! 
Act,—act in the living Present! 
 Heart within, and God o'erhead! (Selected Poems 21-24) 
 
By rallying readers to embrace the moment and “act,” the speaking heart appears 
explicitly to reject poetic nostalgia. The past is “dead,” or vacant and meaningless, so we 
must take “heart” within the “living Present.” While the speaker tells us to ignore the past 
in order to “be a hero” in the “bivouac of Life,” this heroic self draws upon a past 
religious righteousness in the service of the present (Selected Poems 19, 18). Longfellow 
resurrects the right action that the afterlife used to inspire and reattributes it to God’s 
watchfulness in the present. Longfellow thus conflates God’s powers with the power of 
the heart in order to summon an individualistic ideal. No longer a judge determining 
immortal reward, God’s role has been retooled to a guardian assuring the rewards of this 
life. Indeed, the past is resurrected when stanza seven urges readers to recall the example 
of “great men” in order to “make our lives sublime.” Because these monumental figures 
“depart[]” or die, they leave an emptiness that serves to enliven the present: 
Lives of great men all remind us 
 We can make our lives sublime, 
And, departing, leave behind us 
 Footprints on the sands of time; (Selected Poems 25-28) 
 
The heroic self that Longfellow hopes to inspire in the present depends on a dead and 
empty past—on “footprints on the sands of time.” “Lives of great men” create a memory 
of heroic individualism that inspires us to make this life, not the afterlife, sublime. Faith 
in their example resurrects the certainty of belief that was formerly located in religion and 
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harnesses it to an emphasis on acting in the moment. Our sublimity may imprint history, 
thereby enabling a life after death based on human fraternity instead of the bygone 
reliance on religious reward. Longfellow tells us to bury the past just one stanza earlier 
because doing so permits its re-projection as a self-generated and self-generating fantasy. 
Nostalgia must first empty the past before it can instill or fortify “heart” in readers. Hence 
loss—the loss of religious reward, the loss of great men, the loss of that footprint’s 
creator—is the very condition of the return of heroic individualism. 
Much of the poem’s language consists of platitudes and clichés—hearts, 
footprints, and, in the next stanza, shipwrecks—that have figurative significance across 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These phrases signify nostalgia because their 
intuitive meaning is based on absence. Stanza eight invokes the Crusoe-like image of a 
shipwrecked man: 
Footprints, that perhaps another, 
 Sailing o'er life's solemn main, 
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother, 
 Seeing, shall take heart again. (Selected Poems 29-32) 
 
Romantic shipwreck imagery, from Coleridge’s Mariner to Longfellow’s Hesperus, 
hearkens back to nostalgia’s homesickness and homecoming. The word combines the 
Greek nostos, homecoming, and algos, pain (Boym xiii). Existentially shipwrecked 
brothers and readers alike, longing for a time when lives were “sublime,” heed the 
footprints and understand that they too can rediscover an inner will power. Footprints on 
sand are a commonly understood symbol for erasure or instability, and yet Longfellow 
uses them to trigger the heart’s fortitude. To regain the heart through loss demonstrates 
the permanent absence that generates nostalgia’s power. By looking to transient 
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impressions for inspiration, Longfellow predicates possession on dispossession, grounds 
strength in instability—like building on sand. 
We can detect the decades-long popularity of Longfellow’s “Psalm,” and the 
culture-wide longing for a strong self that it both responds to and cultivates, as an 
influence on Crane’s poetry. By appealing to nostalgic strategies elaborated by 
Longfellow, Crane’s poems address how the fantasy of the heroic self can survive in a 
modern “universe” that appears to have no “sense of obligation” to acts of greatness 
(Crane War Is Kind 36).9 A number of Crane’s poems take up the heart, exaggerating 
Longfellow’s meaning in order to clarify the ideal of courageous selfhood the heart 
represents. By the turn of the century, life seemed to Crane and others less “sublime” and 
more indifferent to the human condition than ever before. Crane’s poetry empties the 
heart of its inherent goodness in order to adapt the self to this modern era; however this is 
not a pessimistic maneuver to reflect a pessimistic outlook. Instead, Crane upholds heroic 
selfhood at the end of the nineteenth century by demonstrating that it does not necessarily 
emerge from the virtuous heart, in turn extending the possibilities of the self’s 
composition. While Longfellow stressed the purely good self that nostalgia could 
constitute, Crane believed that the existence of such righteous individualism was 
impossible. He thus revises the modern heroic self as one who possesses the courage for 
honest self-scrutiny and understanding; recognition of one’s own devilishness becomes 
the paradoxical source of the courageous heart. The strong, admirable self is the one who 
can recognize the inherent rottenness of people and the world and still seek positive 
community in the wake of that admission. Crane upholds Longfellow’s nostalgic 
selfhood by using its fantasy to reveal what is absent in us, that is, a perfect goodness. By 
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employing nostalgia to acknowledge the dark side that exists in all selves, Crane adapts 
nostalgic fantasy to a modern era. In foregrounding the virtuous heart’s impossibility, 
Crane preserves the usefulness that Longfellow identified: the heart still supplies a shared 
fantasy that fosters comfort and community in the face of the world’s indifference.  
In XLVI from Black Riders, “Many red devils ran from my heart,” Crane retains 
the convention that the heart is the font of self-expression, but complicates the conviction 
that locates courageousness therein. He extends Longfellow’s ethics of the heart in order 
to make possible a courageous self conceived without Longfellow’s didacticism: 
MANY RED DEVILS RAN FROM MY HEART 
AND OUT UPON THE PAGE, 
THEY WERE SO TINY 
THE PEN COULD MASH THEM. 
AND MANY STRUGGLED IN THE INK. 
IT WAS STRANGE 
TO WRITE IN THIS RED MUCK 
OF THINGS FROM MY HEART. (Black Riders 55) 
 
By housing devils there, Crane dislodges the virtue associated with the heart. In contrast 
to Longfellow’s “Psalm,” what emerges from the heart is not good but demonic, not 
sublime but “tiny.” Crane renders this expression of the demonic “strange” or 
disorienting in order to question the assumed transparency of the heart to its owner: this 
speaker is separate from and baffled by his devilish interior. Despite the addition of two 
surprises not typically associated with the heart—ignorance of its contents, and the 
housing of devils in the font of goodness—Crane maintains the ability of Longfellow’s 
hearts to inspire courage, just not by drawing on the supposed virtue therein. In fact, the 
author performs a heroic act by recognizing the devils that dwell in his heart. Mashing 
devils with a pen does not constitute bravery; rather acknowledging and inscribing one’s 
devilishness onto the page indicates a courageous heart. 
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Crane’s hearts do not work to communicate a fantasy of the heroics abiding in 
every self. As opposed to a heart that symbolizes a nostalgic integrity, his are bitter, 
devilish, and selfish because they are nostalgic. Poem III of Black Riders, “In the desert,” 
strains the normative meaning of the heart that Longfellow drew upon in order to prove 
that nostalgia secures the self through strange and destructive acts: 
IN THE DESERT 
I SAW A CREATURE, NAKED, BESTIAL,  
WHO, SQUATTING UPON THE GROUND,  
HELD HIS HEART IN HIS HANDS,  
AND ATE OF IT.  
I SAID, “IS IT GOOD, FRIEND?”  
“IT IS BITTER—BITTER,” HE ANSWERED;  
“BUT I LIKE IT  
BECAUSE IT IS BITTER,  
AND BECAUSE IT IS MY HEART.” (Black Riders 9) 
 
Crane condenses the multiple clichéd interpretations of “heart” depicted by Longfellow’s 
poem—having heart, taking heart, and assumptions about the heart’s inherent goodness 
and humanness—into a scenario that distorts their common meaning. By making a 
disgusting creature a “friend” who not only “has heart” but also is also capable of “taking 
heart,” literally, in his hands, the poem overturns the traditional association of heart with 
human integrity. In order to refute the assumption that the heart contains heroic goodness, 
Crane then renders the “good” ambiguous: the creature’s heart could be “good” because 
it is virtuous or merely because it is tasty. Emphasizing the breakdown of cliché’s 
intuitive meaning, the creature’s repetition of the word “bitter” supports the same two 
interpretations: a comment on magnanimity (or lack thereof) or a comment on flavor. Yet 
where Crane sees cliché, he also sees an opportunity to rearticulate Longfellow’s poetic 
meaning by extending nostalgic selfhood not only to distressed humans but grotesque 
creations. Nostalgia for the heart’s lost goodness simultaneously points out our common 
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beastliness, thereby creating fellowship through shared nostalgic belief and shared 
depravity. 
Crane collapses nostalgic logic—the creation of the self through negation—into a 
single action, the eating of one’s heart. In the conventional sense, to eat one’s heart out 
means to suffer silently.10 Jean Starobinski comments that “for the Romantic, nostalgia 
was a disease which could neither be cured nor assuaged . . . the nostalgic did not stop 
eating his heart out; the wound did not heal” (94). The nostalgic consumes his heart 
because such suffering endlessly eats away at a person. In the context of the poem, the 
creature’s self-consumption thus indicates nostalgic self-constitution. But in the act of re-
internalizing his core, the creature destroys the heart he attempts to re-gain, replaying the 
loss that is nostalgia’s “generating mechanism” (Stewart 23). By rearticulating 
Longfellow’s hearts, Crane reveals that nostalgic self-making destroys the very selfhood 
one seeks to regain. Yet this paradox allows Crane to revise the ethics of Longfellow’s 
heroic selves. Crane extends the making of the heroic self to embrace the ugly, the 
violent, and the masochistic. The creature physically eats his heart, but he does not seem 
miserable—in fact he enjoys it. He “like[s]” to consume it, he “like[s]” to destroy this 
core. By exploiting nostalgia’s illogic, Crane renders these acts of self-destruction 
“good”; nostalgia’s self-consumptive self-constitution is absurd, but its pain creates 
pleasure, its sacrifice creates satisfaction. 
Crane situates this poem at the very frontiers of nineteenth-century selfhood, 
echoed in the poem’s desert wasteland. But can we even claim that this creature is or 
becomes a “self”? Does this creature struggle to reconceive its selfhood or exhibit faith in 
a nostalgic past? On the one hand, granting this creature a heart and hailing him as a 
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“friend” suggests his humanity; on the other, his strange actions strain prevailing 
definitions of human selfhood. In other words, the creature may make it possible to read 
this poem as estranging, not reclaiming, the concept of selfhood. Cavitch suggests as 
much, arguing that the “autocardiophagic creature” points out “the curse of the illusion—
the mirage—of individual consciousness” (37, 38).11 Discussing epizeuxis (the repetition 
of “bitter—bitter”), he explains “the creature is there to remind us that we are incapable 
of the authentic production of the same, of re-production, or simple repetition, but that we 
are nonetheless constantly falling back on what seem to be the best rhetorical resources—
the figures of repetition—enabled by our fictive lives of stable individuation” (Cavitch 
41). For Crane, indeed, “stable individuation” had always been a nostalgic fiction, as 
demonstrated by Longfellow’s “Psalm” which performed the same shoring up over fifty 
years earlier. Yet even if the various forms of repetition in “In the desert” underscore the 
self’s unreality, Crane implies that the “illusion” of selfhood for man and creature alike is 
worth retaining due to the comforts of the construct. The poem relies on a nostalgic 
“falling back” or faith in order to communicate its fiction of strong individualism. 
Destroying his heart in homage to his very self, the creature’s autocardiophagia 
constitutes a strange act of sacrifice. Susan Mizruchi, discussing ritual in everyday life, 
explains that “sacrifice is the quintessential ritual form, and its mark or signature is its 
articulation of nostalgia” (467-8). Sacrifice signals “a token of authentic belief: where 
there is sacrifice, there is faith” (Mizruchi 468). In other words, autocardiophagia is an 
act of sacrifice symbolizing a nostalgic belief in the self. Like “Psalm,” this poem 
concerns a belief that is not explicitly religious, but implies the fellowship that faith 
entails. The creature’s sacrifice implicates a community of, if not believers, then at least 
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witnesses.12 Hence, Crane creates an “I” who bears witness to this act of sacrifice. While 
the creature’s self-consumption nearly obscures all the other conditions and 
considerations of the text, we should not lose sight of how Crane situates this bizarre tale 
through an “I” who hails the creature and relates his conversation. By witnessing and 
then relating the event, the “I” recognizes the creature as a self, demonstrating that 
selfhood is not created in isolation. Thus the poem creates what Halliburton calls “a 
spontaneous sense of fraternity” in the first-person exchange with the creature (279). Like 
the footprints of shipwrecked sailors or the exemplary lives that “great men” leave 
behind, the nostalgic self relies on recognition by another. While Crane depicts the 
inadvertent self-destruction that results from the nostalgic pursuit of self-completion, 
nostalgia’s fantastical self nevertheless fosters fraternity through the recognition of a 
shared ideal. 
Nostalgic Knights 
 “In the desert” reinterpreted the courageous heart by constituting heroic selfhood 
through a grotesque act of self-cannibalization. The heart, however, was only one among 
many nineteenth-century tropes symbolizing strong individualism.13 Of these, I will focus 
on one nostalgic device deployed by both Longfellow and Crane to define heroic 
selfhood: medieval chivalry. With its emblematic image of the knight and all his 
attendant heroics, chivalry evoked nostalgia in the same way as the “heart”: by looking 
back to an ideal selfhood to inspire autonomy in the present. Both appeal to an imaginary 
past, but employ different images and themes. 
By the turn of the century, bourgeois American culture had resurrected a fantasy 
of the Middle Ages that signified a time of authentic virtue and heroic self-reliance.14 
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People looked to medievalism’s childlike simplicity in order to revise the perceived 
complexities and artificiality of overcivilized modern life; according to T. J. Jackson 
Lears, “wearied by struggles with religious doubt, impatient with the vagueness of liberal 
optimism, Americans hailed the ‘childlike faith’ of the Middle Ages . . . Admiration for 
the sincerity of the medieval peasant was tied to longings for ‘real life’” (No Place 150). 
Chivalry encouraged people, especially the young, to stay hopeful and look within for 
power. In Twentieth Century Knighthood: A Series of Addresses to Young Men (1900), 
Louis Albert Banks commented that while young readers might not possess the physical 
attributes of knights, “the higher deeds of the loftier chivalry, of upright thinking, of pure 
conduct, of self-denying devotion, are within each and every one of us” (qtd. in Lupack 
197). Writers revised medieval aristocracy by locating chivalric righteousness within 
every individual, rather than those with material wealth or noble bloodline (Lupack 197).  
As Banks’s revisions make clear, the chivalric craze did not draw upon the 
historical realities of the middle-ages. Instead, the medieval period was subjected to 
sanitized and generic cultural re-productions in forms “based on literary rather than 
historical examples” (Lupack 197). Popular texts in the 1880s included Lord Alfred 
Tennyson’s Idylls, Sidney Lanier’s The Boy's King Arthur, and reprintings of Thomas 
Malory's Morte Darthur in 1868, 1876, and 1889 (Bowden 198 note 5). The Tennyson 
and Lanier texts presented moralizing and romantic depictions of the Arthurian tale, and 
readers focused on the optimistic and noble messages of this literature instead of the dark 
historical events they effaced. Yet, according to Betsy Bowden, Morte Darthur in its 
entirety “stands solid witness against any Golden Age of childlike innocence . . . the 
alleged glory days of British chivalry provide no admirable heroes, no moral or ethical 
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standards, no inspirational ideals”—hence the popularity of the Lanier version, which 
explicitly targeted young people, excluded the violent parts, and included illustrations 
(180). 
In addition to these reprintings and reproductions of chivalric literature, chivalry 
influenced the era’s fiction. For example, popular Civil War literature resurrected knights 
and distressed damsels in the conflict between north and south; David Blight explains 
that “an unheroic age could now escape to an alternative universe of gallant cavaliers and 
their trusted servants” (222). Crane’s Red Badge of Courage (1895) and Mark Twain’s A 
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889) explicitly addressed the themes and 
images of chivalry, while Henry Adams’s “The Dynamo and the Virgin” (1907) staked 
the medieval Virgin against modern machinery. Moments in works such as W. D. 
Howells’s The Rise of Silas Lapham (1885) in which Lapham recalls Civil War heroics at 
the Bromfield Corey’s dinner party, and the jousting scene in Charles Chesnutt’s The 
House Behind the Cedars (1900) suggested the ubiquity of chivalry even when war or the 
Middle Ages were not the explicit subject of the text. 
 Cultural nostalgia for medieval simplicity and chivalric virtue created a pedagogy 
paralleling the Fireside poets’ message of hard work, patience, and progress. 
Longfellow’s afterlife was thus inflected by chivalry’s popularity. In addition to its 
inspirational nostalgia, “A Psalm of Life” was repurposed according to chivalric themes; 
the poem was reproduced as a book by E.P. Dutton and Co. in 1892, with illustrations by 
noted Boston artist H. Winthrop Peirce. Notably, all of the edition’s illustrations couched 
Longfellow’s words in idealized medieval settings. For example, stanza four, in which 
the speaker explains, “Art is long, and Time is fleeting,” and our hearts “like muffled 
! 
50!
drums, are beating / Funeral marches to the grave,” is followed by an illustration of an 
artist painting a mural in the foreground, while behind him a procession winds out of 
view (see fig. 1).15  
Fig. 1. H. Winthrop Peirce, A psalm of life (New York: Dutton, 1893). 
 
 
Art is literally long, represented by the size of the mural, and time flees, just as the 
procession disappears into another room. Peirce or the publishers felt that Longfellow’s 
sentiment lent itself to a medieval context. The painter is dressed in what would be 
understood as medieval garb.16 In addition, Peirce depicts an alcove behind the artist that 
contains the sarcophagus of a fallen knight, his family crests above him. As demonstrated 
by this reproduction, Longfellow’s poetry was well suited to chivalric reinterpretation 
because it assisted in nineteenth-century endeavors to heroicize the self. Hence, poems 
like “A Psalm of Life” and “Paul Revere’s Ride” remained popular well after 
Longfellow’s death because they contained an embedded chivalry that inspired selfhood 
! 
51!
whenever it was read. Indeed, poems such as “Paul Revere’s Ride” made explicit the 
inherent chivalric values of poems such as “Psalm.” “Paul Revere’s Ride,” first published 
in the Boston Transcript in 1860, was originally meant to rally the Union cause by 
relying on a historically inaccurate but inspirational reinterpretation of the American 
Revolution (Sorby 16). After the Civil War the poem became a schoolroom standard, 
repurposed to teach American identity by drawing on a shared, heroic past (Sorby 3).17 
The poem offered a chivalric, nationalist identity to all readers who struggled to conceive 
individual selfhood across the tumultuous second half of the nineteenth century. 
Through the figured Paul Revere, Longfellow creates a knight with all the 
trappings. Revere is selfless and self-reliant, he is loyal to and in pursuit of an ideal; he 
even rides a horse. The poem opens by placing the reader in the position of the child-like 
subject, who shall be inspired by and loyal to the example of Paul Revere: 
Listen, my children, and you shall hear  
Of the midnight ride of Paul Revere,  
On the eighteenth of April, in Seventy-five; 
Hardly a man is now alive  
Who remembers that famous day and year. (Selected Poems 1-5) 
 
This opening stanza depicts a tension typical of the rest of the poem between temporal 
specificity and nostalgic ambiguity. Us “children” will hear “of the midnight ride,” 
setting this incident apart as a legend, one out of time but nevertheless handed down over 
time. This atemporality is parried by the specificity of a date in line three, yet Longfellow 
manages to erase the significance of the date in the next lines. We are reminded that 
“hardly a man” remains who remembers this specific date, hearkening to a “famous” past 
that is about to be lost. Revere’s ride happened a long time ago, so long ago that it is 
about to pass from someone’s lived past into the realm of collective legend. Longfellow 
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moves from the date to death to signal the move from history to nostalgia. In other words, 
the poem’s chivalric reinterpretation of event makes the past not history but narrative, 
and thus ideological and imaginary.18 
From Union supporters to turn-of-the-century readers, the poem’s poetics of 
nostalgia conflated a chivalric and nationalist identity. Longfellow’s nostalgic 
nationalism depends on the dead, figures whose absence generates a powerful political 
presence: 
Beneath, in the churchyard, lay the dead, 
In their night-encampment on the hill, 
Wrapped in silence so deep and still 
That he could hear, like a sentinel's tread, 
The watchful night-wind, as it went 
Creeping along from tent to tent, 
And seeming to whisper, “All is well!” (Selected Poems 42-48) 
 
The bivouacking dead are envisioned as good, obedient soldiers—“All is well!” 
according to their sentinel, the night-wind. Their permanent encampment suggests 
commitment to an un-named cause, and they are faithful, retired fighters, eternal knightly 
figures. The repetition of “night” in this stanza could be heard as “knight,” situating these 
dead in a “knight-encampment” watched over by a “knight-wind.” Because nostalgia 
operates through absence, these dead “knights,” like the great men and shipwrecked 
sailors of “Psalm,” are unavailable, and their meaning reconceived in order to create an 
American chivalric lineage. By providing these dead with the attributes of chivalry, 
Longfellow extends American culture to a time before the Revolutionary War while 
simultaneously freeing this past of its British heritage. America’s very earth is populated 
with dead knights, and Americans inherit chivalry simply by being American. 
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The end of the poem returns to Revere as he rides out of the past, and Longfellow 
extends his chivalric lineage into the present and beyond: 
So through the night rode Paul Revere; 
And so through the night went his cry of alarm 
To every Middlesex village and farm,— 
A cry of defiance and not of fear, 
A voice in the darkness, a knock at the door, 
And a word that shall echo forevermore! 
For, borne on the night-wind of the Past, 
Through all our history, to the last, 
In the hour of darkness and peril and need, 
The people will waken and listen to hear 
The hurrying hoof-beats of that steed, 
And the midnight message of Paul Revere. (Selected Poems 119- 
130) 
 
The “cry,” “voice,” and single “word” are generalized and generic encapsulations of 
Revere’s chivalric message. Likewise, the (k)“night-wind” that whispered of wellness in 
the graveyard returns in this last stanza; now identified as emerging from “the Past,” it 
conveys the “hurrying hoof-beats” and “midnight message” into the present. Through 
these sounds, Longfellow’s nostalgia reveals its reliance on absence, because what carries 
into the present—a cry, a voice, a word—are reverberations without origin. The original 
is lost to the past and Revere’s “echo” signals history turned into nostalgia. Yet these 
sourceless sounds offer a chivalric model of national identity. By blurring historical 
particularity, Longfellow’s knightly Revere transcends time and is available whenever 
readers need him most; hence Revere’s “word” echoes “forevermore.” Indeed, Revere 
could come knocking on any given night. Chivalry exists, Longfellow tells us, we just 
have to listen for it in order to take heart. 
While not as well known, chivalry inflected the era’s poetry as well as Crane’s 
works. The Red Badge of Courage grappled with explicitly chivalric ideals while Black 
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Riders and War is Kind intensified these themes and images. Crane’s poetry emphasizes 
how chivalric nostalgia turns “history” into legend and experience into echo by effacing 
an event’s attendant, unsavory aspects. While he reveals the violent, immoral, and 
illogical events that chivalry obscures, Crane both deconstructs and deploys the 
impossible heroics it inspired. For example, “Fast rode the knight” from War Is Kind 
illustrates the glory of chivalric selfhood but makes room for the gruesome circumstances 
accompanying heroic acts: 
Fast rode the knight  
With spurs, hot and reeking,  
Ever waving an eager sword,  
“To save my lady!”  
Fast rode the knight,  
And leaped from saddle to war.  
Men of steel flickered and gleamed  
Like riot of silver lights,  
And the gold of the knight's good banner  
Still waved on a castle wall.  
. . . . .  
A horse, 
Blowing, staggering, bloody thing,  
Forgotten at foot of castle wall.  
A horse  
Dead at foot of castle wall. (War Is Kind 30-31) 
 
The horse “forgotten at foot of castle wall” serves as an apt metaphor for chivalry’s 
evasive nostalgia. The first stanza assuages popular anxieties by modeling chivalric self-
worth and success (the knight’s “good banner / Still waved”) to readers at a time when 
life would suggest ennui and defeat. However, the second stanza remembers what the 
first forgets. While the first stanza, in its hurry, neglected the indefinite article in “like 
riot,” the second stanza emphasizes chivalry’s redactions by ignoring definite and 
indefinite articles. The oversight occurs in two different lines to demonstrate chivalry’s 
deliberate abstraction of event: “Forgotten at foot of castle wall . . . Dead at foot of castle 
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wall.” The missing articles “a” and “the” overlook the scope or type of reference made by 
the noun, just as chivalry overlooks its original referent. 
By calling attention to the darkness that chivalry ignores, Crane’s poetry avoids a 
happy ending or didactic message. Unlike his Fireside predecessors, his works deliver no 
overt lesson. In a letter from 1896, Crane explains “preaching is fatal to art in literature. I 
try to give readers a slice out of life; and if there is any moral or lesson in it I do not point 
it out. I let the reader find it for himself” (qtd. in Wertheim 230). Indeed, Crane avoids 
Longfellow’s exhortative poetics, but he embraces the shared ideal of heroic selfhood 
that Longfellow hoped to incite. By withholding an explicit moral, Crane expands the 
poetic possibilities constituting this self. Because the strong, admirable individual is the 
one who recognizes the rottenness in his self and the world, Crane includes chivalry’s 
absurd violence in his endorsement of the heroic self. In poem XXVII from Black Riders, 
“A youth in apparel that glittered,” Crane creates a perverse parable, rearticulating 
chivalry’s ridiculous values to depict an equally ridiculous, yet surprisingly strong 
selfhood: 
A YOUTH IN APPAREL THAT GLITTERED 
WENT TO WALK IN A GRIM FOREST. 
THERE HE MET AN ASSASSIN  
ATTIRED ALL IN GARB OF OLD DAYS;  
HE, SCOWLING THROUGH THE THICKETS,  
AND DAGGER POISED QUIVERING,  
RUSHED UPON THE YOUTH.  
“SIR,” SAID THIS LATTER,  
“I AM ENCHANTED, BELIEVE ME,  
“TO DIE, THUS,  
“IN THIS MEDIEVAL FASHION,  
“ACCORDING TO THE BEST LEGENDS;  
“AH, WHAT JOY!”  
THEN TOOK HE THE WOUND, SMILING,  
AND DIED, CONTENT. (Black Riders 34) 
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Crane describes the frenzy of a youth caught in the throes of chivalry’s rallying cry. His 
glittering gear suggests a knight’s suit of armor, and the poem further alludes to chivalry 
by engaging its ideals of bravery through the youth’s death.19 A scowling man in strange 
clothes with a knife has more than normal importance to the youth; he believes he is 
experiencing real “medieval fashion” and is consequently “content” to be murdered. 
However, the youth’s seemingly authentic experience does not have any historical origin. 
He recalls a chivalric significance that never existed; his justification is an echo of what 
was fictional in the first place. Crane foregrounds the emptiness of chivalry’s meaning in 
the poem’s non-descriptive phrases. By creating a sort of rootless shorthand in 
expressions such as “apparel that glittered,” “garb of old days,” “medieval fashion,” and 
“best legends,” Crane condenses meaning, generating generic, conventional sayings that 
summon nostalgia but have no inherent content.20 The larger narrative of the poem 
suggests such condensation; to the youth, even the event of being attacked signifies a 
larger, older story.21 Like the missing referents in “Fast Rode the Knight,” these 
condensations are meant cover up the emptiness underpinning their meaning. Hence, the 
last lines lack the word “stab”; by describing instead how the youth passively “took” the 
wound, the poem removes the real action of the poem. In this quest for chivalric self-
completion, Crane recognizes that self-destruction is based on an ideological emptiness. 
Yet chivalry’s emptiness permits its pervasiveness in a way that renews Longfellow’s 
goal of inspirational selfhood. Echoing “In the desert,” this poem depicts an act of self-
sacrifice that symbolizes a nostalgic belief in the self.  
Crane places this poem’s heroic (non-)action in the present tense in order to 
exaggerate how chivalric poetics turn event into legend. Since chivalry rests on no 
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original source, the narrator may convert action into chivalry as it happens. Any 
instance—a walk in the woods, a murder—may claim a condensed, medieval meaning. 
By misconstruing murder as his own good fortune, the youth demonstrates how chivalry 
provides a meaningful identity in an otherwise cruel and meaningless world. Halliburton 
argues “the youth reminds us of the creature who eats his heart and likes it because it is 
bitter. The youth, too, finds a place within himself” (289). Because the youth took to 
“heart” nostalgia’s teachings, he perceives murder by shabbily dressed criminals as 
tantamount to knightly self-sacrifice. While chivalry “handicap[s]” “the capacity to see 
life and oneself fully and clearly,” Crane demonstrates that the limitation actually 
expands the constitution of heroic selfhood by including the immoral, violent, and foolish 
(Pizer 213).22 Despite its criticism of the tradition and its delusions, the poem 
nevertheless asserts that chivalry preserves a self-satisfaction typically mourned as lost. 
Poetry cannot inoculate against the optimistic power of nostalgia: it is ridiculous and 
beneficial. This satisfaction even seduces the poetic speaker into adopting stilted, 
chivalric speech when he describes the youth’s happy death—“Then took he the 
wound”—as if he could not help falling into the same stylized storytelling of the youth. 
By stumbling into chivalric speech patterns, the speaker proves how chivalry 
resuscitates the external recognition and communication that constitutes the self. Like the 
“I” who speaks to the creature in “In the desert,” the assassin and the poetic narrator are 
as necessary to the youth’s heroics as the ideals of chivalry. As William Waters explains, 
“every coherent utterance aligns itself to, is coherent with respect to, some conception of 
its intelligibility, and intelligibility means uptake, receivability” (5). The youth assumes 
an “uptake” of his excited assertion by the assassin, meaning he expects “some 
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conception of its intelligibility,” a resonance with the assassin that fosters fraternity 
through the recognition of a shared ideal. Even if the assassin “is co-opted without being 
consulted,” the narrator exists to understand what the youth wants (Halliburton 291). 
Really, it is the narrator who completes this connection by adopting the youth’s tone and 
expressing his contentment. Crane reveals the absurdity of chivalric ideals, but 
nevertheless shows how nostalgic poetics constitute connection, even if that connection is 
imperfect or misunderstood. 
Nostalgic Crane 
Despite revealing nostalgia’s emptiness, Crane projected a longing for the perfect 
communication that it once provided. In other words, Crane was nostalgic for nostalgia’s 
ability to transmit ideal selfhood. Because he believed in its communicative powers, 
Longfellow employed nostalgia to convey his fictions of the heart to his readers. While 
Crane’s poetry revealed how Longfellow’s heroic hearts were impossible fantasies, he 
nevertheless missed the ways that nostalgia could broadcast a believable fiction. Crane 
thus translates nineteenth-century nostalgia into the modern era in order to forge a poetic 
fraternity, no longer based on a shared ideal of selfhood, but based on the recognition of 
the fantasies that attempt to fill its place. By withholding an explicit moral teaching, 
Crane’s poetry underscored the relationships nostalgia made possible—between man and 
creature, narrator and reader. Crane upholds the connections created by nostalgia in 
“There was a man with tongue of wood” from War Is Kind: 
There was a man with tongue of wood  
Who essayed to sing,  
And in truth it was lamentable.  
But there was one who heard  
The clip-clapper of this tongue of wood  
And knew what the man  
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Wished to sing,  
And with that the singer was content. (War Is Kind 34) 
 
Crane turns away from poems about the heroic self in order to poetically discuss poetry, 
and how it no longer serves as a vehicle for nostalgic transmission. The man wants to be 
understood, and by finally designating him as the singer, Crane indicates that he has 
successfully performed his role. Like the singer, the poet performs nostalgia. But because 
nostalgia’s communication of illusion is no longer believable, the song is awful and 
incomprehensible—to all but one. The “one who heard,” like Crane, can still recognize 
what that nostalgia, despite its failures, hoped to translate. As a result, the singer is 
“content.” His satisfaction stands; it is literally the final word. Like the creature of poem 
III, Crane’s characters are gratified only when their selfhood is externally recognized—
when the creature holds his heart outside his body, when another hears the singer. They 
do not appear to yearn for a lost sense of self because they construct themselves in 
relation to others. Crane demonstrates that no man is a self all by himself; contentment 
results from recognition. This little tale alludes to anxieties about intersubjective 
connection in an age of disorienting modernism, concerns over messages being received, 
about being able to reach people through the clutter and clamor of modernity. Crane thus 
looked backwards to nostalgia’s communicative conventions in order to adapt selfhood to 
a modern environment; he fostered fraternity through an example of cacophony.  
  Perhaps Crane pays tribute to Longfellow in this poem. Longfellow was subject to 
criticism throughout his career for, according to Margaret Fuller in 1852, “ha[ving] no 
style of his own growing out of his own experiences” (154). In other words, Longfellow’s 
poetry was problematic because it was nostalgic, because it translated or repeated the old. 
Longfellow’s nostalgia thus recycled images and tropes in ways that were lamentable. 
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But perhaps Crane was the one who knew what Longfellow wished to sing. In fact, Crane 
might have even reappropriated Fuller’s criticism of Longfellow’s “Prelude” to Voices of 
the Night (1839), in which she called the “idea of the leaves clapping their little hands” 
“unpleasant” (155). Crane’s poem thus provides an interesting commentary on 
Longfellow’s supposedly repetitive poetry and his exemplary life. In 1825, Bowdoin 
College hired Longfellow to be a professor of modern languages and sent him to Europe 
to gain proficiency. In other words, Longfellow was a professor of “tongues,” or a 
professor of translation and transmission. They show up in his poetry, for example 
“Kéramos,” a poem from 1878 when Crane was approximately seven years old: 
Turn, turn, my wheel! The human race, 
Of every tongue, of every place, 
Caucasian, Coptic, or Malay, 
All that inhabit this great earth, 
Whatever be their rank or worth, 
Are kindred and allied by birth, 
And made of the same clay. (Poems 643) 
 
“There was a man” seems to come to the same conclusion, although the way the poem 
gets there may not be the same. Longfellow translated nostalgia for his readers in order to 
encourage the recognition that all are “kindred” and “allied.” Crane extended 
Longfellow’s nostalgic performance in hopes of figuring a new “tongue” that would 
transmit a meaningful human fraternity via a shared nostalgia for nostalgia’s perfect 
communication.  
Nostalgia’s ability to foster “Human Kindness” allows us to re-evaluate Crane’s 
poetry (qtd. in Wertheim 180). As one who faced the nostalgic fantasies of his age, Crane 
found within them (and perhaps because of them) a human fellowship based on a shared 
belief in the heroic self, despite the impossibility of purely righteous personhood. As a 
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result, a surprising tenderness emerges in Crane’s writing. While they depict the 
indifference of nature and the cruelties of existence, his poems do not make light of the 
human condition. For example, in poem V, the man who said “range me all men of the 
world in rows” creates “a loud quarrel, world-wide / It endured for ages”; the man then 
“went to death, weeping” for causing the “bloody scuffle” (Black Riders 11). In poem 
XXXVIII, the ocean tries to comfort a “woman, weeping” over her drowned lover by 
explaining that the “old, helpless” sea king “weeps too” as “the bustling fates / Heap his 
hands with corpses” (Black Riders 45) These figures suffer for inadvertently causing 
harm to others, and Crane extends this fraternity of suffering into a form of protective 
love forged by disaster. In poem X, the speaker asserts that the destruction of the world is 
insignificant as long as “thou and thy white arms were there, / And the fall to doom a 
long way” (Black Riders 17). Crane reverses conventional love lyrics in XXIII by 
explaining that the stars and sun should “shed no beams upon my weak heart” because 
“she is here / In a place of blackness” (Black Riders 30). In perhaps his most severe 
example of love in the face of destruction, poem LXVII explains “God lay dead in 
Heaven” while the earth, “groaning thing, / Turned black and sank.” “But of all sadness 
this was sad,” the poem explains, describing a woman who “tried to shield / The head of 
a sleeping man / From the jaws of the final beast” (Black Riders 80). The world may be 
falling apart, God may be dead, nature indifferent, but these lines suggest that, no matter 
how small, the bond between two people is valuable and worth protecting. Crane’s poetry 
bears witness to the connections nostalgia makes possible, and suggests that such shared 
expression and reception of its fantasies may be all we have against life’s disasters, 
deserts, and assassins.  
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In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the union that Longfellow and Crane’s 
poetics of nostalgia strove to create. Since this unity relied on nostalgia’s perfect 
communication, Chapter Two will focus on lyric address. I will explore how Walt 
Whitman and Edwin Arlington Robinson’s poetry attempted to foster democratic union 
through the communicative exchange between the poetic “I” and “you.” While Chapter 
One examined the formal shift from Longfellow’s genteel lyric to Crane’s innovative 
“pills,” Chapter Two charts the reverse, from Whitman’s free forms to Robinson’s 
lapidary verse, in order to examine how Robinson revises Whitman’s mode of address. 
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1See Dana Gioia “Longfellow in the Aftermath of Modernism”; Christoph Irmscher 
Longfellow Redux; Newcomb 3-43; Sorby xi-xlv, 1-34. 
 
2Elizabeth Renker argues that “the twilight of the poets was not the twilight of the genre, 
but the twilight of a particular elite definition of the genre” (136). Virginia Jackson and 
Shira Wolosky explore the development of the supposed break or decline. Wolosky 
attributes the interpretation of poetry as “transcendent” and “pure” to practices 
“peculiarly shaped in response to social and historical no less than aesthetic trends” at the 
end of the nineteenth century (“Claims” 14). According to Jackson, the tendency to 
collapse all nineteenth-century poetry into the “single abstraction of the post-Romantic 
lyric” contributes to the perception of modernist poetry as an enlivening break from the 
nineteenth century’s personification and emotional availability (183). Michael Cohen, 
discussing the aftermath of Stedman’s formulation, comments that “critiques grounded in 
an analysis of this bifurcation of culture into genteel ideals and pragmatic reality run 
through twentieth-century polemics against the nineteenth century” (181). 
 
3Other works reverse this approach, by challenging modernism’s stability as a historical 
and literary construct. For example, Edward Cutler demonstrates modernism’s relation to 
the nineteenth century, arguing “the modernist pretense of innovation is itself historically 
derivative; the fetish of ‘the new’ common to later modernism was itself constitutive of 
the emergent mass print forms of the nineteenth century” (3). By collapsing the “rigid 
dichotomy between ‘high’ and ‘low’” that has been employed to characterize modernism, 
Lawrence Rainey clarifies modernism’s incorporation of influences that critics typically 
claim it rejects.  
 
4Scholarship from the past ten years has remained invested in and devoted to his poetry’s 
modernity, focusing exclusively on how its depersonalization models modernist 
innovation avant la lettre. Jerome McGann argues that the “immediate typographical 
unfolding” of the original 1895 poem “Black Riders” “simultaneously evacuates the texts 
of the subjectivity that poetry, particularly romantic poetry, commonly asks the reader to 
expect” (96). Shira Wolosky pushes Crane’s poetry toward modernist depersonalization, 
explaining that in Crane’s “radically experimental” verses “individualist claims are 
exposed as self-constricting, religious contexts as drained of meaning” (Poetry 204). Max 
Cavitch reads Crane’s poetry as presaging not just the modern, but the post-human. He 
argues that “Crane doesn’t deny the personal; he combusts it, like a fossil fuel, and lets 
the residue trail behind on the page, where it congeals into toxic, post-human shapes” 
(34). Cavitch’s leap into the post-modern post-human exemplifies and extends this 
perception of Crane as a proto-modernist. Meanwhile, Crane’s fiction currently receives 
copious and diverse critical consideration. See the Stephen Crane Society for an 
extensive bibliography of recent work, listed by year: 
<http://public.wsu.edu/~campbelld/crane/cranebib.htm>. 
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5Despite the fact that these men were already dead or dying by the 1890s, Fireside Poets 
saturated the turn-of-the-century literary marketplace. According to John Timberman 
Newcomb, they “were not foisted upon an unwilling public. Their ascent to canonicity, 
and their long hold on American literary institutions, suggests that they embodied a 
model of cultural value that resonated powerfully with readers of the era” (8). 
 
6For example, Gandal argues “Crane’s work contains no concept of will, conscience, 
moral character, eternal soul, or reason as a higher faculty of supreme arbitrator” (Virtues 
9). According to Donald Pizer “there is no God, he appears to be saying, and isolation is 
therefore the quintessential human condition” (214). And Saunders points out that 
“Crane’s apostasy moves in the direction of existential and nihilist philosophies 
influencing much early-twentieth-century literature” (196). 
 
7Crane states this in a letter written to Nellie Crouse on January 12, 1896. He also 
explains “I don’t like to make wise remarks on the aspect of life but I will say that it 
doesn’t strike me as particularly worth the trouble. The final wall of the wise man’s 
thought however is Human Kindness of course. If the road of disappointment, grief, 
pessimism, is followed far enough, it will arrive there” (Wertheim 180). 
 
8See also Gilmore, 18-34, and West, 9-41. 
 
9I quote from the poem, “A man said to the universe,” from War is Kind:  
A man said to the universe: 
“Sir, I exist!” 
“However,” replied the universe, 
“The fact has not created in me 
“A sense of obligation.” 
 
10The Oxford English Dictionary traces this understanding of “to eat one’s heart” back as 
far as Spenser in 1590 and Tennyson in 1850. 
 
11Jerome McGann makes a similar argument about Crane’s poetics of impersonality by 
attending to the “arresting typographical design” of the original Black Riders (89). See p. 
87-110. 
 
12As a “social institution,” the “ritual procedure” implies both “sacrificial actors” and 
“witnesses” (Mizruchi 468). 
 
13See for example chapter 4 of Philip J. Deloria’s Playing Indian, which explains how 
“archaic Indianness” was employed to “salvage” American identity amidst the 
“uncertainty and anxiety of modern urban industrialization” (100). 
 
14Such a focus on the medieval was not mere evasion; its “antimodernism” hoped to 
inspire people to contend with modern life. See Matthews “Chaucer’s American Accent” 
and Michelson “A Response to David Matthews.”
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15Available in full on Google books. 
 
16These costumes, accessories, hairstyles, and facial hair are of the same style as those 
pictured in Alfred Kappes’ illustrations for Sidney Lanier’s edition of The Boy’s King 
Arthur, which was published in 1881. 
 
17Its attachments to the Civil War added to its post-bellum popularity because late 
nineteenth-century culture was also awash in reconstituted, “reconciliationist” Civil War 
stories (Blight 216). 
 
18Stewart argues “nostalgia, like any form of narrative, is always ideological: the past it 
seeks has never existed except as narrative, and hence, always absent, that past 
continually threatens to reproduce itself as a felt lack” (23). 
 
19The glittering apparel cannot be armor, however; it merely resembles armor. As 
Halliburton points out, “a small, hand-held blade is not going to kill a person encased in 
protective metal” (290).  
 
20Contemporary reviews of Crane’s poetry address his condensation. In his review of The 
Black Riders, Thomas Wentworth Higginson explains that “while Whitman dilutes 
mercilessly, Crane condenses almost as formidably. He fulfils Joubert’s wish, to 
condense a page into a sentence and a sentence into a word” (Monteiro 17). In 1899, 
Ashley A. Smith comments that “he does not describe so much as, by the use of a single 
word or phrase, he suggests the description” (Monteiro 197). 
 
21Other Crane poems depict this condensed chivalry. “Fast rode the knight” signaled 
“war” through the phrase “Men of steel flickered and gleamed” (War Is Kind 30-31). In 
poem I, “Black riders came from the sea,” instead of scenes of battle, Crane describes 
“clang and clang” and “clash and clash” (Black Riders 7). Knights on horseback are 
broken down into component parts such as “spear and shield” and “hoof and heel.” Crane 
even suggests a damsel in distress with the feminine “wave of hair.” However this phrase 
and the others are so condensed as to offer a multitude of generic readings.  
 
22In a discussion of Maggie, Donald Pizer notes that Crane’s characters are “locked in a 
prison of self-delusion” (212). Maggie depicts “the overpowering role of emotional self-
interest in the handicapping of the capacity to see life and oneself fully and clearly” 
(213). 
CHAPTER 2 
WALT WHITMAN, EDWIN ARLINGTON ROBINSON, AND ROMANTIC 
ADDRESS 
Heeding the call for Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Poet, Walt Whitman rearticulated 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s strong self in order to poetically professes himself the 
“I” who would encompass all voices within a union of his self-making. Like Stephen 
Crane, Edwin Arlington Robinson demonstrated that such perfect self-enclosure and self-
possession were fantasies, but recognized that this impossibility could foster a democratic 
union. Robinson expands upon Crane’s beastly and foolish figures by disassembling the 
supposedly heroic self into limited, flawed people-in-progress. 
Through his many years of poetic output and revision, Whitman’s professed 
desire for union revealed his perception of a primary and ongoing problem of dissolution 
or fragmentation. Whitman’s poetry attempted to provide solution and safeguard for a 
nation facing divisive, destructive issues, by creating a democratic union through his 
poetic voice and a poetic voice possessed by the union. David Reynolds explains that, 
during the 1850s, “the healing of a divided nation, [Whitman] had come to believe, could 
be best achieved through all-absorptive poetry” (67). Whitman hoped to achieve this 
poetic nation through consensus, a joining together of people in a democracy that was, 
importantly, uncoerced. Kerry Larson argues, “Whitman is quite single-minded in his 
determination to erase all boundaries, to overcome all distance, to create, in effect, a 
space in which reader and poem are one . . . the goal is not so much communication as 
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communion” (Drama 10). Whitman took it upon himself to be the agent of this 
consensus, fostering union through his own self; “into the vacuum created by the 
dissolution of the nation’s political structure rushed Whitman’s gargantuan ‘I’” 
(Reynolds 67). 
Despite Whitman’s hopes for consensus and communion, most readers find his 
profession of democracy to be tinged with autocracy. Identifying Whitman’s role as both 
“autocrat and democrat,” Larson declares “there is no future in trying to factor out the 
democratic altruist from the democratic egotist” (Drama 53). Understanding the 
“egalitarian and the authoritarian” to be “mutually constituted,” we can trace this 
“relation of adjacency” throughout Whitman’s poetics, but it is especially evident in his 
discussion of the American presidency (Larson Drama 51). The office that Whitman 
despised before the Civil War and adored afterward highlights the “adjacency” of his 
autocrat and democrat because, for Whitman, the president must be the former in order to 
ensure the latter (Larson Drama 51). In other words, the president’s authority was 
justified by the union he created. According to Whitman, however, presidential power 
has a price. Sean McCann explains:  
. . . presidential rule appeared legitimate so long as it served to bring forth a 
better, more democratic national community, and so long as the president 
demonstrated his commitment to that ambition in his willingness to sacrifice his 
own gratification, and in the limit case, his life, to the cause. xiii  
 
Whitman envisioned union through a “Redeemer President,” the leader he called for in 
his unpublished 1856 diatribe “The Eighteenth Presidency!” (1321). A few years later, 
Lincoln seemed to fulfill Whitman’s hopes, and over the course of the Civil War, 
Whitman’s “admiration and sympathy for the president grew” (McCann x). Whitman saw 
in Lincoln both leader and martyr: 
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If, on the one hand, Whitman envisioned the president standing at the head of a 
massive army and exercising powers that dwarfed those of any king, on the other 
hand, he shielded the president from the charge of tyranny by emphasizing 
Lincoln’s willingness, like that of his soldiers, to surrender his life to the cause he 
served. McCann xii 
 
The union that Whitman wanted to create through poetry Lincoln appeared to create by 
dying. 
In order to create union, then, Whitman needed a President—or a Poet. The 
qualities in Whitman’s Redeemer President are the same as those in his definition of the 
Poet; indeed, for Whitman “the job of the new poet, like the job of the president, is not 
precisely to lead the people, but to be the people, to represent them full and entire” 
(Faries 164). For example, in his “Preface” to the 1855 Leaves of Grass, Whitman 
comments that American “Presidents shall not be their common referee so much as their 
poets shall. Of all mankind the great poet is the equable man” (iv). Likewise, he argues in 
“The Eighteenth Presidency!” that “I would be much pleased to see some heroic, shrewd, 
fully-informed, healthy-bodied, middle-aged, beard-faced American blacksmith or 
boatman come down from the West across the Alleghanies, and walk into the 
Presidency” (1308). Both the President and the Poet feature the adjacency of the autocrat 
and the democrat: one who creates union by paradoxically holding himself apart and 
above, and one who redeems this authority through sacrifice. Lincoln appeared to 
sacrifice his life for the nation, and Whitman’s Poet sacrifices his voice for unity with his 
readers. The Poet may “play[] the role of the benevolent dictator who enforces the 
democratic leveling in his poetry,” but he further enacts his Presidential abilities by 
sacrificing his own voice for the creation of union (Faries 168). 
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Whitman’s prose and poetry might envision a “democratic leveling” but the fact 
of his “benevolent dictator” remains: the creation of poetic democracy may not always be 
accomplished democratically and the Poet’s sacrifice might not actually or adequately 
atone for autocracy. While his poems advocate democracy, more attention needs to be 
paid to how the autocratic action emerges from the democratic ideal. Patrick Redding 
points out that the tendency to read Whitman as professing a democratic poetics institutes 
a sort of false and anachronistic reading practice; “to describe a poem as ‘democratic’ 
does not characterize an object so much as expose a particular way of reading that has 
become deeply internalized and, thus, unexamined. Twentieth-century readers of 
Whitman demonstrate that his program was never that coherent in the first place” (671). 
While Redding will “point the way beyond Leaves of Grass as the normative standard for 
what it means to be ‘democratic’ in poetry,” I want to look backwards to discern where 
the autocratic impulse resides within a democratic poetics (670). Indeed, Larson recently 
argued:  
. . . the many features we take to be distinctively Whitman’s—the privileging of 
the reader as a vital interlocutor, the muting of overt authorial judgment or 
invidious comparison, the use of rhetorical indeterminacy to blur differences 
between speaker and listener, the hostility to unduly idiosyncratic, non-
generalizable experience—all had a long foreground somewhere. Imagining 98 
 
What critics overlook in these formulations of Whitman’s Poet-President is Whitman’s 
reliance on an inherited Romantic poetics that similarly posits the Poet as the 
authoritative leader and insightful uniter. Shelley claims that poets are the 
“unacknowledged legislators of the world,” and Emerson echoes the British Romantics 
when he argues that “the poet is representative. He stands among partial men for the 
complete man, and apprises us not of his wealth, but of the commonwealth” (Shelley 
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309) (Emerson Prose 184). While Larson may not put Whitman in a Romantic lineage, I 
would argue that when we read him as a node in a Romantic tradition, we can see “the 
peculiar extremism of his literary egalitarianism” as an extension of Romantic address 
(Imagining 98). Whitman’s obsession with equality stems from a Romantic 
preoccupation with poetic communication and communion that he adopts and extends. 
Examining Whitman in the tradition of Romantic poetics explains where this egalitarian 
impulse gave rise to its authoritarian counterpart.  
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address inspired Whitman so much that he pinned it to his 
wall, which is to say that just as presidential address holds in balance authority and 
democracy, the conventions of Romantic poetic address allow Whitman’s Poets and 
Presidents to become both sovereign and subject (Erkkila 203). In the late-eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, the poem was understood to be the personification of the 
“voice” of the Poet, the idealized author of verses that expressed and exposed his inmost 
thoughts and feelings. The Poet was thus the speaker of the poem, represented by the 
pronoun “I,” and “I” addressed himself to “you,” another unavailable presence. As 
Emerson says in his essay “The Poet,” “man is only half himself, the other half is his 
expression” (Prose 184). By addressing “you,” the Poet constitutes his interiority and 
generates autonomy through self-enclosure. At the same time, Romantic address acted 
according to a logic in which the Poet was subject to powers not his own. The poem was 
the result of forces seizing and speaking through the Poet; hence the poetic voice was 
possessed, populated, and subject as opposed to singular, solitary, and autonomous. 
These contrasting understandings of Romantic address translate into the tension between 
authority and democracy in Whitman’s works. His poems are authoritative, speaking to 
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command others and thereby constitute his own “voice,” yet they are simultaneously 
subject, sacrificing power to the will and voices of others. Whitman’s use of Romantic 
address conflates both understandings in order to make possible the adjacency that, in 
turn, reconstitutes national unity. Whitman addresses himself as “you” and addresses 
“you” as himself, combining and expanding the boundaries of Romantic address in an 
effort to constitute a democratic poetics. He renders the privileged address of the Poet 
fluid; his “I” stretches to directly address “you” and speak for all people. Whitman’s 
poetry encompasses all voices, addressing and transmitting them to create a poetic union 
forged through his self.  
If Whitman registers the legacy of Romantic poetics, it is helpful to look at a 
figure that in turn registers Whitman’s legacy. Robinson rearticulates Romantic practices 
in their Whitmanian configuration. Robinson’s Poet-President is Whitman, who is 
depicted in Robinson’s poetry as having sacrificed his authoritarian voice for the unity of 
the nation. At the same time, Robinson redeploys Romantic address in a way that 
emphasizes the tension between unity and authority, demonstrating how reaching out to 
“you” to constitute union can instead constitute disunion by favoring the powerful, 
singular “I.” In order to illustrate the authoritarian influences of Romantic address, 
Robinson composes poems which shift “I” to “we” and “you” to “he.” “We” illustrates 
the position of Whitman’s unified poetic speaker, but Robinson’s poetry often warns 
against the tyranny of the “we,” an extension of the ability of “I” to speak for others. 
Robinson employs “he” to exaggerate the position of “you,” demonstrating the strange 
self-enclosure of the speaker who distances, instead of drawing closer, the addressee.  
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Nevertheless, Robinson imagines equality through Whitmanian address and tries 
to adapt this address in an effort to reconstitute union and community. He revises 
Whitman’s capacious voice by condensing it, limiting the scope of “I” and “you”: “I” is 
no longer capable of speaking for and channeling “you.” But this compression constitutes 
an innovation, creating consensus by allowing the voices that Whitman speaks for to 
speak for themselves. Both poets have the same objective for their poetry, a goal 
Robinson inherits from Whitman. They are concerned with the possibility of union 
created from consensus, the common feeling and accord that will foster cohesion and 
equality. They index a struggle across the nineteenth century to create union through 
poetic communication, a practice that these figures allow us to chart from the Romantics 
through the beginning of the twentieth century. Whitman wanted to profess and possess a 
nation of readers during a time of disunion; later in the century, Robinson wanted to forge 
human connections at a time when his family was disintegrating. The two share a purpose 
but differ in terms of scale: Whitman hopes to reconstitute national unity while Robinson 
hopes to reconstitute communal connections. Whereas Whitman wants to remake a nation 
through the poem, Robinson hopes to remake a family. 
Whitman and Romantic Address 
The relation between Whitman’s authoritative Poet and his possessed poetic 
subject instantiates the relation between Romantic theories of address. Whitman conflates 
and then extends these different theories in order to shift Romantic address from nature to 
people, creating a poetics of union and equality. In one schema, the Poet is associated 
with a nightingale; his poem is like the bird’s song. According to Shelley’s “Defence of 
Poetry,” the poet “is a nightingale who sits in darkness and sings to cheer its own solitude 
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with sweet sounds; his auditors are as men entranced by the melody of an unseen 
musician, who feel that they are moved and softened, yet know not whence or why” 
(293). In this situation, the reader thus “overhears” the poem, according to John Stuart 
Mill’s famous formulation. The Poet’s self-enclosure was psychologized as proof of 
sincerity; indirect speech constituted transparent expression.1 The poem’s access to 
private feeling was understood to represent a universal human understanding, or a “more 
weighty and important kind of truth,” as opposed to the passive, objective truth of 
scientific data (Abrams Mirror 313). An additional natural metaphor attributed the Poet’s 
voice to natural forces. Like the wind creating a tune by blowing over a harp, natural 
powers pass through the Poet who gives voice to a poem. Again, Shelley’s “Defence” 
argues that man is “an instrument over which a series of external and internal impressions 
are driven, like the alternations of an ever-changing wind over an Æolian lyre” (288). The 
Poet is especially susceptible to this kind of possession and especially adept at speaking it 
out. Mark Maslan explains that “the poet is a passive medium upon which the poetic 
power acts and through which it makes itself—or, rather, a version of itself—heard” (71). 
“The Eolian fiction” foregrounds the diminished presence of the Poet; it offers “a fiction 
of mediated expression” that “relegates him or her to an ancillary role” (Maslan 71).  
The metaphor of the Eolian harp suggests that the Poet is not isolated, but 
populated and possessed by nature’s presence; a second power, not the Poet’s own, 
speaks through him. Yet the nightingale metaphor suggests the Poet’s self-enclosure, 
isolation, and autonomy; he expresses his self through his own power and pleasure. 
Whitman’s poetry redeploys and holds in balance this tension in Romantic poetics. His 
Eolian Poet stands apart as the delicate instrument that registers the world’s voices; he 
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sacrifices his own voice to become representative, giving up autonomy to become the 
mouthpiece of natural forces. At the same time, Whitman’s Poet-as-nightingale 
constitutes the authoritarian figure whose self-enclosure offers representative truths to his 
overhearers. Characterized by the Romantic apostrophe—“O wild West Wind” for 
example—the reader overhears the solitary Poet addressing a natural object or 
phenomenon, enclosing his self through this apparent gesture outward. Shelley, who 
describes the Poet as both bird and harp in the same essay, illustrates this contradiction 
between self-enclosed solitude versus possessed population. Whitman’s poetry 
acknowledges their paradoxical proximity and conflates the two to achieve poetic union 
and equality. He expands the self-enclosed act of address, incorporating the possessor’s 
presence into the poetic voice and populating his poetry with people. 
By joining together the Eolian and the isolated speaker, Whitman may speak to 
and for all peoples. He is both possessed and possessor, the solitary singer and the bard of 
a nation. Whitman’s 1859 poem, “A Word Out of the Sea,” later “Out of the Cradle 
Endlessly Rocking,” conflates the metaphors of the harp and bird to recreate this speaker. 
Whitman understands poetic possession not as a sign of the self’s attenuation but its 
strength, a way to host and harness external energies within himself. In this poem, he uses 
the Eolian fiction to break the self-enclosure of the solitary poetic singer by first 
acknowledging and then encouraging the voices that speak through his “I.” Whitman 
addresses his possessors, drawing them into his singular self while giving them the 
chance to be sounded. Whitman’s poetic voice becomes representative, bigger than his 
own self, speaking for all to forge union.  
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Better known as “Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking,” this poem’s first version, 
titled “A Child’s Reminiscence,” was published on Christmas Eve, 1859, in The New 
York Saturday Press. Whitman does not explicitly assert his ability to channel and 
proclaim multiple voices in this 1859 version, but it presents the beginnings of what turns 
into a more elaborate declaration of possession in later editions. Whitman makes 
significant changes to the poem for its next iteration in the 1860 Leaves of Grass. I will 
focus on this 1860 version, then titled “A Word Out of the Sea,” because it most 
explicitly registers and reveals Whitman’s development of the poetic “I.” Whitman’s “I” 
incorporates apostrophe into poetic possession, constituting a poetic speaker who can 
address people, not just nature. We will first examine Whitman’s expansive “I” in order 
to understand how that “I” is then capable of addressing and encompassing “you.”  
“A Word Out of the Sea” articulates and intensifies the Eolian poetics of “A 
Child’s Reminiscence,” both of which may have been registering the earlier influence of 
Emerson’s Eolian Poet. Prior to Emerson’s famous essay “The Poet” in Essays: Second 
Series, Whitman attended a lyceum lecture by Emerson also titled “The Poet” in 1842.2 
This lesser-known address articulated the Eolian conventions that Whitman later reflects 
in “A Word Out of the Sea.” Here Emerson explained that as “the universal knower and 
singer,” the Poet “must have an universal experience . . . he wants every rude stroke that 
has been dealt on his irritable texture: he hangs out his life like an Aeolian harp in a tree” 
(“Poet” 357). “A Word Out of the Sea” illustrates how Whitman’s poetic “I” was 
awakened, not by being hung out on a tree, but by resonating voices on the Long Island 
shore. The poem recalls the moment when, as a child, the speaker heard the call of a 
mockingbird to his lost mate, which awakens the speaker’s own poetic powers. It is easy 
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to read this awakening as Whitman’s own, due to the contextless “I” and evidence from 
Whitman’s personal experiences.3 I will read “I” as Whitman not to prove some 
biographical correlation but because conflating “I” with Whitman reveals how he 
specifically reconfigures the tropes of Romantic address to create poetic union with 
people. To illustrate the transformation of boy into Poet, Whitman repeats the tropes of 
the bird and the harp in the acts of eavesdropping and possession; the boy, overhearing 
the bird, realizes that he is possessed by voices that only he can hear, understand, and 
translate. But Whitman does not just tell the story of how his Poetic “I” was constituted 
via Romantic practices; he extends the Romantic “I” to address and encompass both 
natural and human voices. “I” is neither self-enclosed nor merely possessed; Whitman 
transforms Eolian possession into self-possession.  
The poem’s opening establishes its focus on the constitution and extension of “I.” 
Favoring an expressive, self-constituting syntax, this opening notably avoids direct 
address, appearing to speak into the void. There is no use of “you” or the use of 
apostrophe, which is notable since apostrophe is a convention featured, even exaggerated, 
throughout the rest of the poem. For a poetic voice trying to establish his “I,” apostrophe 
would seem the natural and rhetorically most forceful convention of address to employ. 
As Jonathan Culler explains in his seminal essay “Apostrophe,” while Romantic 
apostrophe “seems to establish relations between the self and the other,” it “can in fact be 
read as an act of radical interiorization and solipsism” (146). The apostrophized figure—
indicated by “O” plus a noun, or an emphatic “you!”—is subsumed, even consumed, by 
the “I.” The speaker appears to reach out to nature personified, but the apostrophe assists 
in constituting and communicating the selfhood of “I,” thereby emphasizing its 
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singularity and self-enclosure. Apostrophe, Culler argues, provides the means for “one 
who successfully invokes nature” to “mak[e] himself poet, visionary” (“Apostrophe” 
142). Yet Whitman avoids apostrophe in the opening of this poem devoted to the 
development of “I.” Instead he constitutes himself through syntax in order to establish 
equality and unity as the governing principles of his poetic address. In other words, 
Whitman begins the poem about his own poetic becoming not by subordinating other 
figures to his making, but by crediting the expansive, mysterious natural world with his 
creation: 
OUT of the rocked cradle, 
Out of the mocking-bird's throat, the musical shuttle, 
Out of the boy's mother's womb, and from the nipples 
     of her breasts, 
Out of the Ninth Month midnight, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
From the memories of the bird that chanted to me, 
From your memories, sad brother—from the fitful 
     risings and fallings I heard, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I, chanter of pains and joys, uniter of here and here- 
     after, 
Taking all hints to use them—but swiftly leaping 
     beyond them, 
A reminiscence sing. (“Word” 269)4 
 
“Out” of and “from” these situations, the “I” emerges to sing his own memory. These 
individual phrases accumulate to build the figure rather than reflecting him back to 
himself. Instead of a “you” whose presence is subordinated to justify the existence of “I,” 
Whitman creates an “I” based on hypotaxis. Each of the subordinate clauses in this long 
periodic sentence rely on the resolution and structure provided by the pronoun “I.” While 
dependent, these phrases have equal weight in relation to each other, demonstrating the 
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adjacency of Whitman’s authority and democracy: the equality of the syntax is made 
possible through a central authoritative “I.” 
This section, titled “Pre-Verse” in the The New York Saturday Press in 1859, is 
separated from the rest of the poem by a gap and a small dash. While this subtitle is 
dropped in the 1860 edition of Leaves of Grass, in both 1859 and 1860 this section 
remains typographically divided from the rest of the poem by a break. The next section, 
titled “Reminiscence” in 1859 and 1860, begins to number the stanzas, from one to thirty-
four, but this opening section has no number until 1867. Whitman isolates this opening to 
introduce and establish the poetic “I” who retells this story. He uses a unique form of 
address in the “Pre-Verse” because, as the rest of the poem illustrates, he has overcome 
the diminishing self-constitution of the Eolian harp and the isolating self-constitution of 
the nightingale. The Poet of the “Pre-Verse” communicates his self through an equalizing 
syntactical union. The birth of this Poet, however, requires a return to Romantic 
conventions in the rest of the poem.  
In the “Reminiscence,” Whitman revises Romantic address, encompassing all 
natural voices instead of being possessed by or constituted through them. Whitman layers 
the tropes of the bird and the harp densely against each other until this innovative “I” 
breaks through in its clarity. The “Reminiscence” introduces these tropes in its first 
stanza, describing the “he-bird,” “she-bird,” and the young Poet “absorbing, translating” 
(“Word” 270). Shifting from Shelley’s nightingale to the mockingbird, Whitman 
emphasizes the isolation associated with the trope. Overhearing his song, the speaker 
describes the “he-bird” as “the solitary guest from Alabama” and “the lone singer” 
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(“Word” 271). However this bird, the image that typically represents the isolated poetic 
speaker, comes to possess the poem’s speaker: 
8  He called on his mate, 
He poured forth the meanings which I, of all men, 
     know.  
 
9  Yes, my brother, I know, 
The rest might not—but I have treasured every note, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
10  Listened, to keep, to sing—now translating the 
     notes, 
Following you, my brother. (“Word” 271-272) 
 
The speaker describes his possession, and in alternating, italicized stanzas, continuing 
until stanza 28, the bird’s song speaks through him. Yet these seventeen stanzas of 
ventriloquized bird-song repeat Romantic apostrophes, calling on the sun, the land, the 
stars, the night, among other natural objects. Thus Whitman confuses and conflates the 
conventions of Romantic address: the speaker overhears an isolated bird, the speaker is 
possessed by that bird and translates his song, and within that song the bird apostrophizes 
nature. Who is created; who is diminished? The confusion allows Whitman’s Poet to 
emerge. His retelling conflates the bird and the harp, isolation and possession, in order to 
position himself as a Poet who contains and resonates all modes of address. Whitman 
describes nature becoming a Poet and the Poet possessing nature; yet this becoming 
occurs through his singular voice. His innovative Poetic speaker collapses and expands 
Romantic conventions to encompass all speakers, possessors, and apostrophes in a new, 
unifying “I.” 
By stanza 28, the bird’s song ends, “The aria sinking, / All else continuing” 
(“Word” 275). Following the bird’s song it would appear that all poetic presences have 
been equalized; the bird, the boy, and a third presence, the sea, characterized as “fierce 
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old mother,” unite in “the colloquy there—the trio.” What emerges from this apparent 
union, however, is Whitman’s own poetic voice. Having contained the bird’s song and 
the old mother’s “incessant[]” moans and cries, the poetic voice emerges to name itself 
the “outsetting bard of love” (“Word” 275). Whitman repurposes Romantic conventions 
when he describes the moment of poetic awakening:  
29. Bird! (then said the boy's Soul,) 
Is it indeed toward your mate you sing? or is it 
     mostly to me? 
For I that was a child, my tongue's use sleeping, 
Now that I have heard you, 
Now in a moment I know what I am for—I awake, 
And already a thousand singers—a thousand songs, 
     clearer, louder, more sorrowful than yours, 
A thousand warbling echoes have started to life 
     within me, 
Never to die. (“Word” 275-276) 
 
The he-bird possesses the boy, awakening his own poetic powers, and the boy thus 
transmits its song among a thousand others. Instead of becoming a passive instrument for 
natural voices, he apostrophizes this possessor—“Bird!”—and incorporates him into his 
own subjectivity. In a reversal of the Eolian fiction, in which possession indicated 
submission, the speaker’s ability to attract these possessors asserts his self. He declares 
himself populated with “a thousand songs,” and this possession indicates his poetic 
autonomy, strengthening the “I” rather than diminishing it. The moment of the Poet’s 
awakening relies on a conflation of possession and self-enclosure: the apostrophe to that 
which possesses the boy results in self-possession, allowing him to expand “I” to channel 
not just one voice but thousands. 
Having established the poetic “I” and the birth of the Poet, Whitman begins the 
next stanza with emphatic, repetitive apostrophes. Because the Romantic apostrophe 
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enforces the constitution of the singular poetic speaker, it would make sense for Whitman 
to assert the birth of his Poet and fortify him through the enclosure of apostrophe. These 
apostrophes, however, address the possessing force and the speaker himself, continuing 
to confuse the distinction between Eolian population and apostrophic isolation: 
30. O throes! 
O you demon, singing by yourself—projecting me, 
O solitary me, listening—never more shall I cease 
     imitating, perpetuating you, 
Never more shall I escape, 
Never more shall the reverberations, 
Never more the cries of unsatisfied love be absent 
     from me, 
Never again leave me to be the peaceful child I was 
     before what there, in the night, 
By the sea, under the yellow and sagging moon, 
The dusky demon aroused—the fire, the sweet hell 
     within, 
The unknown want, the destiny of me. (“Word” 276) 
 
Later editions of Leaves of Grass remove the apostrophes in this section; by 1867 
Whitman eliminates the line “O throes!” and replaces “demon” with “singer.” “Demon” 
here may indicate an evil fiend, but the word also implies the sense in which a demon is a 
possessing, indwelling spirit. While Whitman might call this bird a demon, he again uses 
apostrophe to address that which possesses him, conflating apostrophe and possession in 
order to assert a self-possessed “I.” The speaker is “projected,” apostrophized by his 
possessor, and in turn the speaker apostrophizes his possessor, doubling the self-
constitution of Romantic apostrophe. Indeed, his repetition of “never” becomes not a 
negation but an assertion of his self.5 The next line takes these conventions to their 
breaking point by introducing an innovative “I.” Whitman’s remarkable apostrophe to 
himself, “O solitary me,” identifies him as both speaker and overhearer, while “never 
more shall I cease imitating, perpetuating you,” identifies him as the possessed and 
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possessing. Whitman has expanded address to act as both harp and bird, carving out a 
new “destiny” for “me,” or the Poetic “I.” While the harp’s possession would appear to 
diminish the speaker, and the self-enclosure of the bird would appear to shut out any 
possibility of poetic union, Whitman conflates the two to create an “I” that is both self-
possessed and capable of containing and connecting multiple voices. 
In the next stanza Whitman continues to intensify apostrophe but shifts the focus 
from that which is “projecting me” to the voices that the boy discovers he is capable of 
projecting. The recognition of this capacity marks the shift of poetic address from nature 
to people, accomplished through apostrophes that push beyond mere self-constitution to 
self-expansion. Section 31 repeats Romantic apostrophe to the point that its “O” nearly 
loses meaning: 
31. O give me some clew! 
O if I am to have so much, let me have more! 
O a word! O what is my destination? 
O I fear it is henceforth chaos! 
O how joys, dreads, convolutions, human shapes, and 
     all shapes, spring as from graves around me! 
O phantoms! you cover all the land, and all the sea! 
O I cannot see in the dimness whether you smile or 
     frown upon me; 
O vapor, a look, a word! O well-beloved! 
O you dear women's and men's phantoms! (“Word” 276) 
 
By the 1881-82 edition, this section contains only two apostrophes: “O give me the clew! 
(it lurks in the night here somewhere,) / O if I am to have so much, let me have more!” 
Their proliferation in the 1860 version emphasizes the incorporation of human forms in 
Whitman’s poetic address. Whitman begins with exclamations concerning disorientation, 
ending with his situation amidst women and men. The apostrophe no longer only 
constitutes the self in relation to a single natural object but constitutes the self in relation 
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to all things, “human shapes, and all shapes.” Because these figures are visible and 
audible, they may be addressed, accomplished through the apostrophes in this stanza. 
Now that the world is available to be addressed, it is available to be encompassed by 
Whitman’s voice, his “I” extended to unify all. As we saw in the stanza above, “never 
more shall the reverberations” cease through him; thus all will be sounded through his 
expanded and expansive “I.” 
“A Word Out of the Sea” charts the movement from Whitman’s possession by 
other voices to his self-possession, from a singular voice speaking through him to his 
ability to register and speak for multiple voices. The newfound ability to give voice to all 
voices that is this poem’s culmination indicates a new kind of Poet, one who is self-
possessed when he is possessed and who opens up when he apostrophizes others. “I” 
does not become a solitary, solipsistic figure; rather “I” embodies other voices and 
registers the silent ones. Whitman creates this “I” for the benefit of those who hear or 
read his voice; Whitman’s “I” intends to reach out to and join together all those “you’s” 
who exist in a divided nation. While “A Word Out of the Sea” shifted address from 
nature to people, the 1855 Leaves of Grass explores the import of that shift by 
concentrating on “you,” the addressee. I move backwards, from 1860 to 1855, because 
the instances exemplifying Whitman’s innovative Romantic address are not necessarily 
chronological. These discrete moments in his early works best illustrate where he 
specifically conflates Romantic tropes and expands the positions of “I” and “you.” Let us 
now examine how Whitman’s innovate “I” directly addresses “you” in order to teach her 
to become a Poet-President, because as such, she can join Whitman as an equal in his 
poetic union.  
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The 1855 Leaves of Grass renovates and reaches out to “you” in order to make 
the addressee more than a speaker-constituting apostrophe or the natural force possessing 
the poet. The work’s opening poem might suggest otherwise, however, with its focus on 
Whitman as the singular Poet. While it had no title in 1855, the poem becomes “Poem of 
Walt Whitman, An American” in 1856, then simply “Walt Whitman” in 1860 and “Song 
of Myself” in 1881. As these titles indicate, the focus on Whitman serves to position him 
as the representative man; in other words, a poem about Whitman is really a poem about 
us. Indeed, Whitman asserts this in his preface to the 1855 Leaves of Grass, adjusting the 
Romantic role of the Poet across time and place: “the American poets are to enclose old 
and new for America is the race of races. Of them a bard is to be commensurate with a 
people” (iv). While Whitman may emphasize his poetic prowess and exceptionality, he 
does so to assert and enforce the equality and fraternity that exists among all people. The 
poet “is the equalizer of his age and land,” and it is through his position as a Poet that 
Whitman is able to address and join “you” in a new union (Leaves iv). 
Through the focus on himself, the opening poem of Leaves of Grass exemplifies 
how Whitman revises Romantic understandings of “you” as an addressee and apostrophe. 
While “A Word Out of the Sea” offered an explanation of Whitman’s poetic awakening, 
the 1855 Leaves of Grass instructs “you” on how to achieve poetic awakening. Whitman 
teaches “you” how to become his “I,” making his addressees his poetic equals. Whitman 
wants all his readers to become Poets, bardic seers who can see, understand, and 
articulate anew in order to fulfill his democratic project. Whitman must reconceive “you” 
in the same way he reconceived the Romantic “I.” Once he teaches all these voices to 
become Poets like himself, all may be joined in one poetic union. Whitman’s “I” may 
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create a poetic union of all voices through his own voice, but as the great equalizer, 
Whitman must provide some guidance to “you” on how to “stand by my side and look in 
the mirror with me” (Leaves vii). No longer an address deflected through nature, nor an 
object that reflects the speaker, Whitman demonstrates that “you” can become his “I”; 
through Whitman’s voice “you” may address and possess nature, “you” may register and 
sound other voices, and thus “you” may join Whitman’s voice in poetic unison. His “I” 
will only be complete when “you” stands beside him as poetic equal; hence “you” is not 
to be subordinated but incorporated.  
The 1855 Leaves of Grass opens by reveling in the self-constitution and 
directness of the renovated Romantic address; Whitman jubilantly encourages us to join 
him, celebrating the equality inherent in each self: 
I CELEBRATE myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume, 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. (Leaves 13) 
 
Whitman begins by breaking the self-enclosure of the poem and the fantasy of its 
indifference to the reader. Rather than giving the “you” “the privileged intimacy of a 
voyeur,” Whitman changes the terms of this relationship by making it more equitable 
(Larson Drama 5). “You” is seized and appropriated into the making of one vast poetic 
union through the power of Whitman’s poetic voice. Larson explains that “by placing his 
auditors at the center stage of his verse, Whitman hopes to bring forward and actualize 
the movement from isolated individuality (‘the simple, separate person’) to affirmed 
unanimity (‘the word Democratic, the word En-Masse’) captured within the ‘common 
ground’ of the poem itself’” (Drama 6). The use of “assume,” whose Latin root sumere 
means to take into oneself or usurp, demonstrates the sense in which this poem adopts 
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“you” and incorporates its presence into Whitman’s voice. Now that he has adopted 
“you,” Whitman needs to educate his interlocutor on how to become a Poet and a self-
sufficient part of his universe. A few stanzas into the poem, Whitman lists the actions that 
“you shall” perform in order to “reckon the earth” and “get at the meaning of poems,” in 
other words, the abilities “you” needs in order to understand the vast connectedness of his 
poetic union: 
Stop this day and night with me and you shall possess the origin of all poems, 
You shall possess the good of the earth and sun . . . . there are millions of suns  
left, 
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand . . . . nor look through the 
     eyes of the dead . . . . nor feed on the spectres in books, 
You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things from me, 
You shall listen to all sides and filter them from yourself. (Leaves 14) 
 
The use of “shall” in the second person makes each clause a decree, a new rule for living 
that overlooks the will of the subject. However, Whitman deflates his prescriptive tone 
through a loose syntactical structure whose paratactical clauses model Whitman’s vision 
of equality. Romantic poetic possession returns here, but renovated so that Whitman 
makes “you” the possessor rather than the possessed. Whereas nature’s possession of the 
Poet’s voice generated the poem, now the Poet’s possession of nature, “the earth and the 
sun,” is “the origin of all poems.” Moving from personal poetic awakening to awakening 
the personal poetry of others, Whitman teaches us in this poem how to be a “you” that is 
neither apostrophized nor possessed. By becoming the Poet, “you” will create her own 
address, and hence her own self.  
After directly addressing “you” to teach her how to enter into his poetic union, 
Whitman moves his focus to himself as an example to invoke and inform the reader. 
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Whitman later names himself in the poem, not to set himself apart or as a solipsistic 
doubling, but to assert his equality and solidarity with the interlocutor: 
Walt Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, a kosmos, 
Disorderly fleshy and sensual . . . . eating drinking and breeding, 
No sentimentalist . . . . no stander above men and women or apart from them . . . .  
no more modest than immodest. (Leaves 29) 
 
Whether this confession of fleshiness and sensuality is intriguing or revolting, Whitman 
transforms exposure into equality. He plays on the form of “modest,” demonstrating that 
despite the “im-” prefix, these words are more synonyms than antonyms. Immodesty 
makes one modest; all are joined in their common fleshiness. Because exposure 
constitutes equality, he insists upon openness, indeed, getting rid of locks and doors. And 
yet in this open world of the poem, all returns “at last to me”:  
Unscrew the locks from the doors! 
Unscrew the doors themselves from their jambs! 
 
Whoever degrades another degrades me . . . . and whatever is done or said returns 
     at last to me, 
And whatever I do or say I also return. 
 
Through me the afflatus surging and surging . . . . through me the current and  
index. 
 
I speak the password primeval . . . . I give the sign of democracy; 
By God! I will accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the 
     same terms. (Leaves 29) 
 
Proclaiming his solidarity with “another” and insisting that he shares the “counterpart” of 
all personal and impersonal actions, Whitman appears to mimic Romantic address, 
invoking his “you” by ignoring her. However, Larson explains that “in Mill’s fictive 
contract,” “the supposed banishment of the reader from the poet’s consciousness here 
serves in fact to extend a tacit invitation to that reader . . . Access is predicated upon 
exclusion” (Drama 4). “You” is incorporated whether she is acknowledged or not. These 
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lines set up “counterpart[s]”—cycle and terminus, afflatus and speech, and implicitly, “I” 
and “you.” Rather than existing as discrete concepts, Whitman hosts them in himself, 
modeling their simultaneous individuality and connection. The sense of return and 
circularity makes Whitman the medium that everything passes through and lives within; 
he sacrifices his self to turn the “one” into his “kosmos,” his “I” into the interlocutor’s 
“you.” 
This poem moves from address to inclusion, that is, from the address of “you” as 
a separate presence to “you”’s incorporation into Whitman’s all-encompassing voice. 
Whitman has sacrificed his individuality to encompass multitudes while encouraging and 
equipping “you” to join his union by becoming her own Poet. He has equipped “you” 
with the ability to speak through his poetic voice, but, rather than allowing these voices to 
simply speak on their own, Whitman must speak for them. Whitman’s interaction with 
“you,” speaking to her and for her, comes off, in the words of Adela Pinch, as 
“impossibly, embarrassingly bossy” (91).6 Despite Whitman’s efforts to open himself to 
“you” in order to create equality, his poetic practice creates inequality because speaking 
for “you” is a form of oppression. Pinch points out that “once a poem stages an address to 
an actually existing person, that empirical person becomes virtualized – a ‘compost of 
Nullity’ if not of Dullity –, part of the fictive fabric of the poem” (93). “You” may not be 
consumed by the constitution of “I,” but “you” becomes part of the “I’s” fictional world. 
In other words, if Whitman addresses us, then we are conscripted into his vision of a 
universe. This address attenuates our autonomy rather than upholding and encouraging it, 
inasmuch as we speak through him and not for ourselves. Despite efforts to constitute a 
“you” who exists as Whitman’s equal, the autocratic act of addressing and speaking for 
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“you” incorporates it into a nation of Whitman’s making. While Whitman teaches us in 
this poem how to be a “you” who is neither apostrophized nor possessed, “you”’s 
autonomy is dependent on Whitman’s authority. Whitman’s “bossiness” is the only way 
he can ensure union, however; he may guarantee communion when he controls its 
creation. While this uniform absorption would appear a form of union, it lacks consensus 
and institutes hierarchy: Whitman is placed above and apart as the singular voice, vision, 
and being.  
Whitman may conflate and expand the parameters of Romantic address, and he 
may try to teach “you” how to be her own Poet, but in the effort to constitute a 
democratic union peopled with communicative Poets, he inevitably constitutes and 
privileges himself as the Poet President. We have reached the problem of Whitman’s 
revised Romantic address: Whitman may create a poetic union, but it does not achieve 
equality. All voices may deserve to be heard, but their sounding occurs through 
Whitman, and as a result, they emerge transformed: 
Through me many long dumb voices, 
Voices of the interminable generations of slaves, 
Voices of prostitutes and of deformed persons, 
Voices of the diseased and despairing, and of thieves and dwarfs, 
Voices of cycles of preparation and accretion, 
And of the threads that connect the stars—and of wombs, and of the fatherstuff, 
And of the rights of them the others are down upon, 
Of the trivial and flat and foolish and despised, 
Of fog in the air and beetles rolling balls of dung. 
 
Through me forbidden voices, 
Voices of sexes and lusts . . . . voices veiled, and I remove the veil, 
Voices indecent by me clarified and transfigured. (Leaves 29) 
 
Rather than the birds, winds, and natural objects of Romantic address, Whitman becomes 
the mediating force through which poetic selves are constituted. The loose structure of 
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this sentence emphasizes the autonomy of each phrase and each voice, outcasts that for 
“generations” have not had a social voice. But anaphora reduces individuality and turns 
the voices into repetitions, items in a list; the establishing phrase, “through me,” 
syntactically carries them back to Whitman as originator. Herein lies the problem of 
Whitman’s leveling or tallying; he achieves equality and individuality by constituting all 
people through himself. Whitman makes himself the ubiquitous material of his poetic 
universe. Although this list originates in Whitman, he tries to minimize the appearance of 
his authority by avoiding a main clause that also concludes in him, but the echo of 
“through me” maintains his authority throughout the list. While he highlights their 
existence, indicating that these are people and things worthy of speaking, he may only 
call attention to them by submitting them to his bardic voice. Whitman sounds these 
voices through himself and with some editorial power; he takes it upon himself to 
“clarif[y] and transfigur[e]” in order to reveal their equality. This unveiling returns us to 
the significance of this section, which combines Whitman’s stated name and the nameless 
figures, his speech and the “dumb” voices: Whitman cannot assert equality without at the 
same time setting himself apart. 
This poem concludes with Whitman returning to “you,” his readers. Having tried 
to expand his “I” to encompass all people within it, “I” appears to have reached its 
expansive breaking point, disintegrating into disembodied components. Whitman has 
been divvied up into the world, available to us in equal parts. His breakdown leaves us 
disoriented, yet reorientation and reconstitution serves to circumscribe us firmly within 
the world of Whitman’s making: 
I depart as air . . . . I shake my white locks at the runaway sun, 
I effuse my flesh in eddies and drift it in lacy jags. 
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I bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love, 
If you want me again look for me under your bootsoles. 
 
You will hardly know who I am or what I mean, 
But I shall be good health to you nevertheless, 
And filter and fibre your blood. 
 
Failing to fetch me at first keep encouraged, 
Missing me one place search another, 
I stop some where waiting for you (Leaves 56) 
 
These ending stanzas provide further instructions or guidance from the Poet to his 
readers. “You” “fail[s]” and “misse[s],” implying that we need Whitman’s guidance. 
Interestingly, Whitman increases his presence by describing its loss; we will not know 
what he is, what he means, or where to find him, but this is the best evidence of his being. 
“You” cannot seek out Whitman because he is ubiquitous; he is even in our blood. 
Indeed, the last line is missing a period; the poem never properly ends and Whitman 
never finishes talking. We are unified in a vast and democratic union, but Whitman 
places us in a nation of his making. He may sacrifice his body to host a nation, but we 
sacrifice our autonomy to his poetic authority. This experience comes to seem rather 
enclosed because it reveals its limitations—it is circumscribed by Whitman. The body of 
Whitman becomes a paradoxical figure: to embrace multitudes, it serves as a figure of 
enclosure. 
Robinson and Whitmanian Address 
Until now I have discussed address, and how Whitman receives and revises 
Romantic practices to create a Poet able to unify antebellum America with his 
authoritative and democratic powers. I would like to further extend the trajectory by 
tracing Romantic address through the end of the nineteenth century in the poetry of 
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Robinson. His poetry seems the precise opposite of Whitman’s, but as Alan Trachtenberg 
explains:  
If Whitman is a poet of ‘Myself,’ Robinson just as surely is a poet of many selves 
and many stories, stories of selves, or ‘others,’ witnessed from without. It’s of the 
witnessing and often the judging of lost souls and failed provincial lives that 
Robinson makes his best poems, foregrounding the act of storytelling within the 
story itself. Whitman sings; Robinson tells. 275  
 
When read not as a negation or extension of Whitman’s example, but a condensation of 
Whitman’s practices, we will see that Whitman and Robinson both employ Romantic 
address for the same goal of consensus and unity. Robinson read and at some point 
revered Whitman, including the poem “Walt Whitman,” in his first and second 
collections of poems. According to Trachtenberg, years after writing “Walt Whitman,” 
Robinson explained “I was very young when I wrote it, but I knew all the time I was 
writing that I didn’t really mean it” (qtd. in Trachtenberg 273). The fact that he does not 
choose “Walt Whitman” when he puts together his Pulitzer-Prize winning Collected 
Poems (1921) suggests that Whitman may have occupied a central place in his 
consciousness—a place he did not want to inhabit, a model he did not want to 
acknowledge. Despite this exclusion, Whitman’s example makes its mark on Robinson’s 
poetry, albeit in the reverse of Whitman’s expansiveness. Trachtenberg notes an aversion 
in Robinson, but does not realize that antipathy may be based on a shared poetic promise. 
Robinson’s poetry can be seen as attempting to solve a problem recognized in Whitman, 
one of democratic community and communication.  
While Trachtenberg argues that “between Whitman’s songs of the unfolding of 
selfhood and Robinson’s finely tempered investigations of point of view and tonal irony 
there lies little common ground,” I will demonstrate that there is quite a bit of common 
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ground between the two poets (275). Robinson posits a different solution to a shared 
problem. His poems may not appear to resemble Whitman’s, but his poetic impulse is the 
same; his works are an inversion or negative image of Whitman’s poetic practice but not 
his influence. Indeed, Robinson would disavow Whitman because Whitman’s poetry fails 
to achieve the communion that they both strive for. They experience the same problem in 
different historical conditions. While Whitman experienced the dissolution of the union 
and conflicts of the Civil War, Robinson experienced dissolution of his family and the 
conflicts of modernity. Scott Donaldson explains “during the terrible decade from 1888 
to 1898—as Win Robinson grew from an inexperienced youth to a mature man of nearly 
thirty—his family collapsed around him in a series of terrible misfortunes” (59). Within 
seven years, Robinson’s father and mother died (his mother devastatingly of diphtheria—
no one but her sons would bury her); his oldest brother, who Robinson adored, became a 
drug addict and then died of an overdose; his other brother married the woman Robinson 
loved, then squandered family fortune in the depression of 1893, died of alcoholism, and 
left the family destitute (Donaldson 59-72). As his family fell apart, Robinson’s poetry 
attempted to represent and rebuild those lost bonds. The inequalities of financial crisis, 
illness, and love inflected his works. Robinson’s life reveals these impressions in his 
famous self-depreciation and solitude.7 Robinson recognized in Whitman a poet who 
exposed a similar loss and desire, expanded to the national scale. 
 Robinson was well known and critically lauded for his long Arthurian narratives 
in the early twentieth century, as well as his shorter poems, many of which are character 
studies, eponymous pieces about a person or the poetic expression of that person. As 
such, they do not figure a strong Poet. While Whitman makes his Poet representative of 
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“the commonwealth,” Robinson moves in the opposite direction, creating poetic figures 
whose “I” does not presume to represent all people. Robinson’s works constitute a sort of 
“bad” Poet who represents his own limited and idiosyncratic viewpoint. He presents the 
“partial men” Emerson warned against, characters with limitations who discuss the 
limitations of others. Reading Robinson’s limited men as, indeed, limited charts another 
historical development of Romantic address at the turn of the century. Robinson takes on 
Whitman’s expanded address by condensing and confining the power of “I.” In doing so, 
Robinson confronts the problems of Whitmanian address. In a severe attempt to avoid 
imposing upon “you,” Robinson all but banishes the personal pronoun from his poems so 
that the “I” may not speak for it. While Whitman created unity by expanding his “I” to 
incorporate the addressee into his poetic voice, Robinson understands that while the 
poem is directed toward a “you,” it need not directly addresses “you” to constitute 
connection. Robinson does not resurrect Mill’s strategy of ignoring the reader to draw her 
closer, however; instead Robinson uses the absence of “you” to create union. To name 
“you” is always to distance her by acknowledging that she is separate from the “I”; to 
name “you” is always to consume or lose her to the constitution of the “I.” Robinson 
avoids “you” so that there are no distinctions or barriers between the participants in 
poetic address, an act that reflects back on Whitman’s practice. But because Robinson 
recognized the limitations of Whitmanian address, he radically reverses the assurance 
associated with the Poet. Robinson acknowledges the possibility that the Poet may fail: 
we may not hear him or understand him. Through this possibility Robinson offers the 
prospect of poetic union. The potential for failure voids the autocratic assumption and 
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assertion of the Poet. Robinson will ultimately prove that “we” can fulfill Whitman’s 
promise, but only in the face of his perceived failure. 
Whereas Whitman conflated and contained the bird and the harp, Robinson 
represents the failure of both modes of address to create democratic union. Robinson 
reiterates Whitman’s harp; his Poet registers multiple voices but stops them from 
speaking through him. Withholding these voices would appear to de-populate Whitman’s 
expansive renovation of Romantic address and constitute the ultimate act of Poetic 
autocracy. Robinson limits the voice of Whitman’s Eolian Poet, however, in order to 
ensure that the Poet never speaks for anyone else. While these voices exist mutely, they 
may exist autonomously, able to join with the Poet without being circumscribed by him. 
The possessed speaker sacrifices his self to host these other voices; Robinson recognizes 
that the Poet must become strange to himself, give up part of himself in order to ensure 
equality and unity. In addition, Robinson condenses Whitman’s expanded bird to create 
more democratic possibilities for Romantic address. While the bird’s song to itself 
rendered all address and apostrophe into the solitary and solipsistic “I,” Whitman 
expanded “I” to include and incorporate “you” by directly addressing and speaking for it. 
While union was created, equality was barred as the Poet set himself apart. Robinson’s 
poetry illustrates the dangers of speaking for “you.” His speaker does not address its 
interlocutor, but draws her in by believing in, not ignoring, the person out there listening. 
His poetic speakers understand that they are talking to “you,” another person, not to 
nature or themselves. Doing so allows us to draw closer of our own accord, instead of 
demanding or assuming it. 
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To illustrate Robinson’s revision of Whitman’s address, I will examine two 
poems that concern the tropes of the harp and the bird, beginning with the birth of the 
Poetic “I” and the trope of the harp in his poem “John Evereldown.” In “A Word Out of 
the Sea,” the boy’s possession gave birth to his self-possession and connection to all 
people; in “John Evereldown,” Robinson demonstrates that possession may create self-
estrangement and disconnection from others. As the possessed speaker, John does not 
directly address his possessor or allow the possessor to speak through him. Robinson 
pushes possession to a different possibility in which the speaker talks about the possessor 
instead of speaking to the possessor. This shift condenses Whitman’s expanded address 
because the speaker is de-populated and even made strange by naming and thus 
distancing the possessed part of himself. But this reduction serves to expand the 
democratic possibilities of the poem’s address. As John becomes increasingly estranged 
from himself and others, his ability to become an autocratic Poet diminishes. While John 
may not be able to speak directly to others or create union through his poetic voice, he 
sacrifices his autonomy to allow other voices to exist. Like the Poet’s sacrifice in Eolian 
poetics, John sacrifices communication and connection so that other voices may not be 
spoken for, so they may continue to exist in possibility. While “A Word Out of the Sea” 
depicted the “I’s” perfect communication and self-expansion, “John Evereldown” depicts 
the speaker’s miscommunication and self-delusion. Robinson illustrates how poetic 
failure, or the work of the bad Poet, may actually create uncoerced, democratic consensus 
and community; he risks failure in the spirit of Whitman’s poetic unity. 
Compared to “A Word Out of the Sea,” “John Evereldown” depicts a bizarre 
poetic awakening that could also be understood as insanity. John registers other voices, 
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but he does not address them back. Meanwhile this poem features a second speaker who 
addresses John, asking him questions that John does not adequately answer. The back-
and-forth question and answer places the poem in a ballad tradition, and “John 
Evereldown” echoes the popular “Edward” ballad from the popular Child collection.8 
While the traditional ballad “Edward” repeats the names “Edward, Edward” and “mither, 
mither,” and places the exchange between Edward and his mother within the same stanza, 
Robinson employs the longer name “John Evereldown” and separates the back-and-forth 
conversation into discrete stanzas. In the same way that “Edward” “linger[s]” through 
“repeated questions, repeated answers,” and “redundancy in the mother’s speech,” 
Robinson’s poem extends the action, repeating questions, answers, and names (Stewart 
“Possession” 42). Even the name “John Evereldown” possesses the residues of “Edward” 
in the soft “e” and hard “d” of “Evereldown.” Robinson’s engagement with this ballad 
demonstrates how he diminishes the autocratic power and presence of the Poet. The 
ballad tradition removes the Poet’s authorial presence by permitting its speaker to reveal 
interiority without the attendant poetic self-making or self-extension. MacEdward Leach, 
in The Ballad Book (1955), argues “an impersonal kind of I” speaks in the ballad (8). 
Leach calls the form “objective; the action is allowed to unfold of itself, without 
comment or expressed emotion of the author” (7). The ballad effaces the authority of the 
Poet, allowing the “I” to channel other voices that do not contribute to the constitution of 
selfhood but the constitution of community. Michael Cohen explains that “the socio-
political value of ballads derived from their association with the idealized oral cultures of 
imagined folk communities,” and Susan Stewart argues that “of all the singers of Western 
lyric, the ballad singer is the one most radically haunted by others, for he or she presents 
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the gestures, the symptoms, of a range of social actors” (Cohen “Whittier” 4) (Stewart 
“Possession” 41). Hence Robinson engages the form because it was both haunted by a 
community and independent of the power of the Poet to create that community. 
Robinson’s own “possession” by the ballad tradition strives to achieve the same 
consensus that Whitman desired.  
“John Evereldown” is likewise possessed or haunted by Whitman’s “A Word Out 
of the Sea.” It begins with a pair of dactyls, and this triple meter recurs throughout the 
poem. Like Whitman’s use of present participle verbs, Robinson begins this poem with 
the repetition of John’s “going” and “pointing” in a strange direction.9 Robinson replays 
Whitman’s poetic birth through John, who is possessed by the voices of others: 
 “WHERE are you going to-night, to-night,—  
 Where are you going, John Evereldown?  
There’s never the sign of a star in sight,  
 Nor a lamp that’s nearer than Tilbury Town.  
Why do you stare as a dead man might?      
Where are you pointing away from the light?  
And where are you going to-night, to-night,—  
 Where are you going, John Evereldown?”  
  
“Right through the forest, where none can see,  
 There’s where I’m going, to Tilbury Town.      
The men are asleep,—or awake, may be,—  
 But the women are calling John Evereldown.  
Ever and ever they call for me,  
And while they call can a man be free?  
So right through the forest, where none can see,      
 There’s where I’m going, to Tilbury Town.” (Collected 1-16) 
  
John does not speak back to the voices that speak to him, nor does he translate their song 
for the benefit of his interlocutor. John instead demonstrates where possession goes mute. 
Instead of possessing the possessor through direct address, John does not make them a 
part of his being. He lets other voices exist outside his self; John is incapable of 
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apostrophe. Robinson thus sets severe limits on the poetic speaker, but these limits should 
not be mistaken for Romantic self-enclosure. Whereas Whitman depicted the self-
possession and expansion of “I” due to its ability to register and channel other voices, no 
voice actually speaks through Robinson’s possessed speaker. Instead, he speaks about 
these other voices, removing the autocratic authorial function of the Poet. While “I” 
remains capable of being possessed, it is no longer capable of speaking for or being 
spoken through. This may diminish the communicative ability of Eolian address as 
demonstrated in this poem, but a more limited “I” maintains the potential union 
foreclosed by Whitman’s autocratic poet.  
Robinson pushes against the Poet who creates nations; instead “John Evereldown” 
creates neighborhoods. The figure of John is contingent on a human relationship that 
emerges from the first speaker. Because they address each other, they recognize and 
register each other; the address of the other constitutes their poetic being. Whereas 
Whitmanian address constitutes the “I” through direct address and incorporation of those 
possessors into the self, Robinson’s poetic speakers emerge from recognition, not 
consumption—not a taking in or talking through, but a recognition of and talking to. 
William Waters explains: 
Every coherent utterance aligns itself to, is coherent with respect to, some 
conception of its intelligibility, and intelligibility means uptake, receivability. 
Even self-address is modeled, as the term itself shows, on address in the more 
general sense . . . [address] is the fiber of language’s use and being, inseparable 
from every word in every sentence. 5 
  
Robinson revises the self-making of Whitman’s address; John and the unnamed speaker 
both rely on each other’s presence to constitute their own. Rather than “you” possessing 
“I” or “I” possessing and upholding “you,” Robinson demonstrates that all poetic 
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presences have a turn to be “I,” and that “I” only exists with the participation of another. 
John’s recognition of the women extends this example to include all the voices that do 
not get a chance to speak. He believes in them, and in registering their voices, he gives 
them a chance to speak back. In this way, Robinson’s speakers imply their interlocutor. 
While it is explicit in this poem that the speakers address each other, other poems exist 
because they believe in “uptake, receivability” by another without having or name her or 
channel her voice. 
Despite this connection between John, his neighbor, and the women, Robinson 
does not depict a perfect union in this poem. Unlike Whitman’s nations, Robinson’s 
neighborhoods appear to create relationships of disconnect and disbelief. This 
relationship between John and the other speaker is problematic; meanwhile John heeds a 
bond that could be a total fantasy. Yet, undeterred by its strained and strange 
relationships, “John Evereldown” rearticulates a Whitmanian longing for connection. 
This poem depicts the call to community, the desire to be desired. John wants to go to 
those who want him; he is called and he wants to respond: 
“But why are you going so late, so late,—  
 Why are you going, John Evereldown?  
Though the road be smooth and the way be straight,  
 There are two long leagues to Tilbury Town.      
Come in by the fire, old man, and wait!  
Why do you chatter out there by the gate?  
And why are you going so late, so late,—  
 Why are you going, John Evereldown?”  
  
“I follow the women wherever they call,—      
 That’s why I’m going to Tilbury Town.  
God knows if I pray to be done with it all,  
 But God is no friend to John Evereldown.  
So the clouds may come and the rain may fall,  
The shadows may creep and the dead men crawl,—      
But I follow the women wherever they call,  
 ! 101!
And that’s why I’m going to Tilbury Town.” (Collected 17-32) 
 
The first speaker continues to pepper John with questions and John does not notice, or if 
he does notice, he ignores the tone of concern (and irritation). Instead, John heeds an urge 
that is most likely a total fantasy. Proximity does not create intimacy between John and 
his neighbor; John’s loyalty to the distant women grows stronger over the course of the 
conversation as he describes his strange burden. The very human connections that poetry 
tries to revive are inadvertently overlooked due to an absorbing and obscuring “call.” The 
possessed, poetic “I” is not the vehicle of perfect communication; in fact “I” holds the 
potential to be misunderstood, to miss its mark. But this failure creates a different kind of 
communicative and communal space for John. John is not representative, and because he 
fails to express or represent ideas or feelings that others can easily understand, he leaves 
open the space for other voices, other selves to exist. His failure to communicate ensures 
that he cannot speak for anyone. John may not be teaching others through his example; 
nevertheless he reflects the desire for community. 
Despite this desire, Robinson recognizes that unity does not necessarily constitute 
democracy. While “John Evereldown” depicts fragmented people and the longing for 
community, the poem “Richard Cory” demonstrates that community may not entail the 
democracy and equality promised in Whitmanian poetics. This poem rearticulates the 
trope of the bird, as Robinson warns that a union may constitute and enclose itself at the 
expense of others. In this poem, a poetic speaker refers to itself as “we” and represents 
the voices of a community. “We” discusses the one, Richard Cory, for the benefit of an 
unnamed, rather than ignored, interlocutor. In other words, Robinson reimagines 
Whitman’s expansion of the bird trope, exchanging Whitman’s unified “me” for “we.” 
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“We” promises the unified voice of many, but, like the solitary bird, this voice speaks to 
constitute itself. The many may join together because they address a single other, creating 
a circumscribed, exclusionary speaker. While Whitman speaks for “you” in Leaves of 
Grass in order to join it with his “I,” Robinson shifts these pronouns in “Richard Cory” 
so that “we” speaks for “he,” demonstrating that the subject of the poetic address—be it 
“you” or “he”—nevertheless exists to constitute the speaker. “We” and “he” show that 
the ideal unity of Whitman’s “I” and “you” may still result in bird-like self-enclosure and 
exclusion. 
“We” presumes to speak for others, but in the process demonstrates the 
destructive bossiness of assumption. In the poem’s opening stanzas, Robinson blurs the 
line between Whitman’s all-knowing, ideal Poet and the everyday, neighborhood gossip: 
 Whenever Richard Cory went down town, 
 We people on the pavement looked at him: 
 He was a gentleman from soul to crown, 
 Clean favored, and imperially slim. (Collected 1-4) 
 
Paronomasia in this stanza—“crown” and “imperially,” and the sonic similarity between 
“soul” and sole—intensifies Cory’s nobility, in contrast to “Walt Whitman’s” immodesty 
in Leaves of Grass. Whitman’s coarseness and his professed impatience for hierarchy 
(“By God! I will accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the same 
terms”) were meant to assert his equality in order to foster unity with readers (Leaves 29). 
“Richard Cory” fosters community in the same way: “we people” are equal, (im)modest, 
and join together in their common awe of Cory. “We people” echoes the inclusiveness of 
the U.S. Constitution’s “we the people,” but this equality only exists in relation to the 
excluded Cory. The creation of community occurs by setting Cory apart, and Robinson 
echoes Whitman’s inadvertent creation of hierarchy when he sets himself apart as the 
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bardic seer. Robinson rearticulates Whitman’s poetics in which the equality of those 
addressed results from the Poet’s exceptional powers. “We people” may come together 
on equal terms only by declaring someone else unequal. The speaker may appear to 
praise and admire, but this stanza evinces the crowd’s ability to make themselves 
exclusive by discussing Corey’s exclusivity.  
Cory’s wealth and grace make him a figure of envy and admiration. By 
responding to the elegant Cory with awe, the community effectively objectifies him, like 
the bird apostrophizing to nature to constitute his self. While Whitman’s “I” assumed and 
spoke for “you,” “we” likewise assumes and speaks for “he” to further establish their 
identity: 
And he was always quietly arrayed,  
And he was always human when he talked; 
But still he fluttered pulses when he said,  
“Good-morning,” and he glittered when he walked. 
 
And he was rich—yes, richer than a king— 
And admirably schooled in every grace: 
In fine, we thought that he was everything 
To make us wish that we were in his place. (Collected 5-12) 
 
In their admiration of Cory, the community estranges this man rather than including him. 
They react but do not interact; very familiar with Cory’s exterior, they know nothing of 
his interior. The poem’s iambic pentameter and abab rhyme scheme sets up a nearly 
mechanical meter whose regularity and perfection parallels Cory’s exhibited regularity 
and perfection. This mechanical indifference reflects the actions of the townspeople and 
their routinized conception and treatment of Cory. “We” presumes that Cory has a perfect 
life, that his riches and nobility are evidence of his enviable happiness. This collective 
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thinking demonstrates the tyranny of the mass, a reversal that speaks to Whitman’s 
poetics. Robinson demonstrates that even the demos can act as the assumptive autocrat.  
Cory is never afforded the opportunity to speak for himself; “we” speaks for Cory 
and this figuration possesses fatal limitations. While “we” may constitute a community 
by the example of Cory, Robinson’s poetry teaches us that we cannot go so far as to 
assume to speak for another. Echoing Whitman’s well-meaning act of assumption—
“what I assume you shall assume”—Robinson demonstrates the dangers of assuming 
something about other voices or lives; assumption creates isolation, even destruction: 
So on we worked, and waited for the light, 
And went without the meat, and cursed the bread; 
And Richard Cory, one calm summer night,  
Went home and put a bullet through his head. (Collected 13-16) 
   
Robinson tells a well-known story here; that we should not covet our neighbor’s wealth 
because riches and social status do not bring happiness. However, poetry traditionally 
claims the privilege of intimacy, as demonstrated by Whitman’s (im)modesty. But 
Robinson warns what happens when the speaker assumes intimacy, when the speaker 
speaks for, not to or with the figured other. This poem points out that Whitman’s Poet has 
the potential to destroy others by speaking for them. Even with Whitman’s 
advancements, there is something tyrannical in Romantic address. The ideal of a unified 
poetic speaker, represented by “we,” becomes as solipsistic and autocratic as the bird 
who sings to herself and apostrophizes to others for her own self-creation. Through 
address, the speaker inevitably holds itself apart and above that which it names. Indeed, 
Maslan makes this point:  
 . . . many individuals and groups thus achieve unity with one another not by 
themselves but only through Whitman’s identification with all of them. And this, 
in turn, means that the poet is not just another of the people presented in the 
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passage; in his capacity to unite an otherwise heterogeneous collection of people 
into a tableau of the People, he is actually unique among those with whom he 
identifies. 113  
 
Robinson’s “we people” performs this in reverse: a “heterogeneous collection of people” 
become “a tableau” by singling out one other. As a result, community is created; 
inclusion is possible through exclusion. Hence “I” or “we” falls back into self-enclosure, 
repeating the circumscription of Whitman’s address. “Richard Cory” deflates Whitman’s 
extension of Romantic poetics, moving from an expansive, all-encompassing “I” who 
unifies itself with “you” to a self-enclosed “we” who excludes and avoids “he.”  
Addressing Whitman 
By meditating on the problem of reception raised in “John Evereldown,” 
Robinson reflects on problems of poetic address that Whitman never considers. What if 
no one hears the Poet’s voice? What if we cannot comprehend what he says? How then 
will there be poetic unity? In “Richard Cory,” Robinson approaches the problem from 
another position: those whom the Poet addresses and channels, those “you’s” and “dumb 
voices” Whitman wants to incorporate into his poetic voice. Once unified, however, will 
they create the equality Whitman hoped to instill? While Robinson’s poetry tries to 
uphold the promise of Whitman’s example, allowing all people a chance to speak, he 
examines the potential for Whitman’s instruction to fail. His speakers’ limitations imply 
that Whitman’s expansive “I” and “you” are not tenable at the turn of the century.  
But Robinson does try to expand on the promise of Whitman’s poetics instead of 
just revealing its problems. Whitman is Robinson’s great Poet, and his poems recognize 
the need for a single bardic leader to create union. At the same time, Robinson attempts 
to revise Whitman’s union in the effort to eliminate authority and make genuine 
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consensus possible. “Walt Whitman,” the poem that Robinson rejects from his collected 
works, perhaps best illustrates not just the meaning of Whitman to Robinson, but the 
inheritance and reconfiguration of poetic authority and democracy through Romantic 
address. The poem never directly articulates its purpose or acknowledges its subject; 
instead it addresses the failed products of Whitman’s poetics, those who cannot read, 
hear, or understand. In other words, “Walt Whitman” begins by deflating Whitman’s 
heroic project: 
The master-songs are ended, and the man 
That sang them is a name. And so is God 
A name; and so is love, and life, and death, 
And everything. But we, who are too blind 
To read what we have written, or what faith 
Has written for us, do not understand: 
We only blink, and wonder. (Torrent 1-7) 
 
The poem is composed of three stanzas in blank verse. The final line of each stanza 
flattens the meter’s association with heroism by featuring three iambs instead of five and 
a leftover, weak beat. This poem, and in a sense, all of Robinson’s character studies, 
concern how “we” have bungled Whitman’s promise. Because we did not hear or heed 
his voice, we become “blind” or unperceptive.  
Whitman’s “I” and “you” are no longer feasible; they are too big, too open, too 
generous, and too demanding. Thus, Whitman by the 1890s is “drained” (Trachtenberg 
271). He is turned into a name, no different than other self-constituting forces that we 
have similarly deflated: God, love, life, death. Whitman’s unsustainable “afflatus” could 
not keep these forces afloat and we no longer know how to read, hear, or understand 
them. In other words, he no longer possesses us with his voice: 
Last night it was the song that was the man, 
But now it is the man that is the song. 
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We do not hear him very much to-day: 
His piercing and eternal cadence rings 
Too pure for us --- too powerfully pure, 
Too lovingly triumphant, and too large; 
But there are some that hear him, and they know 
That he shall sing to-morrow for all men, 
And that all time shall listen. (Torrent 8-16) 
 
“Last night” Whitman was a man made up of his songs; they possessed him and spoke 
through him. But now, in a reversal of the Eolian harp, Whitman speaks through the 
songs. He haunts them, possesses them: they are all that is left of him.  
Whitman now speaks through his songs instead of attracting and articulating all 
songs, all voices through his self, yet this reversal creates a space for a more democratic 
address, one that does not rely on the singular, special Poet. There are “some” who are 
capable of hearing Whitman’s voice; they are possessed with this special ability. These 
few register these songs, these remnants of Whitman’s voice, and know what they mean 
for the future. Whitman will once again “sing” “for all men” because those few who hear 
him reconstitute his voice and his poetic possibility. “We,” or at least some of us, make 
possible the Poet. In other words, the listener upholds the speaker; “you” must register 
“I” in order for “I” to exist. We must hear the speaker, not just be addressed by him, 
because otherwise he does not speak. “We” in this poem simultaneously occupies the 
roles of speaker and interlocutor, “I” and “you,” and by making “we” listen and speak, 
Robinson collapses and revises the positions of poetic address. 
Robinson revises address in a poem about Whitman in order to re-vision a 
democratic poetics. While Whitman no longer possesses us with his voice, we can act 
like his Eolian Poet, hearing voices and redeploying them. Many may be too blind or 
insensible to comprehend, but Robinson points out the important possibility of those who 
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are capable. By leaving open the possibility of those who can hear, by not apostrophizing 
or addressing them by type or name, Robinson gestures to the possibility of an uncoerced, 
unassumed consensus and resurrects Whitman as an unauthoritarian Poet. “We” does not 
mandate that we all hear Whitman’s songs; “we” does not grasp the “some that hear him” 
in direct address. The poem fosters the possibility of artistic leadership where all have 
potential to speak and hear. 
The end of the poem revises the assessment of the first stanza: 
The master-songs are ended? Rather say 
No songs are ended that are ever sung, 
And that no names are dead names. When we write 
Men's letters on proud marble or on sand, 
We write them there forever. (Torrent 17-21) 
 
Names are not dead and songs are not ended: nothing sung, named, or written ever really 
goes away. Whitman inspires in Robinson a sort of poetic faith, that despite the 
limitations of address, despite its great possibility for failure, consensus and connection 
are possible. We will still keep communicating, even when that communication seems 
barred or impossible. Remaining open to the residues of other voices, and acknowledging 
the possibility that they might go unheard and unread, Robinson revises Romantic 
address to eliminate its self-enclosure. For poetry at the turn of the century, address was 
possible only when its failure, its fading, remained a possibility.  
In order to further explore this failure, the next chapter will examine how gender 
inflected the impossibility of the self-enclosed and self-possessed lyric subject. While 
Robinson revealed how lyric address could not constitute self-enclosure, Frances Sargent 
Osgood and Edna St. Vincent Millay revealed that this self-enclosure was always already 
denied to female poets across the nineteenth century. Their works in the poetess tradition 
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exploited the paradox of self-enclosure in a medium that relied on address to constitute 
the self. 
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1Adela Pinch explains that “overhearing, eavesdropping, and voyeurism become the 
conditions of confidence, and intimacy is the enemy of knowledge” (103). 
 
2See Maslan, note 40, p. 194. Joan Shelley Rubin explains “In 1842, the 23-year-old Walt 
Whitman heard Emerson deliver the lyceum lecture on poetry that Emerson later adapted 
for publication as ‘The Poet’” (20). 
 
3See Richards “Poe’s Lyrical Media,” 25-26, for a brief discussion of Howard Nelson’s 
recent essay that links this poem back to Whitman’s adolescence.  
 
4Leaves of Grass (1860). All quotations of Whitman’s poetry come from the online Walt 
Whitman Archive, Ed Folsom and Kenneth M. Price, editors. Since the archive 
reproduces the poems as they appeared in the print editions of Whitman’s works, I will 
cite them as they were originally printed with page and/or stanza number, rather than line 
numbers. 
 
5The echoes of Poe’s raven should not be overlooked here. See Richards, who argues 
“just as the bereaved lover in ‘The Raven’ makes his story from the raven’s nevermore, 
Whitman’s speaker characterizes himself as a ‘projection’ of Poe’s poem” (“Poe’s 
Lyrical Media” 28). 
 
6Pinch is not specifically referring to Whitman here, but Culler’s essay “Apostrophe.” 
 
7In typical, self-depreciating tone, Robinson comments that “if [he] ha[s] a message”: 
If it is likely to be of any great value to the race, I suppose that a part of it might 
be described as a faint hope of making a few of us understand our fellow creates a 
little better, and to realize what a small difference there is after all between 
ourselves as we are and ourselves not only as we might have been if our physical 
and temperamental make-up and out environment had been a little different.  
From William Stanley Braithwaite, “America’s Foremost Poet,” in the Boston Evening 
Transcript, May 28, 1913, found in Cary 122. 
 
8See Stewart, “Lyric Possession” 41-43. 
 
9For more on Whitman’s “-ing” endings, see Richards “Poe’s Lyrical Media,” 25, and 
Larson, Drama, 188. 
CHAPTER 3 
EDNA ST. VINCENT MILLAY AND THE POETESS TRADITION 
In the next two chapters, I move from productions of the liberal self to poets who 
were socially denied its status. Whereas Walt Whitman and Edwin Arlington Robinson 
explored lyric self-possession through the trope of Eolian poet, this chapter considers 
what happened when women poets took on that role. Women poets across the nineteenth 
century had to contend with the expectation that they were already harps that could not 
help but profess perfect privacy to the public. While figures such as Whitman and 
Robinson were socially deemed capable of self-possession and could thus employ lyric 
address to expand the boundaries of self-enclosure, women were not granted this same 
subjectivity. In fact, the very self-profession that constituted self-possession for male 
poets constituted dispossession and exposure for female poets, rendering their self-
enclosure impossible. Just as Robinson conserved nineteenth-century poetic forms, Edna 
St. Vincent Millay conserved the practices of Frances Sargent Osgood’s poetess poetry 
well into the twentieth century to reveal how the self-possession that private profession 
supposedly conferred was a fiction for both men and women. 
It is taken for granted today that Millay’s poetry detailed the sexual and social 
liberation of the modern woman. But why, critics ask, does she represent the emergence 
of modernity in such distinctly un-modern poetic forms? While the work of her female 
contemporaries, such as H. D. and Marianne Moore, distances itself from the nineteenth-
century conventions of the genre, the majority of Millay’s poetry evoked them; her work 
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was conservative in the sense that she conserved past traditions. A number of critics, 
among them Robert Johnson and Jane Stanbrough, have attempted to make sense of the 
apparently problematic opposition between her subversive ethos and her traditional 
forms. They have thus concluded that Millay exercises a healthy poetic restraint, 
containing modern emotional unruliness and vulnerability within self-imposed and 
protective formal limitations.1 Millay’s poetic self-discipline assuaged and explained the 
conflict between innovative content and conventional form. 
I want to suggest that such an approach insists upon a conflict where none exists. 
Millay’s conservative forms communicate rather than confine a modernist affect and 
intuition. She taps into a poetic tradition that has always expressed emotional insight 
through conservative poetic conventions. Her poetic restraint derives from her literary 
lineage as a practitioner of the poetess tradition, which emerged in eighteenth-century 
England, achieved immense popularity in the nineteenth-century United States, and 
persisted, as Millay demonstrates, within twentieth-century modernism. In this essay I 
situate Millay’s early poetry collections, Renascence and Other Poems and A Few Figs 
from Thistles, within the tradition of antebellum American poetess poetry. In doing so, I 
engage many of the interpretive challenges this tradition has incurred, most notably the 
conflation of the woman poet with her poem.2 The poetess was published and popular in 
the nineteenth century because she appeared to offer her own private thoughts to a 
reading public. This profession constituted both the poetess’s allure and her greatest 
difficulty, however. Her poems had to convincingly communicate to readers the personal 
thoughts and feelings of a woman who was moral, sincere, and idealized. In other words, 
the poetess publicly performed her privacy, which ultimately rendered her consumable 
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and forgettable because she relinquished the interiority that would otherwise establish her 
as an abiding, autonomous literary figure.3 This vexed poetess tradition inflects Millay’s 
modernism; she redeploys the faulty expectation that women poets profess privacy in 
order to disrupt the ideal intimacy associated with women’s poetry. 
While scholars have recovered and analyzed poetess poetry from the nineteenth-
century United States, the lasting influence of this poetic tradition on later works has not 
yet been established. It is time to start drawing lines from the nineteenth-century poetess 
onward. In “The Poet as Poetess,” Virginia Jackson addresses the difficulty of studying 
this literary figure. As a “trope in a rather pure sense, as definite and slippery as a turn of 
phrase, the trope of the Poetess worked differently at different moments over the course 
of the nineteenth century” (57). In this essay I offer a historical solution to the problem 
that Jackson identifies: the practice of ahistorically idealizing the poetess “as a hologram 
of readerly desire” (Jackson “Poetess” 54). By investigating shifting notions of women’s 
poetic privacy, I trace historical iterations of the poetess in order to draw her beyond the 
nineteenth-century and into the modernist period. By overtly writing within the poetess 
tradition, Millay, more than other comparable women modernists, made explicit the 
problems of private female expression in the early twentieth-century. She highlighted and 
reclaimed the woman poet’s specific inheritance in her conservative approach to 
modernist quandaries. In a sense, American modernism was underpinned by the poetess’s 
problematic privacy.4 An awareness of people’s alienation despite urban proximity and 
the question of personified versus objectified private emotion as a potential means of re-
connection led modern poets to examine the authenticity and feasibility of interiority and 
to question the existence of actual privacy. By the twentieth century, the woman poet’s 
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problems with privacy were blended or dissolved amid the larger investigations of the 
movement. Where other modernists employed innovative practices to investigate the line 
between the inner self and external world, Millay depicted an alternative mode of 
modernist inquiry that engaged a tradition consumed and created by public figurations of 
interiority and the ideal of privacy. In a period noted for its artistic experimentation, she 
attested to the presence and relevance of this conservative practice. By mobilizing the 
poetess to confront the problem of modern selves and souls, Millay unveiled the problem 
that faced the woman poet: the impossible and self-diminishing practice of professing 
privacy. 
Consider Millay’s poem “The Penitent,” which characterizes a freewheeling 
femme’s failed attempt at self-revision according to traditional propriety. Here she 
depicts a girl seeking seclusion in order to trouble the relationship between privacy and 
ideal womanhood. The poem thus undercuts the ethical soul-baring associated with 
women’s public poetry. The speaker “had a little Sorrow / Born of a little Sin,” and she 
mandates that she, along with Sorrow and Sin, will atone for being “bad” (lines 1-2, 8). 
She therefore shuts herself up with them in “a room all damp with gloom” to work on 
“pious planning” (3, 9). But Sorrow will “not weep,” Sin simply “go[es] to sleep,” and 
the speaker cannot keep her “graceless mind” on the task of saving her “soul” (13, 14, 16, 
15). In the final stanza, she surrenders to wickedness: 
So up I got in anger, 
And took a book I had, 
And put a ribbon on my hair 
To please a passing lad, 
And, “One thing there’s no getting by— 
I’ve been a wicked girl,” said I; 
“But if I can’t be sorry, why, 
I might as well be glad!” (17-24)5 
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The speaker performs the role of the poetess by professing personal conflict in terms of 
ideal feminine morality, which she resolves to restore in the privacy of her room. Rather 
than purge impropriety, this exercise renders the speaker a “wicked girl,” a shifting, 
fickle female, as demonstrated by the tiny tantrum at the poem’s end. The conflict 
between the speaker’s inherited ideals about moral femininity—the expectation that 
privacy will rectify the components of her self—and the reality of her public, provocative 
persona cannot constitute any sustaining “soul.” Such a problem of inner moral integrity 
emerges because the speaker, as a poetess, was always already public: She was available 
for and constructed according to adoring observers and readers. The speaker shows that a 
sincere, sustaining spirit is bound to fail when constituted by public expectations of 
feminine privacy and propriety. 
The fantasy of women’s privacy that Millay exploits in this poem has its roots in 
the nineteenth-century poetess. Thus, I begin this essay with a discussion of the work of 
Osgood, whose poetry modeled the conventions of the poetess tradition while 
simultaneously addressing that figure’s paradoxical and problematic privacy. Her 
seemingly private poetry gave readers what they wanted: the pious, pure woman 
combined with the coy, sexy sprite. However, Osgood attested to the poetess’s complete 
consumability; she could not establish herself as a literary presence because she had to 
sell or offer up her so-called spirit in order to be published. I then map Osgood’s example 
onto twentieth-century women poets who inherited the expectation that they would 
profess intimacy and sincerity, examining Millay’s early work in order to illuminate how 
ideal privacy was taken up and adapted to a modern environment. Echoing Osgood’s 
flirty, fanciful, and clever female personae, Millay purposefully made murky the 
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emotional objectivity of modernism in order to trouble the sanctity of the woman poet’s 
privacy. By performing the private self, Millay revealed that the public profession of 
privacy was a fantasy. She illustrated the emptiness of personal expression in a genre that 
staked itself on being a public presentation of the private. 
Osgood, the Home, and the Spirit 
Poetess poetry has been a highly popular genre because it has been understood to 
express women’s private thoughts; it provided imaginary public access to a poet’s 
idealized interior, and therefore to her presumably inviolable and pure soul or spirit. 
Critical concern with the term “poetess” has focused on this collapse between poet and 
poem. While I concur with Paula Bernat Bennett’s suggestion that it might “be more 
accurate as well as less confusing to speak of Poetess poems or Poetess thematics, rather 
than of Poetesses per se,” the association of public women’s poetry with the fictional 
poetess figure means that a strict distinction between the empirical author and imagined 
poetess persona is difficult to maintain (“Was Sigourney a Poetess?” 270). In this section, 
I will explore how Osgood and Millay understood the equation of a female poet’s 
interiority with the content of her poetry in order to add nuance to “poetess” as a term and 
as a tradition. 
Scholars argue that the figure of the poetess validated an ideal of nineteenth-
century womanhood that granted some women an inborn and insular piety, purity, and 
morality. According to Eliza Richards, “women were imagined to be receptacles of 
emotion untainted by worldly concerns”; antebellum women who wrote poetry therefore 
“were portrayed as fonts of unmediated emotion . . . Their poems were cast as identical 
offspring, incarnations of the poetess’ intimate feelings” (16). However, what some 
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scholars have labeled as “true womanhood” was neither a reality for antebellum women 
nor a stable literary trope.6 By collapsing the real and ideal, the poetess both performed 
the true woman and simultaneously called attention to the figure’s impossibility and 
unreality. Because she supposedly allowed readers access to an emotional and physical 
interior, the poetess afforded a glimpse inside herself that was often perceived as erotic. 
But because the poetess was understood to profess purity, the erotic charge she allowed 
could be seen to derive from innocent, accidental exposure. 
Ostensibly hiding nothing, the nineteenth-century poetess was an utterly open and 
consumable figure, the product of a literary marketplace. By serving as this public figure 
for privacy, the poetess ironically retained no privacy for herself. Antebellum culture 
expected a public person to have a private side: “[N]ineteenth-century self-definitions . . . 
locate the individual in his or her interiority, in his or her removal from the marketplace” 
(Brown 3). While female identity was equated with private and domestic development, 
male identity was established and nurtured in private but extended into the public sphere. 
Men’s publicity hinted at their private side; even in revealing their souls, men were 
always able to give the impression of reserving some essential self. Meanwhile, any hint 
of concealment in the poetess indicated her personal deceit and corruption, so she created 
the impression of transparency in order to be published. Rather than possess an interior, 
the poetess had to perform it with sufficient sincerity to suggest that she was not solely 
acting. But since a concealed core was necessary in the construction of antebellum 
autonomy, these women poets never became memorable authorial presences like some of 
their male contemporaries. The poetess was popular and generic, transient and 
forgettable. This problem was not limited to the poetesses’ heyday, however. Privacy was 
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a gendered poetic practice with different historical iterations that continued to burden 
later public women poets such as Millay. Antebellum understandings of the poetess and 
her transparent soul supplied the preconditions for the twentieth-century women poets 
who were expected to offer access to their private selves in order to have a public poetic 
presence. 
The poetess’s problem with privacy encompassed both her projected emotional 
interior and the physical interiors she inhabited; in other words, women’s privacy was 
articulated through tropes of the private sphere, or the home.7 The home was 
characterized as a private realm of protection and refuge, removed from public exposure 
and economic exchange. However, antebellum figurations of the domestic actually 
indicated a larger reciprocity between the public and private, despite the superficial 
separation of the two. Private life had very public effects. The domestic was defined by 
public, nationalist, and gendered ideologies that infiltrated and influenced an individual’s 
concept of interiority. Despite the cultural values associated with and within the home, 
women lacked a perfectly private space even within the ostensible realm of the private. 
Milette Shamir argues, “What the records of domesticity often reveal . . . are the 
psychological pressures brewing within middle-class women, who did not have at their 
disposal such backstage areas, ironically, at the very moment when they were figured as 
icons of privacy” (41). This notion of a “backstage” is especially pertinent for the 
poetess, who performed a public persona of privacy. The antebellum woman may have 
had no backstage in her domestic life, but the poetess purposefully constructed a 
backstage for public exposure. 
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Poetic representations of the home attested to antebellum women’s paradoxical 
lack of privacy while serving as an apt analogy for the poetess’s dilemma. Women poets 
such as Osgood created a relationship between the domestic woman and the poetess, 
demonstrating how women’s problems mapped onto poetic practices. Osgood depicts the 
problems with privacy in her 1850 poem “‘Happy at Home,’” in which a female speaker 
proclaims the virtues of the home but registers the psychic burden of a life with no 
backstage. The poetic speaker creates a removed, satisfying, domestic space for everyone 
in her life but herself: 
At home! oh, how thrillingly sweet is that word! 
And by it what visions of beauty are stirr'd! 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
One bright little room where the children may play, 
Unfearful of spoiling the costly array; 
Where he, too—our dearest of all on the earth, 
May find the sweet welcome he loves at his hearth[.] (Poems 11-12, 21-24) 
 
There is a space in the home for not only children, but also the husband and father, who is 
referred to solely by the pronoun “he.” The term “welcome” suggests that “he” has been 
outside the home and returns looking for relief. The husband has his “sweet” spot, the 
hearth with “[t]he fire blazing warmly—the sofa drawn nigh” (25), but the second 
meaning of “hearth” as a metonym for the home denotes the entire interior as the 
husband’s domain. Thus the home is a space that nourishes everyone but the speaker, 
whose own body and own space are never mentioned. She proffers her backstage so her 
family members can create theirs, paralleling the poetess’s practice. Osgood renders the 
inside of the home the same as the inside of the speaker; she is available to all who 
enter—or all who read—this paradoxical private sphere. 
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In order to criticize this practice of domestic self-sacrifice, Osgood undercuts the 
sanctity of the home through metrical and formal conventions. She employs anapests, 
typically associated with the limerick, and end-stopped tetrameter couplets, typically 
associated with comedy or satire, in an argument about the superiority of home, 
suggesting that the speaker’s assertion is a big joke. Each stanza ends with an 
endorsement of the refrain “happy at home”; however, the phrase remains in quotation 
marks throughout the poem, as it does in the title (10, 20, 32, 42). Perhaps the speaker is 
picking up on a popular saying of the day or quoting someone else, but these scare quotes 
create a sense of insincerity. The phrase becomes disruptive and suggests the speaker’s 
need to convince herself that she is truly “happy at home.” The refrain’s anapestic pattern 
stresses the first syllable of “happy” along with “home,” yet its repetition raises questions 
about the purpose of this emphasis: Is it endorsement or parody? The poem could be a 
celebration, but by using the recurring, unrelenting meter, Osgood suggests that the 
meter’s comforting chant may lull anxieties to convince the speaker that she is truly 
“happy at home.” 
While Osgood does not overtly overcome the image of the ideal woman and her 
pure interior, she posits a strategy for the retention of privacy through such formal 
subversions. Osgood ends all four stanzas with the rhyming of “roam” and “home”; their 
association creates the kernel of a doubt that punctures the hermetic ideology of the 
domestic. Since privacy could not exist in the domestic space, perhaps public places 
could provide the opportunity to procure a private, hidden self. Through this question of 
roaming, the poem highlights the female figure who actually does roam: the publicly 
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circulating “maiden” of the first stanza who puts on a façade of joy to cover up her own 
sorrowful interior (5). Osgood writes: 
Let the gay and the idle go forth where they will, 
In search of soft Pleasure, that siren of ill; 
Let them seek her in Fashion’s illumined saloon, 
Where Melody mocks at the heart out of tune; 
Where the laugh gushes light from the lips of the maiden, 
While her spirit, perchance, is with sorrow o’erladen; 
And where, ’mid the garlands Joy only should braid, 
Is Slander, the snake, by its rattle betray’d, 
Ah! no! let the idle for happiness roam, 
For me—I but ask to be “happy at home!” (Poems 1-10) 
 
Osgood offers antebellum women, who perhaps also hide a “spirit . . . o’erladen” with 
“sorrow,” a model in this maiden. She poses public, social spaces as the setting for 
women’s potential self-possession. While entirely exposed, one might hide a private side 
here, even if that hidden self is unhappy. Yet despite Osgood’s poetic efforts, the speaker 
inadvertently demonstrates that concealing any core “spirit” was not a possibility. In 
declaring the maiden’s private side, the speaker negates her opacity; instead, the maiden 
becomes transparent and available to others, such as the speaker who sees through her. 
Publicly disclosing a private self still makes this self consumable and transparent. The 
speaker offers up the maiden as an example of such a scheme, but demonstrates that a 
woman’s interior is inevitably, radically public. The woman poet, like the maiden, might 
strive to have private feelings, but cannot overcome public exposure; women inevitably 
offer recognizable and possessable pieces of their spirit. 
In “Won’t you die & be a spirit,” a manuscript poem from 1845, Osgood shifts 
her focus from the spirit associated with domestic women to the imaginary and 
disembodied spirit associated with the poetess figure.8 Her attempts to locate female 
privacy are imported into the poetics of the poetess. Writing could verge on indecency, 
  122 
even prostitution, for the poetess who revealed too much. In order to impart a publicly 
appropriate female intimacy, Osgood presents disembodied, imaginary speakers, fairy-
like spirits or capricious coquettes to articulate erotic love and desire while conforming to 
true womanhood’s conventions.9 However, “Won’t you die & be a spirit” further proves 
that even the poetess’s spirit was not her own possession. 
One of the striking similarities between Millay’s and Osgood’s poetess poetry 
was how it created erotic intimacy with readers through innocent ignorance; their figures 
blurred the line between sexual and moral appeal. Osgood created purity-professing 
speakers who accidentally exposed their interiors; this appearance of propriety excused 
the inadvertent display of erotic desire. “Won’t you die & be a spirit” plays with this fine 
line between desire and decorum: 
Won’t you die & be a spirit 
 Darling, say 
What’s the use of keeping on 
 That robe of clay 
If you only were a spirit 
 You could stay. (Dobson 1-6) 
 
By reversing gender roles and making the male the disembodied figure, Osgood takes 
sexual propriety to its absurd extreme. The speaker wants to spend the night with her 
lover; if only he were a spirit then it would be safe for them to pass the night in the same 
bedroom. However, if he were a spirit, then they could not have sexual relations.  
Formal qualities assist in alluding to the contradictory nature of this plea. The 
poem’s affinities with ballad form—longer odd lines and shorter even lines, the single b 
rhyme in every stanza—suggest an oral tradition; its meter—alternating between four and 
two stresses per line—resembles popular song. These oral effects enhance the poem’s 
wide-ranging, public availability. Thus, the content of the poem—at its core a plea for 
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physical, rather than emotional intimacy—is couched in a public, popular form. Osgood 
was able to write such a risqué poem due to the medium: It was not published in widely 
available newspapers or literary journals but instead circulated as a manuscript poem 
among friends or in literary salons.10 Oddly, it is the purity of privacy that permits the 
eroticism of this poem. Because a woman’s interior was ideally so spotless, confessions 
from this private space were presumably chaste. The glimpse of something suggestive 
may be excused under the pretense of guilelessness, an assumption Osgood exploits in 
this poem. As a result of the speaker’s seemingly authentic appeal, the sexual and 
murderous potential of such an utterance is effaced. 
According to Dobson, Osgood “plays off . . . a popular perception that death 
unites those lovers who have in life been kept apart” (634). While a traditional love poem 
features a male lover lamenting the absence or death of a woman, “Won’t you die & be a 
spirit” presents a female speaker, not lamenting the death of a lover, but begging this 
male lover to drop dead. The request is repeated in different variations at the beginning of 
each stanza, from requesting—“Won’t you die & be a spirit”—to demanding—“Oh! die 
& be a spirit”—to persuading—“If you’ll die & be a spirit” (1,7, 13). How can he bear to 
leave “a being so delightful / And so true”? If he died, then he could touch “the cheek 
that lips of clay / Shall n’er caress” (11-12, 17-18). The fictional speaker declares her 
sincerity and chastity, but Osgood gestures to these ideals to parody them: When a 
woman speaks “so true,” morbid impulses are instead understood as signs of superior 
morality. Thus a speaker could plead with her lover to die and appear innocent, not 
malicious or potentially threatening. Osgood strains the relationship between sincerity 
and feminine morality to depict its paradoxical outcome: Female desire is acceptable in a 
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disembodied fantasy that achieves intimacy through death. This poem suggests that the 
cultural conventions of feminine propriety were ultimately problematic if someone has to 
die just so lovers can enter the bedroom. 
The final stanza of “Won’t you die & be a spirit” concludes with the speaker 
imagining how lovely it would be if her lover could gaze upon her; she wishes for her 
own objectification: 
Just think how nice ’twould be 
 To come & beam 
Like a star about my pillow 
 Or to seem 
A vision—I should love 
 To love a dream! (Dobson 25-30) 
 
Osgood’s depiction of the feminine figure determining, instead of obeying, the terms for 
possession and consumption overturns social roles. While she may offer these reversals 
as criticism, the poem still collapses back into the circular logic of the poetess’ privacy. 
The poem models the creation of the poetess, a figure whose “spirit” is actually 
constituted by public circulation. In this final stanza, the apostrophe drops out, as does 
the request, and the poem becomes a solipsistic musing, not on retaining authority, but on 
becoming the disembodied and objectified spirit the poetess was popularly believed to be. 
The speaker desires to be spiritualized by a spirit, to constitute herself through cultural 
circulation. She confesses that she wants to be generic, public, and ideal; she would love 
to love an ideal, and, in another layer of emphasis, she wants to be objectified, gazed 
upon by an ideal. In wishing for her lover’s gaze and loving him for his disembodied, 
idealized qualities, this speaker—and, by extension, the poetess—is a figure crafted 
around generic and consumable signs of the female spirit. 
Millay: Hiding in Plain Sight 
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Osgood’s model sheds new light on Millay’s work when we read the two 
comparatively. Osgood’s strategies for contending with the problems of poetic privacy 
illuminate Millay’s attempts at poetic self-possession. While a direct comparison of these 
two poets has been overlooked, they shared similar practices. This might indicate 
influence, but at this time no relationship between the two has been documented.11 Yet 
Millay could not help but be aware of the poetess tradition, if not of Osgood in particular, 
through her mother. Cora Buzzell Millay clipped poetess poetry from newspapers 
throughout her daughter’s youth, pasted poetess poems into scrapbooks, and even 
published her own feminine, sentimental, didactic poetry in northeastern newspapers 
beginning in the 1890s.12 Her bookcases contained collected works by poetess poets such 
as Felicia Hemans and Jean Ingelow (Milford 41).13 I am arguing that the connection 
between Osgood and Millay was the result of the unavoidable inheritance of the poetess’s 
popular tradition rather than a direct, author-to-author influence. The poetess was 
powerfully pervasive beyond the nineteenth century: Women poets continued to write as 
poetesses, and poetess poetry was taught and anthologized well into the twentieth 
century.14 The examples of Osgood and Millay depict the reception of women’s poetic 
privacy as it developed over time. 
In her iteration of this tradition, Millay inherited a legacy under which to labor, 
one with an absolute lack of privacy for the poetess. In writing this figure, she practiced a 
conservative poetry in a time of innovation and experimentation. Modernist poetry was 
inflected by gender, and twentieth-century women poets were part of a lineage that had 
associated women’s public expression with complete availability and exposure; they 
implicitly grappled with the problems of the nineteenth-century poetess as they grappled 
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with modernity.15 Men poets did not work within the same lineage, although male 
modernists certainly concerned themselves with the figure and figuration of the feminine 
poet and the diminishment or fantasy of a private self. Millay’s poetry redeployed the 
conventions of the poetess to intervene in strategies of modernist literary expression. 
While other women engaged problems of privacy in modernism’s innovative 
poetic forms, Millay staged a direct confrontation by writing in the very tradition that was 
founded on privacy’s utter publicity. For example, Marianne Moore and H. D. addressed 
the poetess’s privacy, but in a modernist context. While Moore’s poem “The Fish” 
extends strict metrical rhythms into original poetic forms, she engages the poetess’s self-
abnegation in order to explore the objective surface of life. The last lines—“it can live / 
on what can not revive / its youth. The sea grows old in it”— represent the poem’s 
unenlivened biological imagery, akin to the absent or deflated physicality of the poetess 
(38-40). A sense of stagnation, used to explore objective existence, replaces and revokes 
the living self. This poem echoes the poetess’s subjective retreat in favor of generic 
conventions and public availability, as the poetic subject must withdraw or sacrifice 
herself in order to make sense of the world. H. D. similarly explores a poetic lack of 
autonomy in her poem “Helen,” wherein the ideal woman is culturally acceptable in 
generic, objectified form. “All Greece hates” Helen when she “remember[s] past 
enchantments / and past ills” (1, 10-11). When the public female figure, be it Helen or the 
poetess, reserves some part of her self in order to create a backstage, she is “revile[d]” 
(6). But if she were dead, “laid / white ash amid funereal cypresses,” Helen would be 
accessible, beautiful, and beloved (17-18). H. D. thus expresses concern that culture was 
“unmoved” by the autonomous public woman (12). If Helen were to be cremated, 
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literally objectified and culturally possessable, Greece “could love [this woman] indeed” 
(16). Moore and H. D. grappled with gendered privacy in a modern context by departing 
from and experimenting with traditional verse. Conversely, Millay specifically engaged 
the poetess’s conservative forms in order to target female publicity, privacy, and 
possession. 
Millay used the poetess’s conventions and their inherent problems to make the 
poetess’s lack of privacy work for, not against, her. Through moments of pause in the 
profession of privacy, she indicated that the seemingly present, confessional figure had 
taken herself elsewhere, proffering a mere surface instead. While Osgood proved that her 
backstage had dissolved into the public sphere, making women poets available, generic, 
and consumable, Millay demonstrated how to hide in plain sight. This was not the blatant 
obscurity of modernist poetics—Millay could not write with modernism’s complexity 
because she invoked the poetess’s availability. But through moments of unarticulated 
reasoning, or of contradictory confession, or other such intimate, yet obscure, indicators, 
she professed privacy while both disallowing access to a consumable core and 
questioning its very existence. By emphasizing surface sincerity, she offered generic 
femininity while indicating that the real or the authentic female soul existed elsewhere, if 
at all. Millay may offer the poetess’s reproductions of privacy, but through a coy 
obscurity she asserted that these reproductions were not wholly her. These shadowy spots 
did not exist in any backstage, but on the surface: They were on display, but they were 
not transparent. 
Millay’s poems that discuss travel (or lack thererof) and the boundaries of 
women’s freedom are predicated on the poetesses’ understanding of privacy’s radical 
  128 
publicity. “To the Not Impossible Him,” from A Few Figs from Thistles, depicts a female 
speaker confessing her inner turmoil. Millay intensifies Osgood’s techniques to question 
the value of the domestic or local. As in “‘Happy at Home,’” this speaker contemplates 
roaming, taking idealized insularity to its ridiculous extreme: 
How shall I know, unless I go 
 To Cairo and Cathay, 
Whether or not this blessèd spot 
 Is blest in every way? 
 
Now it may be, the flower for me 
 Is this beneath my nose; 
How shall I tell, unless I smell 
 The Carthaginian rose? 
 
The fabric of my faithful love 
 No power shall dim or ravel 
Whilst I stay here, — but oh, my dear, 
 If I should ever travel! (1-12) 
 
The speaker considers travel and experience in order to determine the sincerity of her 
love: Unless she actually goes to “Cairo and Cathay,” how will she know “Whether or 
not this blessèd spot / Is blest in every way?” The speaker’s candor makes the question 
seem innocuous, not promiscuous. As does Osgood’s speaker in “‘Happy at Home,’” 
Millay’s speaker questions her private, insular experience against the possibility of public 
travel and exposure. While the contrast with roaming might have bolstered the supposed 
superior sincerity found at home, Millay reverses the connection: Here it is publicity that 
will determine honesty, and this poem demonstrates just how “impossible” privacy and 
authenticity are. Thus, its final ironic apostrophe—“but oh, my dear, / If I should ever 
travel!”—points to the contingency of the speaker’s feelings in the first place; if she 
should ever leave the blessed spot “beneath my nose,” her “faithful love” could possibly 
be ruined. Since her lover is “not impossible” and the possibility of traveling remains just 
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that, a possibility, then her feelings will remain constant. However, this conditional 
reasoning and the assertion of doubt belies the ironic flimsiness of her love. 
The poem’s metric repetitions and rhymes call attention to the questionable 
sincerity of private feelings. In the first and third line of each stanza, the repeated rhyme 
in the second and fourth stresses lends the poem its bubbly, playful quality, while also 
suggesting an almost forced cheeriness, like that of Osgood’s repetitive speaker. The 
trochaic first foot of lines one and three, echoed in the second stanza (lines five and 
seven), helps the speaker firmly to enter into her mock-serious tone, transforming earnest 
inquiries about love and experience into flippant hypotheticals. The final stanza shifts the 
pattern. Here, the first line is iambic tetrameter, with no trochaic first foot, and the second 
line is trimeter but with a dangling unstressed syllable. This variation from the pattern set 
by the first two stanzas, along with the drawn-out o vowels (“of,” “love,” “power”), 
lowers the prior energy and volume, suggesting a turn to solemnity. Millay’s speaker 
appears to be playing, in the sense of both performance and amusement, until this 
moment of intimacy disrupts the poem. Without the trochaic stress on the first syllable 
and the uneven quality of the second line, these two lines become a quieter, more regular 
statement whose performative quality is de-emphasized. Flirty brightness is dimmed by 
the stress on “dim”; “ravel” unravels, split into two different feet with its extra half-foot 
at the line’s end. The speaker seems to be confessing a sober moment of sincerity. The 
fact that the poem is upset, in both metrical pattern and content, by a new figuration of 
sincerity points to the problem of the poetess: The profession of privacy actually renders 
sincerity questionable, although the entire poetic utterance is ostensibly sincere. This 
brief moment of sobriety jars the rest of the poem’s brightness, as if the speaker forgot 
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her character and let another, more authentic self break through. While Osgood 
emphasized the insincerity of the refrain “happy at home” in order to disrupt the 
speaker’s supposedly sincere profession, Millay uses sincerity to disrupt the performance 
of sincerity. 
This sober interlude, however, is swept away as quickly as it came along, leading 
into the comical apostrophe of the last two lines. This glimpse is as much a part of the 
performance as the rest of the poem. Millay uses this moment of confession to highlight 
the impossibility of privacy. Since even private moments are inadvertently offered to the 
public, sincerity is always questionable. Osgood could not overcome public belief in 
feminine sincerity, despite foregrounding its performance. But Millay employed the 
poetess’s performance to question the place of sincerity in the twentieth century. She may 
declare that there was nothing to overcome, no struggle, because there was no point: 
Ideal, authentic female purity was a fantasy, an unreality. There was no privacy or 
sincerity to begin with. 
While the resolution of this poem points to a lack of freedom, Millay calls upon 
the conservative position of the poetess in order to access a larger audience, free from the 
high modernist criteria that made a poem accessible to a learned few. Modernist 
aesthetics split poetic practice into two categories, according to Sandra Gilbert: “‘Bad’ 
verse was stereotypically ‘feminine’ (i.e., formally conservative, sentimental, lacking in 
aesthetic or intellectual ambition), while ‘good’ poetry was stereotypically masculine 
(i.e., formally innovative, ‘hard,’ abstract, ambitious)” (299). Millay wrote “bad” verse 
by invoking the poetess, but the poetess’s poetry remained utterly accessible due to its 
sentimental theme, its traditional meter, and its privacy-rendered-public. Her poetry may 
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have depicted generic and formal limitation, but her techniques and choices constituted 
an open address. 
Like “To the Not Impossible Him,” “The Unexplorer,” also from A Few Figs 
from Thistles, engages these elements of restriction in order to open the poem; here the 
emphasis on confinement alludes to all the unexplored implications beyond the scope of 
the poem. Only six lines long, “The Unexplorer” describes a figure confined to the 
domestic space, her innocence generated by a lack of world experience that keeps her 
naive and ostensibly honest: 
There was a road ran past our house 
Too lovely to explore. 
I asked my mother once—she said 
That if you followed where it led 
It brought you to the milk-man's door. 
(Tha’s why I have not travelled more.) (1-6) 
 
The speaker’s ignorance suggests that she is a child, if not in years, then in experience. 
The mother, an idealized woman in her domestic-tutelary role, is the singular resource for 
this speaker beyond her self. As we saw with “Won’t you die & be a spirit,” innocence 
translates to interiority: The speaker’s simplicity, her naiveté, and her passivity suggest 
that there is no more to this figure, no public, performed persona. Millay presents an 
open, unadulterated soul whose innocence collapses the line between interior and 
exterior. 
The poem closes with the speaker confiding to her audience, “(That’s why I have 
not travelled more.),” but she leaves open numerous interpretations for this vague 
parenthetical explanation. Something is not fully revealed in the speaker’s reasoning: The 
road is too beautiful, the road leads to the milk-man, hence I have not traveled. Perhaps 
this is a scandalous tale—the road once led the mother to the milk-man and the speaker is 
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his child, but she must never meet him. The sexually suggestive readings of this poem 
connect it to “Won’t you die & be a spirit,” in which innocence enabled innuendo. 
Readers glimpse the domestic, private self and its inadvertent eroticism through what 
appears to be naiveté. However, Millay extends this logic; while Osgood’s speaker made 
herself tantalizingly available for public consumption through the innocent exposure of 
her interior, Millay manages to obscure the privacy her speaker offers. The speaker may 
similarly have no backstage, but by publicly offering an over-simplified, inconclusive, 
child-like logic, she puts forth a part of herself that cannot be penetrated or fully 
ascertained. Her innocence contains obscurity, and the speaker is not fully available for 
public consumption. 
The poem’s stripped-down rhetoric and unraveling meter do not provide enough 
information to judge the speaker’s explanation for “unexplor[ing].” Like “Won’t you die 
& be a spirit,” “The Unexplorer” couches private profession in popular form; it 
establishes itself as ballad form in straightforward iambic tetrameter followed by iambic 
trimeter. But the poem just as quickly conceals its structure, much like the speaker 
conceals her logic: Line three rhymes with line four, instead of line two as it would in a 
traditional ballad, and while the first two lines alternate between four and three beats, the 
fourth and sixth lines are four syllables instead of three. While this recursiveness—back-
to-back rhymes and proliferating four-syllable lines—suggests a lengthening of the poem, 
the extra material provides less information. This speaker does proffer two explanations, 
but within both of these ostensible accounts are holes in mental and metrical logic. The 
first comment, “Too lovely to explore,” is the traditional three-syllable line of ballad 
form, but the rest of the poem’s four-beat lines highlight the missing feet and potential 
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content of this line. The second explanation, the parenthetical closing line, appears as an 
aside that would presumably contain a more direct form of address from speaker to 
audience, hence a more substantial reason. However, the line is a mark of absence, the 
outline of a confession; the “I” here is no closer or more available than the “I” in line 
three. Millay suggests that something is present—ghost feet, ghost lines—but still 
unavailable and withheld. 
Gesturing to missing pieces, the speaker proffers a public explanation that only 
emphasizes what is missing. It is this speaker’s innocence that compels her to both reveal 
her interior and obscure it at the same time. She is too pure to hold her tongue yet too 
simple to explicate, and thus offer up, her own reasoning. In “The Unexplorer,” Millay 
revises the conventions of the innocent, pure, and accidentally erotic poetess by offering 
an interior that simultaneously disallowed sexualization or possession of the figure’s 
spirit. The speaker professes privacy, but what she does reveal is not very consumable. 
Millay suggests that what the reader gets is not really her, or is not really there. 
Millay further develops these points in the sonnet “Bluebeard” from Renascence. 
Despite its ostensibly masculine title, “Bluebeard” may be read as poetess poetry. As 
such, the poem is particularly striking because it provides access to the backstage of a 
publicly performed persona. The fable, in which Bluebeard kills his wives and stores 
their bloody bodies in a hidden chamber, was widely referenced in turn-of-the-century 
U.S. poetry; poets such as Rose Terry Cooke, Emily Dickinson, Edgar Fawcett, Bret 
Harte, James Russell Lowell, and Edwin Arlington Robinson alluded to the tale to 
describe something wondrous, hidden, or deadly.16 These poems approach the Bluebeard 
story as a parable, a moral tale about hidden, private conditions within us or within 
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society. By placing her speaker inside Bluebeard’s secret chamber, Millay empties the 
space of its horrible crimes, nevertheless using the chamber as a symbol of corrupted 
female identity. 
When its speaker is read as female, “Bluebeard” connects the poetess’s 
problematic privacy to modern women poets. The sonnet returns us to the false promise 
of privacy and the pressures of a non-existent backstage, reflected in the room discussed 
in the poem and the sonnet’s own rooms or stanzas.17 The speaker discusses performing a 
public persona while maintaining some private, unaccessed space for herself. But this 
“backstage” is penetrable by the public: 
This door you might not open, and you did; 
So enter now, and see for what slight thing 
You are betrayed. . . . Here is no treasure hid, 
No cauldron, no clear crystal mirroring 
The sought-for Truth, no heads of women slain 
For greed like yours, no writhings of distress; 
But only what you see. . . . Look yet again: 
An empty room, cobwebbed and comfortless. 
Yet this alone out of my life I kept 
Unto myself, lest any know me quite; 
And you did so profane me when you crept 
Unto the threshold of this room tonight 
That I must never more behold your face. 
This now is yours. I seek another place. (1-14) 
 
This speaker’s public persona suggests some withheld treasure or scandal, enticing the 
“greed” of “you” to pry beyond her performance. Thus, the speaker’s last vestige of 
privacy, and not the public’s perception of the private, has been given up: “Yet this alone 
out of my life I kept / Unto myself, lest any know me quite.” She laments that invasion 
has irreparably violated her privacy; the room was a touchstone for self-preservation, and 
she has been so “profane[d]” that the entire operation must be abandoned. The speaker 
professes sincerity by lamenting the invasion of privacy, and here Millay encourages the 
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association of privacy with sincerity, poet with poem. However, she uses the equation to 
foreground emptiness. 
The speaker explains, “Here is no treasure hid, / No cauldron, no clear crystal 
mirroring / The sought-for Truth, no heads of women slain.” There is nothing shocking in 
this private life, but what is shocking is that the private is so “empty” and barren. By 
discussing not just a private but an empty room, the speaker concedes the shell of privacy 
to an expectant, prying public while concealing herself somewhere else. Like “The 
Unexplorer,” empty privacy obscures the subject and allows her to “seek another place.” 
Millay’s performance of the poetess preserves authorial autonomy in order to make the 
room and the poem the site of a vanishing act. Whereas Osgood’s “maiden” publicly 
declared a private side that proved transparent and consumable, Millay publicly declares 
a private space to entice the reader into its emptiness. No one was ever there, not 
Bluebeard or the woman poet; the room was occupied only by a fictional speaker who 
scolds her reader for invading a fictional place. The speaker thus leaves us with a form 
full of fiction, an empty stanza or “room” where we expected to see “Truth” or “heads of 
women slain.” 
When read from the position of a female speaker, “Bluebeard” demonstrates that 
the sonnet is a disappearing act. Millay avoids an invasion of the female interior by 
staging an invasion of the female interior, in turn revealing the emptiness of ideal 
privacy. Rather than invoke the domestic woman who cannot overcome public 
consumption, or the innocent girl who inadvertently reveals her private side, Millay 
moves beyond the poetess by making corruption part of the female figure. Invasion or 
penetration of the woman’s idealized interior creates her identity; Millay demonstrates 
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that the purity and privacy associated with the public woman is a contradiction and a 
fantasy. In order to move beyond the expectations that adhere to the figure, Millay offers 
her own fantasy: a fictional space for a fictional identity, an invited invasion where the 
intruder confronts himself rather than an inner sanctum of privacy and purity. Effacing 
the woman from the site of the poem while offering up her stanza or “room,” Millay 
preserves the poetess, demonstrating that she is one step ahead, looking back at us and 
not the other way around. Even though the poetess’s poetic space becomes “profane[d],” 
Millay nevertheless speaks to the “sought-for truth” pursued in “another place,” the need 
for personal reconciliation between self and the world despite the failed fantasy of 
privacy—a project that aligns the poetess genre with modernist investigation. 
The Modernist Poetess 
By the early twentieth century, representations of poetic selfhood based on an 
isolated, ideal privacy could no longer hold, raising questions about the relationship 
between personhood and personal space. If as J. Hillis Miller suggests, the “twentieth-
century poem” constituted an arena “in which things, the mind, and words coincide in 
closest intimacy,” then poetry had to overcome a tension between the private expression 
associated with nineteenth-century verse and a sense of its disconnection from the 
external world and its people (8). The conflict outlined a crucial concern for the 
modernist poet: how to reconcile personal, private emotions with a depersonalized poetic 
utterance. 
Millay redeployed the poetess’s conventions and expectations in order to parry 
the problems of modernity. She grappled with the issues that surfaced in overtly 
modernist texts but did so by way of an alternate historical practice. By blurring the line 
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between poetic persona and the objective expression of private emotion, she created a 
radically public poetic self that acknowledged the division between self and world while 
exposing that very self to the world. Because Millay has been read through canons and 
criticism formed by modernist influence, the majority opinion on her work posits 
modernist models of interrogation and knowledge as problems that she does not or cannot 
address. Yet Millay in particular provides the means to recover a poetry overlooked by 
the American modernist continuum—the often-ignored, non-canonical poetry of the early 
modernist period, itself an area that is currently receiving greater critical attention.18 She 
forges a link between the antebellum poetess and modernist modes of inquiry because 
both poetic practices were constituted and troubled by ideal privacy. 
I place Millay in relation to nineteenth-century women’s poetic conventions as a 
way to continue destabilizing the rigid dichotomies and oppositions that have long 
characterized high modernism. In other words, the poetess offers a strategy for expanding 
critical understandings of modernist poetry.19 As a widely circulating figure constructed 
by and for the literary marketplace, the poetess embodies a paradoxical privacy. This 
contradictory formulation registers the horizons of a mid-nineteenth-century culture 
coping with industrial, technological, and urban expansions that reconstituted the 
meaning of the private. By the early twentieth century, the prominent stylistic innovations 
of the modernists register the continuation and consolidation of such economic, 
industrial, and social shifts, along with their attendant issues and anxieties. Consequently, 
the presence of the poetess tradition in the twentieth century illuminates modernist 
practice by charting a history of privacy, demonstrating how poetry grappled with its 
status and stability in a time of emerging modernities. While the abandonment of 
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tradition may be the qualifying characteristic of modernism, the nineteenth century 
persists in modernist poetics: Its specter hovers as a presence that Millay and other 
modernists choose to invoke or revoke, and in ways that need not imply retrograde 
aesthetic or political practices. Millay and the high modernists shared a common lineage, 
but differed in how they envisioned and reacted to their inheritance. 
Millay is valuable in part because her poetry offers a range of considerations with 
which to widen conventional readings of modernism. By displaying and disputing 
nineteenth-century poetic practices, she foregrounded the circumstances unifying her 
traditionalism and American modernism’s iconoclasm. Through a twentieth-century 
iteration of the poetess, she depicted another means of modernist investigation, an 
alternative method to its experimentation, innovation, and rejection of tradition. Millay 
took modernism’s concern with surfaces and depth, the real and the artificial, and 
elaborated their conflicts and connections through poetess poetry, a practice that similarly 
questioned form and freedom, public and private availability, artificiality and 
authenticity.  
In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the supposed authenticity of the lyric 
subject in the context of race. While Millay revealed that the poet’s performance of 
sincerity was neither transparent nor real, the next chapter will discuss how African 
American poets exploited this realization. Their work harnessed the performance of the 
black “voice” to publicly prove African Americans’ self-possession while problematizing 
the reduction of race to printed poetry. 
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1Johnson suggests that Millay’s sonnets “reflect the artistic problems of her age . . . . 
[T]hey often balance the urgency of human emotional responses and the concomitant 
need to name what one feels against the limitations of attempting to describe the felt 
moment” (117). Stanbrough argues that Millay’s public image hides internal anguish, “an 
overwhelming sense of personal vulnerability . . . to victimization by uncontrollable 
conditions in her environment” (214). Thus Millay avoids modernist “freedoms of form” 
and favors the sonnet, “a fit vehicle to convey her deepest feelings of woman’s 
victimization” (227). 
 
2To discuss the poetess is to enter into a web of tautologies, associations, and 
contradictions. Critics and readers understand “poetess” to mean a genre, a trope, a 
universal tradition, a figure, a subject, as well as an author. See works by scholars such as 
Bennett (“Was Sigourney a Poetess?”), Jackson (“The Poet as Poetess”), Loeffelholz, 
Prins, Richards, and Walker (American Women Poets and Masks Outrageous and 
Austere) have been instrumental in recovering the archives of poetesses and 
reconstituting the meaning of the poetess figure. 
 
3See Rosenbaum 1-24, 93-126. 
 
4Modernism’s concern with the private and public, the subjective interior and objective 
exterior, echoes the poetess’s problem of public privacy and a poetic self created for 
public consumption. Popular access or availability was a key modernist issue; in A Survey 
of Modernist Poetry, Riding and Graves comment that modernist poetry “seems to say: 
‘Keep out. This is a private performance’” (9). They explain that “what we have to do, 
then, is to discover whether or not the poets means to keep the public out” (10). T. S. 
Eliot contemplates the place of private feeling in public poetry, famously arguing that 
“poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the 
expression of personality, but an escape from personality.” In the words of J. Hillis 
Miller, Eliot determines that “an act of self-surrender has expanded the private mind of 
the poet into the universal sphere” (172). 
 
5All of Millay’s work quoted in this chapter comes from Collected Poems. 
 
6Responding to scholarship on the “cult of true womanhood,” McCall has examined the 
popular and widely circulating nineteenth-century magazine Godey’s Lady’s Book, 
destabilizing the supposed dominance of the “true woman” ideal in antebellum popular 
culture. She finds that “the categories historians have formulated to describe the ideal 
woman were not prevalent in either the fiction or the editorials of Godey’s” (235). 
 
7Kerber and Tonkovich, among others, have pointed out that the separate spheres concept 
was more of a rhetorical and ideological construct than a reality. 
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8This poem was discovered by Joanne Dobson among the Frances Osgood Papers at the 
Houghton Library at Harvard University (648n11). Here I quote from the poem as it is 
reprinted in her American Literature article. The poem is also reprinted in Bennett, 
Nineteenth-Century 62-63. 
 
9See Richards 65-72. 
 
10Dobson explains, “The forum of the salon, with its urbane constituency, allowed 
Osgood to go further than she would—or could—in her published work” (634). 
 
11Milford’s biography is the primary source documenting Millay’s early influences, and it 
provides few details on what the poet may have read at school or at home. The Edna St. 
Vincent Millay Society (www.millay.org) recently opened Steepletop, Millay’s upstate 
New York home, to visitors. The site contains her library, but the archive is not yet open 
to the public. 
 
12See Cora Buzzell Millay’s poetry clippings and published poetry clippings, along with 
her daughter’s scrapbooks, in the Edna St. Vincent Millay Papers, Library of Congress. 
 
13In her 1910 diary, Millay mentions reading Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Sonnets from 
the Portuguese and Palgrave’s Golden Treasury, whose 1907 edition contained work by 
various poetesses. 
 
14For example, The Home Book of Verse, published by Henry Holt in 1918 and “twelfth 
on a list of two hundred books selected by the National Council for Better Homes in 
America to comprise the ‘Ideal Library,’” contained work by Sigourney and Osgood, 
along with many other women poets (Rubin 247). 
 
15Cristanne Miller points out that “one of the most revolutionary aspects of modernism” 
was that “it was the first literary and artistic movement in which women played major 
roles both nationally and internationally, not just in writing modernist prose and poetry 
but in developing its foundational ideas and in shaping literary production” (69). 
 
16In brief, the story follows these lines: No women want to marry the nobleman 
Bluebeard because he has an ugly blue beard. Despite the disappearance of his seven 
former wives, he convinces an eighth wife to marry him. The young woman joins him in 
his castle, but shortly thereafter he leaves for the country. Bluebeard gives his wife the 
keys to the castle, including a key to a small room she is forbidden to enter. Curiosity 
overcomes her, and she enters the room, discovering the bloody bodies of the former 
seven wives. Bluebeard returns, discovers the entry, and tries to kill her, but her brothers 
save her at the last moment. The website SurLaLune Fairy Tales provides an excellent, 
annotated version of Charles Perrault’s tale. 
 
17Millay’s work with the sonnet form further links her to the poetess tradition. The sonnet 
became the culturally appropriate form for women’s public expression in the eighteenth 
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and nineteenth centuries in both England and the United States. It “signified a generic 
role for sincere feeling, a gendered cultural script” (Rosenbaum 100). For further 
discussion on this point, see Curran and Robinson. 
 
18See, to name a few, recent and forthcoming works on turn-of-the-century poetry and 
literary culture by Bentley, Cavitch, Jackson (Before Modernism), and Renker. 
 
19For other works that expand the scope of modernist interpretation, see Cutler 1-21 and 
168-79, Huyssen vii-xii and 44-62, and Rainey 1-10. 
CHAPTER 4 
LYRIC READING AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN VOICE 
Frances Sargent Osgood and Edna St. Vincent Millay exploited the female poet’s 
supposedly sincere profession of privacy in order to find a public space where their 
“voices” could be heard. This chapter continues this examination of “voice,” moving 
from gender to race. George Moses Horton, a slave poet, used the convention of the lyric 
voice’s authenticity in order to publicly profess his status not as a slave but as an 
autonomous self. By the end of the century, Paul Laurence Dunbar, a young African 
American poet considered the representative “voice” of his race, divorces the seemingly 
sincere self from “voice” for a greater—because less scripted—authenticity. In discussing 
the poetics of lyric voice, this chapter will focus on the materiality of printed poetry as a 
strategy to either possess or dislocate the socially acceptable lyric subject depicted in the 
first two chapters. 
Lyric has been understood to create a fictional subject who expresses private 
thoughts and emotions, either to herself or to an unavailable other. In this theory, voice is 
crucial to imagining lyric subjectivity because it is the vehicle that conveys the interiority 
that constitutes and legitimates selfhood. While integral to discussions of poetry, voice 
has constituted one of its biggest problems because, in the words of Eliza Richards, “to 
define voice in written poetry immediately poses a problem, for there is no literal voice in 
the poem: voice is an oral metaphor employed in the description and analysis of the 
written word” (“Voice” 1525). “Voice” is a fiction; readers imagine the printed text on 
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the page to represent human speech. And yet lyric voice has been understood to express 
the personhood, not just of a figured speaker, but of the poet. A poem’s voice has thus 
been read as the articulation of a poet’s interiority, and hence of his or her sincere self. 
But what happens when the poet who composes a lyric voice is not considered a 
self? For example, did the “voice” in poetry written by slaves in antebellum America 
signal personhood or possession? Did the “voice” in poems written by African Americans 
during the Jim Crow era “sound” black and therefore communicate second-class 
citizenship? Because they employed lyric’s voice to access the selfhood that American 
society denied them, poetry by African Americans in the nineteenth-century intensifies 
the problem of voice and subjectivity. Under chattel slavery, slaves were not only 
possessions, but they were denied the social relationships that would register them as 
people. According to Orlando Patterson, slavery conferred on its sufferers the status of “a 
socially dead person. Alienated from all ‘rights’ or claims of birth, [the slave] ceased to 
belong in his own right to any legitimate social order” (5). Even after emancipation, 
blacks were barred from full personhood; as Saidiya Hartman argues, emancipation 
“appears less the grand event of liberation than a point of transition between modes of 
servitude and racial subjection” (6). From slaves to the first generation of free blacks, 
social subjectivity and the all rights that it entailed were contingent on political and social 
recognition. Yet, just as the public sphere constructed selfhood, race was likewise 
constructed and enforced by social and political circumstances. Public recognition thus 
determined both race and the status of selfhood; the construction of the two was 
irrevocably intertwined in the nineteenth century. Hartman explains that “blackness is 
defined here in terms of social relationality rather than identity; thus blackness 
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incorporates subjects nominally defined as black, the relations among blacks, whites, and 
others, and the practices that produce racial difference. Blackness marks a social 
relationship of dominance and abjection and potentially one of redress and emancipation” 
(56-57). The historical denial of personhood was based on the enforcement of the 
political and social relations that constituted race in the U.S. Because race was 
determined by the same public consensus that determined who was a person and who was 
less than a person, black poets saw the lyric voice as a means to speak within the social 
space that decided selfhood. In other words, because the lyric voice was supposed to 
indicate selfhood, black poets used the imaginary construct of voice to try to alter the 
social relations that constructed race. By exploiting that voice’s inherent doubleness, that 
is, the division between the lyric voice’s imagined orality and its textual, material 
mediation in print, African American poets attempted to access the selfhood they had 
been denied.  
African American poets navigated voice’s simultaneous unreality and materiality 
in order to access normative subjectivity as it developed across the nineteenth century. 
Thus, the lyric voice was constructed and deployed in order to accommodate different 
historical iterations of subjectivity. By examining two African American poets, Horton 
and Dunbar, I will trace how the fiction of the lyric voice has been employed and 
exploited in historical understandings of the self. As a slave, Horton tried to gain access 
to selfhood by transmitting the fiction of his own voice in order to convince readers that 
he was not merely a slave but a person. Horton’s poetic voice professed his possession of 
a sincere, emotional interior in order to convince readers of his humanity, and therefore, 
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his unjust enslavement. By the end of the century, Dunbar demonstrated that the socially 
recognized selfhood that Horton sought was an idealized, narrow, and impossible fantasy.  
Horton and Dunbar present different ways of dealing with voice’s simultaneous 
existence and non-existence in lyric. Horton wanted his poetic voice to exist in order to 
gain access to the personhood that the possession of a “voice” would prove. Yet his 
poetry reveals voice’s imaginary construction. Conversely, Dunbar did not want voice to 
exist in his poetry because by the end of the century, the fiction of African American 
voice helped to naturalize stereotypes and was thus recognized as evidence of a narrowly 
defined black subjectivity. Dunbar thus exposed the fiction of the voice in order to strain 
against the fantasy of enclosed selfhood that the possession of a voice would prove. 
Whereas Horton encouraged the inscription of his self in the page’s textual “voice” in 
order to prove his personhood, Dunbar deliberately detached himself from the voice on 
the page in order to preserve personhood. Dunbar thus reverses Horton’s example: while 
Horton used poems that created fictional speakers and situations to directly recall and 
impact his person, Dunbar used poetry, even autobiographical poetry, to detach his 
person from the poetic speaker. 
Double Voice and Race 
The “voice” of printed poetry gestures to two operations that exist in tension: that 
which can be spoken and heard and that which is seen on the page. Paul Zumthor argues, 
“language without voice is unthinkable”; hence the written text of a poem gestures to an 
orality beyond itself (6). This association of language with speaking voice causes an 
imaginary speaking subject to be read into printed poetry. Modern readers have had no 
problem associating the printed page with the human voice due to the ubiquity of 
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“technologically mediated voices” (Prins “Inverse” 47). Historically, however, the 
written text of a poem was not always interpreted as a person talking. Investigations of 
nineteenth-century poetics reveal that contemporary readers and writers could imagine a 
disembodied, dehumanized “voice” in a poem, rather than the utterance of an imaginary 
speaker. According to Yopie Prins, “we listen without the sense of estrangement that 
fascinated Victorian readers and writers, for whom literary and technological inventions 
of ‘voice’ were a way to perform the dissociation and disembodiment of speech” 
(“Inverse” 47). Prins explains that Victorian readers and critics understood voice to be “a 
metaphor,” and that the poem could “dislocate a speaking subject by emphasizing 
impersonal utterances, absent voices, empty echoes, displaced dialogue, and bits of 
heteroglossia” (“Inverse” 45). “The mechanism of meter” provided one means of creating 
this “disembodiment of voice” (“Inverse” 49, 44). Meter interrupts the reading of poems 
as a personified utterance because its “mechanical mediation of voice” evinced a 
dehumanized force beyond an imaginary speaking self (“Inverse” 49). Meter de-
personalizes the poem and provides polyvocality in the additional presence of a voice 
without human origins. Prins argues that “nineteenth-century theories of meter also 
uncover a form of linguistic materialism that complicates the claim to vocal presence. 
Instead of hearing voice as breath or spirit, we see it materialize through the counting of 
metrical marks” (“Meters” 92). Meter’s textual materialization coincided with “a general 
nineteenth-century tendency toward the codification of numerical modes of analysis and 
the production of abstract space” (“Meters”106).  
While Prins insists on the recognition of a disembodied and mechanical voice in 
Victorian poetry, poets and readers still understand lyric to retain human speech acts 
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alongside mechanical depersonifications. In other words, the printed poem offers the 
poetic depersonification of an imaginary persona through the mediation of that voice on 
the page, but the simultaneous and persistent “voice” of this imaginary speaker is 
impossible to discount or erase. Eric Griffiths calls this “the double nature of the printed 
voice” (74). Because poetry is “a use of language that works with the sounds of words”: 
. . . the absence of clearly indicated sound from the silence of the written word 
creates a double nature in printed poetry, making it both itself and something 
other—a text of hints at voicing, whose centre in utterance lies outside itself, and 
also an achieved pattern on the page, salvaged from the evanescence of the voice 
in air. 60 
 
Like Prins, Griffiths discusses this “double nature” in British Victorian and Romantic 
poetry. Yet the doubleness of printed poetry has important ramifications in the reading of 
African American poetics. Indeed, the textual and metrical displacements of voice that 
Prins locates in Victorian poetry as well as the persistence of a personified voice resonate 
in examinations of African American poetics across the nineteenth century. When we are 
sensitive to the ways that lyric poems “signal their addressees,” “touch actual readers,” or 
“mark[] the presence of a hearer,” we can experience the voice of a human figure 
communicating with another through the poem (Waters 6). Textuality may separate voice 
from person but it also maps out a space that can be exploited to create fictional people. 
Prins criticizes Griffiths for “an account of writing as the voice of an absent person” that 
overlooks the dislocated, dehumanized voice. According to Prins, Griffiths insists that 
“the written word ‘retains’ (in both senses) the spoken word and the intentionality of a 
speaker” (45). Yet some poems, like those in the African American literary tradition, beg 
to be read as absent people speaking. With their use of “I,” dialect language, and 
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conversational contexts, African American poetry encourages readers to imagine a 
speaker, even if the utterance possesses depersonifying meter and rhyme.  
Because of African Americans’ struggles to be recognized as subjects in 
American society, African American literature is sensitive to the use of lyric voice as a 
means of gaining access to and reclaiming selfhood, as well as its potential to dislocate 
person from text. This potential is captured in what Henry Louis Gates has termed 
“signifying.” According to Gavin Jones, “signifying is a double-voiced process” and 
pertinent to the poetics of voice because its practice displays and exploits voice’s 
modulations within a poem (190). For example, Griffiths articulates a view similar to 
theories of signification when he argues that “the ‘unsubstantial existence’ of poetic voice 
in print creates the chance of a polyphony, the chance for a divided soul to speak with 
something better than a forked tongue” (75). Griffiths argues that the double voice of 
printed text allows the poet “to fashion, and not merely suffer from, bafflements of voice, 
lacks and flusterings in speech, the burdens of address” (74). Because African American 
poets were historically denied access to the full personhood that the lyric “voice” 
represented, their poetry had to contend with “bafflements,” “lacks,” and “burdens of 
address” that resulted from being non-persons in print.  
By exploiting the mediation of voice by printed page, African American poets 
could contend with the barriers to full personhood imposed by American society. 
According to Max Cavitch, “the phenomenological concept of rhythm” in poetry “of 
slave subjectivity” created “a history of subjectivation through rhythm. . . a continuing 
history of both the subject’s formation (agency) and its subordination (deprivation of 
agency)” (“Slavery” 95-96). Rhythm’s mediation of the printed voice invoked the 
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phenomenological experience of the slave, even if the reader did not have first-hand 
experience of its sensations. Cavitch explains that American chattel slavery “reinforced 
the connections between time, sound, and pain, with its bells, with its whips, and not 
least, with its songs. Sounds both lyrical and unlyrical facilitated new and prodigious 
rhythms of work” (“Slavery” 100). He argues that the rhythms created by slaves in work 
and song inflected poetry; “this singing and chanting, long before its verses started to be 
systematically transcribed and published, had a pervasive influence on American popular 
song, particularly through blackface performance and minstrelsy” (“Slavery” 100). The 
rhythms of slavery marked printed poetry, demonstrating that the rhythm retained by the 
printed voice of the text could dislocate a personified speaker while denoting slavery’s 
phenomenological reality. In other words, the inhumanity of slavery did not need to be 
communicated by a figured human speaker, rather the depersonalized mechanizations of 
meter could communicate this state of presumed non-personhood. But unlike Prins who 
describes the mechanical mediation of voice as creating the possibility of a dehumanized, 
non-subjective poetry, Cavitch demonstrates that meter and rhythm do not merely 
disembody voice and bar the connection of poem to person. Rather, meter and rhythm 
communicated a human state to those who did not think slaves were human. By 
understanding rhythm to communicate physical experience, Cavitch creates a connection 
between the fictional voice of a personified speaker, the depersonalizing voice of the 
inscribed text, and the presence of the poet. While Prins argues that poetry’s materialized 
meter exists independently of a figured speaker, the poem’s meter does not always have 
to dislodge subjectivity from text. According to Cavitch, “one needn’t condemn any poet 
to subjectlessness, or deny subjectivity to any and all enactments of voice in poetry, in 
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order to turn a less personalizing gaze—and ear—toward the figures of subjectivation in 
the poetry of slavery” (“Slavery” 95). Cavitch’s discussion of rhythm allows us to extend 
Prins’ useful polyvocality to nineteenth-century African American poets’ struggle with 
subjectivity. By acknowledging the impact that slavery’s rhythms had on the poem, we 
may access the poet without ascribing his or her personal voice to the page. 
Horton and Voice’s Inscription 
 Horton’s poetry provides unique access to the phenomenology of slavery’s 
metrics and the poetics of voice. He composed the poems of his 1829 collection, The 
Hope of Liberty, while a slave in North Carolina. Its publication was to have a direct 
impact of the life of the poet, thus linking the “voice” of the poem directly to Horton’s 
person. As Leon Jackson explains, The Hope of Liberty was not for sale; it “was not a 
commercial venture that was sold by subscription.” Instead, the collection “was a 
gratuitous publication, introduced into an economy of benevolence, in order to solicit 
contributions (‘subscriptions’) to a manumission fund” (75). In addition to funding his 
freedom, the money raised by the publication was also intended to pay for Horton’s 
resettlement in Liberia through the American Colonization Society (Jackson 75). While 
these poems emerged from and were to irrevocably alter Horton’s life, some of their 
subjects seem impossibly dislocated from Horton’s experience. One might imagine that 
every poem in a collection meant to raise funds for manumission would concern slavery, 
if not explicitly, then symbolically. Many do not; it would be a stretch to draw 
abolitionist arguments and personal appeals from poems about jilted lovers, the seasons, 
and dead babies. The range and depth of feeling displayed in these poems, however, 
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proves Horton’s exceptional emotional capacity and human spirit in order to solicit funds 
from potential donors. 
This range of topics may also result from the fact that Horton did not know his 
poems would be collected. Jackson argues that Horton “had absolutely no hand in the 
publication of the volume, and there is some question as to whether he was even aware of 
its publication” (69). Indeed, Horton was not even aware that some of these works were 
altered. Jackson found that verses previously published in newspapers had been revised 
and reprinted in The Hope of Liberty. A comparison “reveals that someone” adjusted the 
works to “minimize their abolitionist sentiment and instead suggest a colonizationist 
aesthetic” (Jackson 73). Jackson thus argues that Horton’s works were subject to “to a 
series of dis-locations” that “ultimately deprived him of control over his words and the 
contexts in which they were lodged” (66). However, these dislocations reveal the 
polyvocality of poetic voice. The mediating hands of editors and publishers cannot efface 
the double voice of the printed page; while the dislocated and dehumanized “voice” of 
the text—its rhythm, its visual form—may not link up to a personified speaker, the 
printed text nevertheless points to Horton’s struggle to gain access to socially recognized 
personhood. As I will explain, the printed “voice” of these poems re-embodies Horton 
despite his apparent dislocation from the page in order to assert his status as a self. 
The Hope of Liberty contains two elegies on subjects seemingly unrelated to the 
experience of slavery, on the death of a baby and on the death of a maiden. These poems 
prove Horton’s poetic proficiency and his exceptional capacity for sympathy in order to 
impress readers and potential donors. While death was a common experience for the 
slave, these elegies do not explicitly address slavery’s images or symbols to bolster 
 ! 152!
Horton’s case. Nevertheless, the elegy form retains the experience of slavery; Cavitch 
explains that “as part of the mourning culture of black Americans, elegy was also part of 
the racialized drama of sorrow and resistance that characterized American culture more 
generally. . . elegy sometimes helped to restore a sense of the severed affiliations from 
which blacks suffered disproportionately” (Elegy 180). Horton thus indirectly alluded to 
the experience of chattel slavery in order to emphasize the empathy that proved his 
humanity: not only could he express the emotional interiority of a person, but he could 
sympathize with the experience of his white reader. For example, “On the Death of an 
Infant” possesses images that are repeated in Horton’s poems about slavery. Yet, this 
imagery is used by a “sad parent” to rationalize loss: 
Blest Babe! it at length has withdrawn, 
The Seraphs have rock'd it to sleep; 
Away with an angelic smile it has gone, 
And left a sad parent to weep! 
 
It soars from the ocean of pain, 
On breezes of precious perfume; 
O be not discouraged when death is but gain-- 
The triumph of life from the tomb. 
 
With pleasure I thought it my own, 
And smil'd on its infantile charms; 
But some mystic bird, like an eagle, came down, 
And snatch'd it away from my arms. 
 
Blest Babe, it ascends into Heaven, 
It mounts with delight at the call; 
And flies to the bosom from whence it was given, 
The Parent and Patron of all. (Hope 1-16) 
 
As if life was a sort of slavery, the child has been freed into life after death: the child 
“soars” over pain and it is his or her “triumph” to have made this escape. The speaker 
“thought” the child “my own,” but it was “snatch’d” away, implying the punishment that 
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attends the ownership of a person. This poem emphasizes that no one belongs to anyone 
but the “Parent and Patron of all,” and may be interpreted as an indictment of slavery and 
its fantasy of ownership. Horton’s strategic choice of a dead child empathizes with 
parents who have lost children, equating their pain with Horton’s slavery. In this 
commentary on a child returning to its true parent or patron, Horton evokes not just the 
emotional rhetoric of emancipation, but the economy of patronage in which this work 
circulates. If readers become patrons of Horton, donating to his manumission fund, 
Horton might likewise perceive them as the false patrons or parents depicted in this 
poem. However, Horton invokes slavery’s rhetoric of paternalism to revise it. He will not 
become anyone’s “own” as a result of patronage; he remains a self-possessed, 
autonomous individual. If readers think they become patron or parent Horton, they cannot 
expect him to become their property, just like the child did not really belong to its earthly 
parent. Indeed, the poem exists to distance patron from Horton, contributing to his 
freedom and autonomy, not his indebtedness or enslavement. 
In the context of a collection trying to garner manumission funds, this “masked” 
voice is foregrounded. Yet other “voices” emerge when taken out of this context. On its 
most basic level, the poem asks us to imagine the voice of a mourning parent. While we 
cannot say definitively that this fictional speaker is also the voice of Horton himself—
perhaps he parented and lost a child—the fictional persona still suggests his authorial 
presence because it evinces the sympathy and emotional capacity necessary to write such 
a poem. Meanwhile, the poem’s short meter suggests a disembodied, mechanical voice 
materialized on the page. This is especially apparent in rhymes that work visually but not 
aurally, like “own” and “down.” Nevertheless, this textual materialization of voice still 
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retains a link to its author. By detaching the figured speaking subject from the text on the 
page, this mechanical, metrical voice refuses ownership by a personified speaker. Horton 
thus models the kind of liberty he desires for himself through the materialization of voice. 
By diverging from a speaking subject that would own and control it, the disembodied, 
material voice is free. Its liberation from a speaking subject attests to the poem’s 
symbolic message advocating absolute freedom from patronage by just another parent or 
master. Thus the fictional voice of the speaker and the disembodied mechanism of meter 
join to link the text back to Horton’s struggle for recognition as a self-possessed subject. 
Like the child who returns to its otherworldly parent, these voices return to Horton. 
 As fictions and dislocations, the voices of “On the Death of an Infant” asserted 
independence from the bondage created by parentage or patronage while simultaneously 
professing the emotional interiority that constituted subjectivity. Nevertheless, patronage 
was necessary to secure Horton’s freedom. Unfortunately, The Hope of Liberty was “was 
a monumental failure,” not raising enough money to free Horton, let alone send him to 
Liberia (Jackson 77). However, other modes of moneymaking were more successful. 
Horton wrote and sold acrostics to undergraduates at the University of North Carolina 
who hoped to woo young women. By participating in a direct, face-to-face mode of 
poetic exchange, these poems existed at the intersections of a “gift-exchange economy,” 
and “an economy of patronage” (Jackson 57). These acrostics created an obvious 
connection back to Horton due to the exchange of money between poet and patron. Yet 
the acrostics simultaneously erased Horton’s presence by attempting to create an 
exclusive and intimate relationship between the patron and the object of his affection who 
received the gift of the poem. 
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Jackson contends that these acrostics were a more successful form of autonomous 
authorship for Horton because they did not dislocate his person from the poem, unlike 
The Hope of Liberty. He argues that: 
. . . in selling his acrostics, Horton forged relationships with his customers; these 
relationships were often condescending, sometimes not, but they facilitated an 
ongoing source of income and goodwill. The publication of The Hope of Liberty 
was a wholly mediated, indeed impersonal, process through which third parties 
controlled his words, the contexts into which they were introduced, the nature of 
the economy of which they were a part, and the purposes to which any money 
associated with them would be applied. (77) 
 
However, these acrostics were neither more nor less “impersonal” mediations of Horton’s 
authorship. “Third parties” may have determined the “contexts” of publication and edited 
some of his works, but the acrostics similarly introduced a mediating party—the 
undergraduate patron—who erased Horton’s authorship altogether. For example, the 
manuscript of “An Acrostic on the Pleasures of Beauty” is written in Horton’s hand, but 
does not have his signature. The verso indicates that the poem was written for “Mr. 
Pettigrew,” one of the two Pettigrew brothers enrolled at the University of North Carolina 
in the 1830s, but beyond Horton’s handwriting, neither side of the page indicates 
Horton’s authorship.1 The Hope of Liberty at least had Horton’s name attached to it, 
while these acrostics conceal Horton’s presence because the poet’s “voice” was supposed 
to be that of the suitor. Face-to-face exchange actually worked to obliterate Horton’s 
authorial presence more than the “wholly mediated” collection of printed poems. But 
neither the collected poems nor the acrostics have a “voice” that is more authentically 
Horton’s. The poems in The Hope of Liberty and the acrostics constitute alternate 
configurations of the complicated connection between poetic voice and empirical poet. 
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Horton’s poetry splits into multiple embodied and disembodied voices whether the poems 
are part of a direct monetary exchange or mediated by publication. 
  “An Acrostic on the Pleasures of Beauty” depicts the constellation of poet, poem, 
and patron when the poet seems to have been erased. It arranges the name “Julia 
Shepard” to profess Julia’s beauty and the affection she creates in the poem’s speaking 
persona. As such, the poem appears to have no connection back to Horton; the “voice” of 
the speaker would seem to be that of the suitor, leaving no room for the author. However, 
the double voice of printed text undercuts the constitution of the “I” and “you” personas 
in order to reinstate Horton’s presence in the poem. The mediation of the page makes 
possible a disembodied and disembodying voice that upholds Horton’s personhood.  
Horton did not know Julia Shepard, nor did he love her, and the fictional speaking 
“I” of this poem thus exaggerates its unreality through seemingly sincere profession: 
Joy like the morning breaks from one divine 
Unveiling streams which can not fail to shine 
Long have I strove to magnify her name 
Imperial floating on the breeze of fame— 
 
Attracting beauty must delight afford 
Sought of the world and of the Bards adored 
Her grace of form and heart alluring pow'rs 
Express her more than fair, the queen of flow'rs 
 
Pleasure fond nature's stream from beauty sprang 
And was the softest strain the Muses sang 
Reverting sorrows into speachless joys 
Dispeling gloom which human peace destroys—Beauty. (“Acrostic” 1-12) 
 
The acrostic’s form complicates the supposedly authentic voice of “I” by emphasizing the 
deliberate position of text on the page. Rather than the sincerity associated with 
spontaneity, the arrangement of letters belies a craftedness that both punctures 
authenticity and undercuts the fantasy of a speaking persona. By fitting lines to the name 
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of “Julia Shepard,” the voice of the personified speaker is not autonomous but mediated 
by the page. Romance is created by the materialization of text instead of a personified 
voice. 
As a document meant to create intimacy between two people, this poem appears 
to privilege those human presences—the fictional speaker and the object of his 
affection—over all other voices or presences in the poem. Yet, a disembodied textual 
voice that spells out Julia’s name disrupts the constitution of a speaking “I,” and likewise, 
the constitution of Julia. The opening stanza’s reflexive discussion of “name” empties the 
fiction of the personified speaker and interlocutor to foreground the dehumanized 
determinations of words arranged on the page. The line “long have I strove to magnify 
her name” implies that the speaker has assailed to express his admiration for Julia, 
associating “name” with Julia’s person. The technology of the acrostic has finally 
allowed him to do so, but in the process he dehumanizes Julia, turning her from a person 
back into a “name,” or text on the page. “I” finally and successfully “magnifies” Julia, 
but the mention of “name” draws attention to the fact that this magnification is made 
possible by the acrostic form, rather than the expressive powers of the personified 
speaker.  
The poem acknowledges the redistribution of power from a speaking voice to the 
arrangement of the text. Through self-conscious references to speech and speechlessness, 
the poem attenuates the communicative power of the personified voice. The second 
stanza references “Bards,” yet revokes their powers of expression, perhaps alluding to the 
student who cannot compose but can only pose as the bardic creator of this poem. Instead 
of the bard’s words, Julia’s own “grace of form” and “heart alluring” actions “express her 
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more than fair.” But the use of “form” here indicates the poem’s self-conscious tension 
between personified voice and textual technology, as if Horton wanted to emphasize the 
power of the printed page over the suitor’s performance in order to sabotage the wooing. 
Julia’s bodily “form” may attest to her fairness, but the double meaning of this word 
suggests that instead, the “form” of the poem, here her name spread out to constitute the 
acrostic, expresses this fairness. In other words, the text of the page, not the imaginary 
speaking voice nor Julia’s body, would express her “fair.” Likewise, Julia becomes 
constituted by the visual materialization of the text. She is disembodied, dismembered 
even, and split up into the lines of the poem. 
Once Julia’s name has been spelled, the two remaining stanzas emphasize the 
fiction of a suitor’s voice by turning away from the self-conscious textuality 
foregrounded by the acrostic proper:  
But Goddess thou the di'mond of the fair 
Willt from thy brow repel affection's prayer 
And smile to hear the unavailing sigh 
With tears disolving from thy suppliant's eye— 
 
But light upon the beau to thee assignd 
And leave all els with disregard behind 
Then softly bind affection's sacred chain 
Never thro life to be broke off again (“Acrostic” 13-20) 
 
In his discussion of the poem, Jackson points out that “the gifting of poetry. . . was part of 
an embedded economy designed to create lasting affective bonds, and, in this case, to 
draw two people into the bonds of matrimony” (58). Here the suitor references these 
bonds, ultimately requesting that Julia “bind affection's sacred chain.” In order to 
communicate the suitor’s sincere feeling and achieve intimacy, these stanzas depict a 
forlorn speaking subject; yet this “I” has been revealed to be a dehumanized technology 
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of the page in the preceding stanzas. The suitor hopes to create a “sacred chain” that 
would never “be broke off again,” but forges these bonds through the insistent 
inauthenticity of a depersonalized and disembodied textual voice and the authorship of a 
stranger. Thus these last stanzas, rather than constructing the speaking subject through a 
profession of emotion, or creating Julia by describing the physical, pleasurable sensations 
she inspires, emphasize that the poetic creation of personhood is a performance of the 
personal. Horton alludes to what his printed “voice” must overcome: recognition that the 
intimate utterance of poetry is a fictional performance enabled by textual mediation. 
In a sense, this poem was deeply personal for Horton—not because of what his 
fictional speaker says, but because of the conditions of its composition. Horton was 
likewise “assignd” a “beau” who commissioned the work, and the text’s disembodiment 
of the fictional voice connects back to Horton’s position as the poet dislocated from his 
text. Just as Horton has to create the fictional voice of another person, disconnecting the 
poem from his self, this poem’s textual materialization of Julia’s name dislocates “voice” 
from a human speaker. Thus the reference to chains may not even be a reference to 
Horton’s enslavement. Jackson argues “the obligations engendered by the bestowal of 
gifts were precisely the ‘chains’ to which Horton’s poem on Julia Shepard referred, and 
which the initial gifting of the poem was designed to forge. It was a common enough 
trope” (57).  
Horton’s presence in this poem’s fictional voices and their mediation by the 
printed page suggests that all poems have a way of distancing and recalling their author. 
By performing the communicative exchange between others, Horton uses the poem to 
signal his own selfhood. Poems that concern Horton’s personal experience with chattel 
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slavery would appear to avoid distancing their author. However, even the 
autobiographical voice is subject to the dislocations of the page, and Horton’s poems 
about slavery similarly perform his personhood through the fiction of voice. Horton 
argues for his own freedom by evoking his magnanimous humanity in the poem “On 
Liberty and Slavery,” included in the 1829 collection. Like his poem “Slavery,” which 
also addressed his bondage, “these were not passive or defeatist poems that addressed 
God in displacing salvation from the here and now to the hereafter” (Jackson 63-64). 
Instead of expressing rage or hopeless self-pity, Horton discusses the burden of slavery, a 
grief that would be relieved by freedom. Slavery degrades him because of its exhausting 
torment, while freedom would bring a humanizing respite: 
Alas! and am I born for this, 
To wear this slavish chain? 
Deprived of all created bliss, 
Through hardship, toil and pain! (Hope 1-4) 
 
Through the question that begins this poem, “I” expresses disbelief that he should be born 
for slavery. The first stanza employs an implied rhetoric of equality to point out injustice: 
the speaking “I” is deprived of what others enjoy, creating an absurd and arbitrary 
inequality. The rest of the poem continues to impress the reader with slavery’s injustice 
by discussing the burden that has been randomly assigned to the speaker from birth: 
How long have I in bondage lain, 
And languished to be free! 
Alas! and must I still complain-- 
Deprived of liberty. 
 
Oh, Heaven! and is there no relief 
This side the silent grave-- 
To soothe the pain--to quell the grief 
And anguish of a slave? (Hope 5-12) 
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These two stanzas express the emotional experience of a slave in conditions that all 
readers can relate to. In order to constitute a broad sympathy, Horton emphasizes 
sensations of pain and relief without specifically describing their exact quality and 
source. The phrase “languished to be free” expresses how he pines for freedom, and 
“anguish” in the next stanza emphasizes the attendant pain of languishing by embedding 
“anguish” within the word. In the visual representation of languishing’s anguish, and in 
the mechanized, depersonalized near-perfect rhymes—lain/complain, free/liberty, 
relief/grief, grave/slave—the voice emphasizes its textual materialization in order to 
make its plea more deliberate. While the rhyme scheme and meter foreground the printed 
voice on the page rather than a subjective-expressive utterance, Horton harnesses these 
dehumanizing repetitions in order to constitute his self as a slave and a person. The 
mediation of the voice by the page makes communicable the conditions of slavery to his 
readers. As Cavitch explained, slave poetry’s meter captured the rhythms, restrictions, 
and dehumanization of slavery. Horton inscribes this disembodying meter in his poetic 
voice not to distance his self, but to make his self more transmittable and convincing. 
The next stanza addresses the joys of freedom, implying the relief the reader 
could make possible through subscriptions and donations: 
Come Liberty, thou cheerful sound, 
Roll through my ravished ears! 
Come, let my grief in joys be drowned, 
And drive away my fears. (Hope 13-16) 
 
Like anguish and relief, emotions understood to be felt but with no actual physical 
attributes, liberty becomes a phenomenon, a sound to “roll through” the speaker. The 
poem continues to be couched in sensations such as “ravished ears,” but the textual 
location and mediation of voice provides no body. This textual “voice” would appear to 
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disrupt the persuasiveness of an embodied speaker’s plea for freedom. The persistent 
abab rhyme scheme and ballad meter demonstrate the materialization of metrics on the 
page, evacuating the subjectivity of a fictional speaker. In order to avoid this dislocation, 
the poem emphasizes sensation. The fictional voice of the speaker discusses his physical 
and emotional feelings in order to insist upon the imaginary body of a suffering, speaking 
slave. This communication of physicality is enabled, not disabled, by the materialization 
of voice on the page. Printed words become associated with physical sensation; for 
example, freedom is a “cheerful” sound, a sensation that will “roll through” ears. In the 
previous stanza, the equation of grief with “pain” grants an emotional state a physical 
bearing. Likewise, this stanza associates emotional language with physical feeling 
through the textual mediation of voice to further communicate slavery’s sensations. In 
order to parry the dislocations of the textual voice, Horton employs the text on the page 
to communicate physical sensations and complex emotional concepts. Feelings exist in 
both senses of the word—emotions and physical sensations—and this duality is made 
possible through the mediation of printed text. Conflating the two convinces readers of 
Horton’s actual self even though voice becomes disembodied on the page. 
The poem continues to discuss “liberty” as a sound that acts upon the body. 
Liberty may not constitute a physical change to the body’s state, but like sound, it is a 
sensation of reception, something without physical substance that is nevertheless 
internalized: 
Say unto foul oppression, Cease: 
Ye tyrants rage no more, 
And let the joyful trump of peace, 
Now bid the vassal soar. 
 
Soar on the pinions of that dove 
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Which long has cooed for thee, 
And breathed her notes from Afric's grove, 
The sound of Liberty. 
 
Oh, Liberty! thou golden prize, 
So often sought by blood-- 
We crave thy sacred sun to rise, 
The gift of nature's God: (Hope 17-28) 
 
Liberty is associated with sound, a physical sensation. Liberty’s resultant peace likewise 
has a sound; peace may “trump” in the sense of excelling or triumphing, but “trump” also 
connotes a trumpet sounding peace, a fanfare encouraging the “vassal soar.” Horton 
discusses “the sound of liberty” because freedom and sound share the same physical and 
textual paradox. Liberty, like sound, will not physically impact or change Horton’s body; 
yet, like sound, it is characterized as a physical sensation. Liberty is made legible through 
the printed page in the same way that sound or “voice” is represented through the printed 
text. Liberty and sound are felt but not seen, invisible without the mediation of the text. 
Horton relies on sound in this poem to convey the meaning of liberty despite the printed 
text’s erasure of the person liberty would create. In this way Horton exploits the printed 
page to make a plea for his disembodied self. Both Horton and liberty are abstract 
concepts for the reader, but they become realities through a textual representation of 
voice that discusses hearing although it cannot be heard. By linking the abstract concept 
of liberty to physical effects through the textual materialization of voice, Horton may 
communicate his embodied, enslaved existence. Hence the emphasis on voice and sound 
in these stanzas: speaking to oppression, cooing doves, breathing notes. 
 In addition to freedom’s soothing sounds, the poem associates freedom with 
flight: the vassal soars, the dove flies, the sun rises. The next stanzas return to slavery and 
reverse this movement, moving from ascension and action to descent and rest. Despite 
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the change in movement, these last stanzas continue to emphasize embodiment through a 
profusion and confusion of metaphors: 
Bid Slavery hide her haggard face, 
And barbarism fly: 
I scorn to see the sad disgrace 
In which enslaved I lie. 
 
Dear Liberty! upon thy breast, 
I languish to respire; 
And like the Swan unto her nest, 
I'd to thy smiles retire. 
 
Oh, blest asylum--heavenly balm! 
Unto thy boughs I flee-- 
And in thy shades the storm shall calm, 
With songs of Liberty! (Hope 29-40) 
 
Slavery has a face, as does liberty with its “smiles.” In fact, liberty is now an entire body, 
not just a sound, with a maternal “breast” on which to “respire.” While liberty has 
become a protective tree, the last line returns to its sounds. However, we cannot tell if it 
is the “I” speaker or Liberty herself who sings the “songs of Liberty.” Liberty has a voice 
that merges with the speaker’s. This closing emphasizes the poetic polyvocality of the 
printed text: “I” has a voice, as does liberty, while a textual voice gestures to the rhythms 
and restraints of slavery that exist beyond the page. Horton tries to create a self-enclosed 
and self-possessed subject who deserves freedom because of his status as a person, but 
the printed text makes his self-enclosure impossible: he is communicating interiority to 
prove his selfhood to readers. By emphasizing embodiment through textual “sensations” 
of sound and liberty, Horton seeks to overcome the exposure of his supposed interiority 
in order to link his poetry back to his empirical, enclosed, and enslaved self. Horton 
strives to inscribe his body on the page in order to combat the inability to possess his self. 
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Due to this impossibility, Horton in a sense enslaves the dislocated voice of the text to 
complete his self-possession. 
Dunbar and Voice’s Dislocations  
Horton had to perform his interiority which prevented him from enclosing his 
self. To combat this incompletion he employed the dislocations of the printed page to 
revive his physical and phenomenological experience. The textual mediation of voice 
allowed him to construct his body without exposing or performing his interiority. Hence 
he used printed words to represent “feelings,” or physical feelings, in place of emotional 
feelings to ensure his self-enclosure and prevent his self-exposure. Horton thus inscribed 
his self on the page, using the textual mediation of voice to construct his body and his 
seemingly enclosed selfhood. 
While Horton employed both the fictional “I” and its depersonifying textual 
materialization to attempt to inscribe his self on the page, Dunbar reversed this practice. 
Dunbar recognized that the perfect self-enclosure and self-possession that Horton sought 
were impossible: the self was always permeable through a communicative exchange with 
others and always subject to influences beyond the individual’s control. Thus, he would 
and could not use the poetic “voice” to inscribe his self on the page. His poetry subtly 
avoided the direct association between poet and poem that Horton hoped to inscribe. 
Dunbar demonstrated that inscribing the self to the page was oppressive: it 
amounted to permanently wearing a mask or being caged, forms of subjugation to be 
avoided because they limited identity and expression. In order to avoid this confining and 
rigid essentialization of identity, Dunbar’s poems foregrounded the fundamental double-
sidedness of “voice” that offered both the illusion and the erasure of a self. Considered 
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the “poet of his people,” Dunbar experienced his poetry being transformed into 
something that both exceeded his person yet formed a rigid identity beyond his reach 
(Daigle 634). Dunbar thus encountered the same problem of self-possession as Horton, 
even though he was legally free to possess himself. In order to avoid constituting an 
immovable mask that was read as his self at the turn of the century, Dunbar exaggerated 
the fiction of a speaking persona to make clear that the “I” speaker was a performance, a 
mask, but one that ultimately had no actor behind it. The results, however, are slippery 
poems that create personas whose messages and meanings are sometimes contradictory 
or confusing. But Dunbar creates the possibility of multiple meanings in order to avoid 
enslaving his own self to the page. By writing poems that appear to be expressions of 
racial identity, Dunbar demonstrates that race is a textual fiction that does not exist on the 
page, a possible explanation for his writing as both a progressive advocate for African 
American rights and as a retrograde entertainer performing the plantation myth.  
Dunbar’s emphasis on the fiction of a black voice in print does not mean that the 
injustices against African Americans that Dunbar called attention to were equally 
fictional. At the turn of the century, a new generation of African American citizens still 
had to prove their personhood by communicating their inner selves. But due to the 
pervasiveness and the history of minstrelsy in the post-bellum U.S. culture, African 
American public expression was connected to minstrelsy’s denigrations.2 Jonathan 
Daigle, in his discussion of Dunbar’s librettos and theatrical collaborations, explains 
“with its minstrel roots, the emerging black theater could not easily convince racist white 
audiences of black humanity” (637). The ubiquity of minstrelsy had the potential to make 
public expression by African American artists appear performative and ridiculous. By 
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fragmenting the performance of identity, giving it a range of voices, speakers, and masks, 
Dunbar was able to combat turn-of-the-century racist reductions. The fictional masks 
created by his poetic voice echoed how African Americans had to mask their expression 
in the public, white world.  
In order to demonstrate that racial identity could not be confined to minstrelsy or 
to the single voice on the page, Dunbar employed the fiction of a speaker in order to 
access a phenomenological realm of sound. Divested of its oral component, text on the 
page hints at the qualities that it has lost as a result of its inscription; Griffiths explains, 
“my self is my voice, the uttered agent in a significant medium, but the medium exacts, 
as the cost of utterance, a loss of immediate physical particularity” (64). The printed 
poem’s “mute polyphony” allowed Dunbar to fracture the fiction of textual inscription in 
order to locate selfhood beyond the page (Griffiths 66). Indeed, poems that could be 
understood to be Dunbar speaking avoid this inscription because “the poet’s voice is not 
the voice of the person who is the poet” (Griffiths 67). Dunbar’s dialect poems emphasize 
the performance of a persona by creating a textual voice based on the way words sound 
when spoken out loud. Although they are not direct transcriptions, these poems create an 
intersection between oral and printed poetry that duplicates the exchange between 
speakers and listeners.3 In his discussion of oral poetry, Zumthor argues that “the 
discourse of the poem cannot be in itself its own end. . . Within the vibration of voice, the 
thread that connects so many signals or experientially determined markers to the text is 
stretched to the breaking point” (127). The spoken voice of oral poetry retains and 
communicates physical and psychological features that the written text freezes or 
effaces.4 Zumthor explains that “from its initial outburst poetry aspires, like an ideal term, 
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to purify itself from semantic constraints, to get outside language, ahead of a fullness 
where everything that is not simple presence would be abolished. Writing occults or 
represses this aspiration. Oral poetry, in contrast, welcomes its phantasms and tries to 
give them form” (128). While written poetry may appear hopelessly incapable of 
capturing oral poetry’s unique “phantasms,” Dunbar’s dialect poems contain residues of 
this oral voice. Dunbar tries to merge written and oral poetry through a textual inscription 
of dialect. By trying to get “outside language,” Dunbar’s representations of spoken 
dialect uphold these excesses in order to maintain the existence of poetically constructed 
personhood that exists off the page. The double voice of printed dialect insists on its 
reality beyond the page in order to demonstrate that selfhood cannot be inscribed.  
Indeed, readers took Dunbar’s dialect to be the authentic expression of African 
American experience, but not because they imagined a black person or Dunbar himself 
talking. By placing dialect in traditional poetic forms and meters, Dunbar was able to 
combine the oral voice implied by printed poetry via the textual materialization of voice. 
In doing so, Dunbar’s poems did not create or dislocate speaking subjects; rather they 
were perceived as communicating the larger experience of his race. As Michael Cohen 
explains: 
19th-century readers substituted abstractions of genre for persons and personal 
voices, so that certain kinds of poems came to stand for certain kinds of social 
experience. Therefore, when writers, readers, and critics of dialect poetry 
described dialect poems as though they were like ballads and spirituals, they did 
so to authenticate dialect poems as the expressions of racialized folk groups, no 
matter who actually wrote the poems. . . While Dunbar was no doubt read within 
the valence of minstrelsy, his popularity as a dialect poet derived more 
particularly from the ways that his poems were understood to supersede 
minstrelsy by providing a more authentic look at the real black folk. 248 
 
 ! 169!
Because his dialect poems were understood within broader generic categories, Dunbar’s 
emphasis on the fictional voice of the poem and the mediation of the page was read as 
constituting his race’s realities. Rather than inscribing the black subject on the page, 
Dunbar engaged the poetics of voice to both communicate the impossibility of the poetic 
self and the experience of “real black folk.” For example, Dunbar’s “An Ante-bellum 
Sermon” demonstrates the polyvocality of the printed voice in order to give expression to 
a “racialized folk group[]” beyond the page. In “An Ante-bellum Sermon,” a figured 
preacher gives a sermon on the Exodus story, an explicit and popular metaphor for 
emancipation. Presumably a slave preacher who could be punished for fomenting 
abolitionist sentiments, the speaker often reminds his listeners that he is not discussing 
the present: “I'm still a-preachin' ancient, / I ain't talkin' 'bout to-day” (lines 39-40). 
However, he uses the Bible story to represent dual meanings. Its miracles enhance belief 
in “de Lawd,” while its symbolic narrative promises emancipation for the enslaved. The 
preacher’s repeated insistence on the facts of the “ancient” tale and his denial of a 
meaning applicable to “to-day” manages to highlight this second, more subversive lesson. 
What appears to be authentic, earnest speech is used to express disingenuousness, and 
this duality disrupts the coherence of this preacher’s voice. The preacher’s 
communication of the dual meanings of the Exodus story represents the multiple vocal 
possibilities of the printed poem. The last three stanzas of this poem depict this 
proliferation both in the preacher’s message and in the poetics of his printed voice: 
So you see de Lawd's intention, 
Evah sence de worl' began, 
Was dat His almighty freedom 
Should belong to evah man, 
But I think it would be bettah, 
Ef I'd pause agin to say, 
 ! 170!
Dat I'm talkin' 'bout ouah freedom 
In a Bibleistic way. 
 
But de Moses is a-comin', 
An' he's comin' suah and fas'. 
We kin hyeah his feet a-trompin', 
We kin hyeah his trumpit blas'. 
But I want to wa'n you people, 
Don't you git too brigity; 
An' don't you git to braggin' 
'Bout dese things, you wait an' see. (65-80) 
 
These two stanzas set up a rhetorical pattern of invocation and rejection that will be 
repeated in the next and final stanza. The preacher gestures to the “almighty freedom” 
implied by the Exodus story, but explicitly denies the story’s interpretation beyond the 
literal “Bibleistic way.” While Dunbar creates a speaker whose message is mixed, his 
trochaic meter is straightforward and consistent. Lines alternate between eight and seven 
syllables, but Dunbar subtly disrupts this pattern in the last two stanzas. The penultimate 
and the final stanzas reduce their seventh lines, which should be eight syllables, by one 
syllable. For example, “An' don't you git to braggin” is missing its last syllable, and this 
oversight repeats the meter from the previous line, “Don't you git too brigity.” The 
preacher wants to warn his listeners not to brag or get “brigity” because of the inevitable 
freedom signified by his sermon, and the meter helps emphasize these warning by 
repeating the syllables and stresses in back-to-back lines. Thus the “spoken” voice 
contains a metrical, depersonalized meaning that reinforces the preacher’s unspoken or 
symbolic message of emancipation. In other words, we can understand the double voice 
of the printed page as a symbolic representation of the double meaning in the preacher’s 
“voice.” Just as he does not “voice” this other meaning, the unspoken “voice” of the 
printed page assists in communicating the preacher’s meaning. What goes unspoken is 
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then as important as what is explicitly transmitted, and Dunbar proves that self-
expression does not have to printed or voiced in order to communicate with a public. 
 The last stanza emphasizes the printed representation of voice in order to 
acknowledge the spoken voice that exists beyond and free of the page. Dunbar does this 
to assert that selfhood likewise exists beyond and free of the page. The printed voice 
foregrounds its doubleness by gesturing to the spoken voice’s ability to convey a 
meaning not couched in words: 
But when Moses wif his powah 
Comes an' sets us chillun free, 
We will praise de gracious Mastah 
Dat has gin us liberty; 
An' we'll shout ouah halleluyahs, 
On dat mighty reck'nin day, 
When we'se reco'nised ez citiz'-- 
Huh uh! Chillun, let us pray! (81-88) 
 
The end of this poem extends the pattern of the previous two, asserting that the arrival of 
a modern day Moses is imminent while simultaneously attempting to negate this 
message. The use of “Mastah” is ambiguous: it could be a praise to “de Lawd,” it could 
refer to the great emancipator, Lincoln, or it could even thank a plantation master who 
frees his slaves. The inarticulate last two lines of the poem continue this confusion. The 
preacher cuts himself off as he begins to say “citizens,” which could indicate a number of 
events in the fictional world of the poem: he could recognize that asserting a radical 
political equality as citizens of the United States is a dangerous practice, or perhaps 
someone has interrupted his sermon. Whatever the reason, the next phrase, “huh uh!” 
indicates negation and a stop.5 “Huh uh!” could refer to the speaker’s refusal to let this 
political voice through, or it could be a suppression of his hope for freedom. Regardless, 
in the way that “citiz’--” abruptly cuts off and in the ambiguous negation of “huh uh,” the 
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printed text gestures to speech and the conditions affecting the utterance of these last two 
lines. The poem culminates in events the page cannot possibly capture, signaled by a 
visual depiction of speech. Something occurs so that the preacher cannot put his meaning 
into words. Dunbar’s invocation of the oral voice recalls those meanings outside 
language and beyond the printed voice. 
 “An Ante-bellum Sermon” creates polyvocality even when it seems to be the 
fictional utterance of a single imaginary character. The preacher symbolizes the 
possibilities of multiple voices in the double messages of his own preaching. Through the 
textual mediation of the poem’s single, fictional speaker, multiple voices emerge such as 
the depersonalized “voice” of meter and a spoken voice that shadows the printed text. 
Dunbar’s poems offer the illusion of a unified speaking voice on the page while 
simultaneously disrupting that singularity and cohesion. The printed poetic voice in 
Dunbar’s poems is never stable. He uses that very instability to communicate that the 
impossibility of inscribing singular, self-enclosed subjectivity on the page. Selfhood is 
similarly unstable, not to be taken at face value, and suspect by others—much like the 
preacher’s experience in “An Ante-bellum Sermon.” 
The double voice of the printed page is present in all of Dunbar’s poems, but 
critics most often locate it in his dialect poetry. However Dunbar’s poems in “standard” 
English may likewise be read as textual representations of a speaking persona. Both 
“majors” in standard English and “minors” in African American vernacular communicate 
the complications surrounding public recognition of African American selfhood 
regardless of whether the poem “sounds” like Dunbar. In fact, as Gavin Jones explains, 
“Dunbar tends to place poems in black dialect beside poems in orthodox English—a 
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technique he repeated in his public recitals—thus making us aware that there is no natural 
connection between the poet and any single language” (196). Dunbar’s public readings 
demonstrate that no single “voice” constitutes his self; the performance of these poems 
exaggerates the public and textual performance of selfhood in Dunbar’s poems. Dunbar 
addresses the tension between fictional voice and personal experience in the poem “We 
Wear the Mask” (Lyric of Lowly Life, 1896). This work extends the polyvocality made 
possible by the page to call attention to the way these voices were received. Just as the 
voice of a poem becomes multiple and detached from a speaker, Dunbar’s poem 
demonstrates that the “listener” or reader is similarly multiple. Within this diverse 
audience, certain members are simultaneously invoked and even ignored. Readers of this 
poem are directed to recognize the presence of other audiences, disrupting the enclosure 
of the seemingly isolated interlocutor. Instead of the traditional and singular “I-You” 
relationship of poetry, Dunbar shows how the poetics of voice can multiply the possible 
interlocutors in these positions. 
As the title indicates, this poem will discuss masking in African American public 
expression. The poem’s first line, “We wear the mask that grins and lies,” explains that 
“we” wear a cheery facade in order to cover up grief, alluding to the fictional selves that 
African Americans have to present to a white reading public. Some may understand what 
is presented to them by the mask, while others may understand what the mask conceals. 
But by admitting that “we” wears a mask, the entire poem opens itself to the possibility 
of duplicity: how do we know that this voice is sincere when it readily admits to 
masking? This skepticism keeps the straightforward assertions of the poem from ever 
becoming single and static. “We” wears a mask, and because, in addition, it lies, its 
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claims may have multiple meanings or no meaning at all. Dunbar engages the mask’s 
levels of address to avoid limiting representation to one audience and one voice.  
The first stanza addresses the pain that this masking covers up, and suggests that 
“we” must bear the punishment for humanity’s cunning: 
We wear the mask that grins and lies, 
It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes,-- 
This debt we pay to human guile; 
With torn and bleeding hearts we smile, 
And mouth with myriad subtleties. (1-5) 
 
While “we” expresses the many, they are joined into a univocal speaking voice on the 
page. Such a condensation of what seems to be the representative voice of African 
American artistic expression could easily inscribe and essentialize racial representation 
on the page. From the first line, however, this poem makes it difficult to pin down the 
group this “we” voice represents because we know this voice is a “mask” and that it 
“lies.” Unlike Horton’s poetic voice that emphasized its transparent and sincere 
expression, Dunbar tells us that what the world perceives as transparency and sincerity 
are performed. The poem’s “voice” offers other unavailable and unarticulated meanings, 
and the instability of the fictional “we” likewise renders the position of the addressee 
unstable. The reader cannot be certain if the speaker addresses her or another audience 
altogether. Through the performance of a supposed sincerity that simultaneously 
undercuts both its transparency and the stable position of the interlocutor, Dunbar 
disrupts poetic address to render the speaker-audience relationship un-enclosable. 
“We Wear the Mask” reveals by what it purports to conceal, exposing the 
speaker’s torn heart as he attempts to mask it. By alluding to facial and body parts—
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mouths, cheeks, eyes, hearts—it constructs a body that houses an emotional interior. The 
second stanza elaborates on the exposure of this hidden self: 
Why should the world be over-wise, 
In counting all our tears and sighs? 
Nay, let them only see us, while 
We wear the mask. (6-9) 
 
As if holding back in self-protection, this stanza is the shortest of the poem. Indeed, the 
“tears and sighs” suggest vulnerability and the need for a mask that projects an exterior 
strength. This stanza does not specify the consequences of letting the world see beneath 
the mask, and the poem thus protects itself, withholding the damage of such a revelation 
even as it confesses that something lies beneath its exterior. The speaker presents the 
reader with what appears to be transparency, but he merely gestures to interiority without 
illuminating what resides within. In other words, “we” knows why the world should not 
be “over-wise,” but the reader is not privy to this reason. Such concealment suggests that 
public access to this private interior would constitute a violation. Dunbar conceals the 
interiority that would constitute poetic personhood and confronts the paradox of African 
American poetic subjectivity: to perform interiority would prove subjectivity, but the 
very act of profession makes self-possession and enclosure impossible. By revealing what 
cannot be revealed, Dunbar troubles the poetic constitution of personhood. The reader 
cannot participate in this self-exposure or self-construction. 
The second stanza cuts itself in half, suggesting that those lines that would make 
it equal to stanzas one and three are concealed or suppressed. At the same time, the 
second stanza introduces “we wear the mask” as a kind of refrain, a disembodied phrase 
whose emergence ruptures the cohesion of what would appear to be a speaking person.6 
As it becomes a refrain, “we” does not seem to have control over the placement of the 
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phrase. Hence the second stanza cuts itself off while the third stanza could end without 
the independent clause of its last line: 
We smile, but, O great Christ, our cries 
To thee from tortured souls arise. 
We sing, but oh the clay is vile 
Beneath our feet, and long the mile; 
But let the world dream otherwise, 
We wear the mask! (10-15) 
 
Christ is the listener to whom these voices reveal their true selves, but the speaker further 
discusses his act of concealment, obscuring what the mask covers. In a play on clay feet, 
the speaker suggests that the world does not perceive the hidden faults of these singers. 
Yet the continued constitution of a figured body—souls, feet—is disrupted by the textual 
voice of the poem. Its prosodic features inject a voice that does not relate back to the 
personified body/bodies of a speaking “we.” Iambic tetrameter persists throughout the 
entire poem except for the lines “We wear the mask” at the ends of stanzas two and three. 
The poem also employs the same rhyme scheme, using words that rhyme only with “lies” 
and “guile,” and leaving the refrain line’s “mask” without any rhyming counterparts. The 
repetitive meter and repetitive rhymes lend the poem a hypnotic quality that is jarred by 
the assertion of the mask. In a poem that laments wearing a mask, the rhyme and meter 
regulate that lament, suggesting that expression is still not free. If this is the voice of a 
person or group trying to confide in a reader, then the confession tries to overcome its 
confinement by revealing restriction in brief, contrasting moments of metrical 
irregularity.  
But just because the fictional voice creates a mask in the shape of a personified 
speaker does not mean that once exposed, its message is powerless and meaningless. 
Rather, the mask itself creates a powerful rhetoric and communicative tool for poets to 
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reach out to readers. Dunbar extends this double voice in other poems. Whereas “An 
Ante-bellum Sermon” featured a single fictional speaker masking his speech, and “We 
Wear the Mask” depicted a unified “we” speaker creating a mask out of seemingly 
sincerity, Dunbar continues to exaggerate the personified speakers, double voices, and 
supposed authenticity of poetry. By taking what appears to be his own autobiographical 
voice personified on the page, Dunbar adds another layer to the ability of voice to mask 
and double itself, and continues to fragment interlocutors into multiple presences.  
“To Kelly Miller, Jr.,” an inscription Dunbar writes on the flyleaf of his first work 
Oak and Ivy (1893), demonstrates how the seemingly sincere autobiographical voice can 
elude inscription. The autograph ostensibly captures the biographical author on the page, 
and authenticates that the text connects back to him. Like the printed words on the page, 
the author prints his name to transform the fiction of voice into the reality of the author’s 
existence. Dunbar’s inscription, however, makes his person and experience unintelligible 
rather than legible and real. While we know Dunbar is a person and an author (his photo 
was even included in Oak and Ivy), this fragment exploits the double voice of the printed 
text in order to make his own autobiographical voice into a mask or a fiction. Dunbar 
makes himself into an other by addressing Kelly Miller Jr. as himself; as Walter J. Ong 
argues, “every human word implies not only the existence—at least in the imagination—
of another to whom the word is uttered, but it also implies that the speaker has a kind of 
otherness within himself” (52). To write himself onto the page means that Dunbar has to 
gain some distance from his self and thereby dislocates his own being into a textual 
inscription. While an autograph is supposed to attest the person it represents as the 
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originating, creative force behind a work, this inscription instead attests to the shifting 
nature of the voice on the page and how poet becomes detached from his poem: 
Dear Kelly, when I was a kid 
I wrote this book: that’s what I did. 
When you grow up—I may be dead— 
You allus think o’ what I said, 
Dat you gon’ mek yo’ ma’k fu’ true, 
Cos, Kelly M—, I bets on you. (1-6) 
 
The poem begins in a conversational tone rather than a poetic meter. A steady iambic 
tetrameter picks up in the second line, signaling that the “voice” of the first line—
unmetered, and unaware of its place in a rhyming couplet—has been replaced with the 
mechanics of meter. While the meter persists through the rest of the fragment, Dunbar’s 
voice shifts. In line 4, the poem slips into the black vernacular dialect. Notably, this slip 
occurs when Dunbar tells Kelly to always remember what he said. The “I” tells Kelly that 
he believes that Kelly will “mek yo’ ma’k” or make an impression or difference, an 
assertion that will give young Kelly confidence and guidance as he grows up. “I” 
encourages Kelly to remember what he “said” and yet “I” both becomes an unstable 
identity who does not actually “speak” in this moment. Such doubleness, echoed in the 
poems above, denotes insincerity and slippery identity rather than authentic 
autobiography. Dunbar uses the autograph not to authenticate and stabilize his 
subjectivity but to destabilize the inscription of his identity onto the page. Because the 
poem does not inscribe Dunbar onto the page, it makes possible a range of voices that 
exist both due to and beyond the reach of his authorship. Dunbar recognizes that the 
poetic voice is multiple but somehow that multiplicity points back to the authenticity of 
an author. As we have seen, the instability of the voice on the page would indicate 
Dunbar’s autograph. Dunbar creates identity by displacing it. 
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1To view an image of this page, see UNC’s Documenting the American South, 
http://docsouth.unc.edu/true/mss03-06/mss03-06.html 
 
2See Eric Lott, 4-7. He explains that “the minstrel show has been ubiquitous, cultural 
common coin; it has been so central to the lives of North Americans that we are hardly 
aware of its extraordinary influence” (4). 
 
3The failure to “dictate to his reader because he cannot always dictate his voice into 
print” actually constitutes “a discovery of the conditions of essential reciprocity in the 
exchanges which take place between writers and readers” (Griffiths 65). 
 
4Even Francis Berry’s misguided assertion that men make better poets because voice 
resounds in their larger chest cavity alludes to the intimate relationship between the 
physical and psychological that the oral voice creates (37-38). 
 
5“Huh-uh” is listed in the OED as “an expression of negation.” Its reverse, “uh-huh” 
indicates affirmation. 
 
6See Cavitch, “Stephen Crane’s Refrain” in ESQ!54: 1-4 (2008): 33-53. 
CONCLUSION 
LYRIC FAILURE 
Lyric’s expression must both fashion an ideal self and assume its preexistence. 
While expression is key to recognizing the lyric and liberal self, the self has to already 
exist in order to express it. Lyric thus faces the impossible task of creating selfhood by 
communicating it. Furthermore, because lyric creates liberal self-enclosure through the 
“overheard” performance of privacy, it contends with the constitution of interiority 
through communication. This communicative imperative appears to expose the self rather 
than possess the self. Hence, poets enter into a fundamentally flawed vocation. The ideal 
self was a project always doomed to failure. Thus lyric provides insight into a poetics of 
impossibility that is simultaneous with the effort to articulate the self across the 
nineteenth century.  
In the Introduction I discussed the social, political, and economic influences that 
lead to the ideal of liberal subjectivity; these same influences also contribute to its failure 
as well as lyric’s failure to achieve perfect selfhood. According to Scott Sandage, 
“nineteenth-century Americans had to learn to live in a new world where the sky was 
always falling” (22). I have discussed how this sense of instability led to a crisis of 
selfhood. The optimistic, ideal selfhood that was projected in the face of these ongoing 
crises tried to obscure the fact that often, the sky just fell on people. In fact, the 
nineteenth-century consolidation of ideal liberal subjectivity corresponded to the history 
of failure. The autonomous individualism that underpinned the myth of American 
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bootstrapping obscured the failures of many. “Panic,” both personal and financial, was 
the norm in nineteenth-century America. Sandage explains that by the time of the 
economic panic of 1893, the nation “had endured the panic of 1819, 1837, 1857, and 
1873; numerous minor dips; and a civil war,” or nearly a century of constant crisis (17). 
Economic failure was equated with personal failure; failure was perceived “as ‘a moral 
sieve’ that trapped the loafer and passed the true man through. Such ideologies fixed 
blame squarely on individual faults, not extenuating circumstances” (Sandage 17). The 
presence of a “burgeoning genre of success stories and primers long before Horatio 
Alger” asserted that “a winner never quits” (Sandage 17). Sandage comments, “the 
American who fails is a prophet without honor in his own country. Our creed is that hard 
work earns prosperity and prestige. . . Quitters never win. Failure builds character” (18). 
Numerous examples of this philosophy exist in nineteenth-century prose, from 
biographies of famous men, such as The Life of P.T. Barnum (1855), to success manuals 
at the end of the century, such as Portraits and Principles of the World’s Great Men and 
Women With Practical Lessons on Successful Life By Over Fifty Leading Thinkers from 
1898. According to the included essay, “Footprints of Failure” by Reverend James W. 
Cole, “we say that success is the exception and failure the rule of life. Not so” (King 74). 
While the loser is far more common, popular literature privileges the winners. I would 
suggest that lyric offers a respite and a unique realm for the failure of the self. 
Indeed, the expression of this failure is useful because poets and readers could 
constitute community though the mutual recognition of the self’s collapse. The poetry 
examined here approaches the self with the knowledge of its impossibility and the hope 
this acknowledgment will nevertheless enable a productive union of deficient people. 
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Antebellum poets such as Longfellow, Whitman, Osgood, and Horton are not naïve in 
their promotion of a self-enclosed subject; rather they believed that transmitting the 
possibility of selfhood could forge fraternity or even freedom. For Longfellow and 
Whitman, belief in this self could serve the project of national unity. For Osgood and 
Horton, access to liberal selfhood was barred, but belief in its ideal helped them locate a 
public space in which their “voices” could be heard. 
Crane, Robinson, Millay, and Dunbar emptied the promise of ideal selfhood 
articulated by these predecessors, but by upholding the unity that belief in the self 
inspired, they were able to reconstitute selfhood for a modern era. Because they 
experienced “a Gilded Age that was also a great depression,” they practiced a poetics of 
failure meant to revise the poetic self (Sandage 228). There is perhaps no better poet than 
Edwin Arlington Robinson when it comes to articulating failure. Robinson’s first self-
published work, The Torrent and the Night Before, coincided with the economic panic of 
1893; he, Crane, Dunbar, and Millay watched “the century peter[] out amid farmer’s 
revolts, the advent of Jim Crow, currency wars over the gold and silver standards, 
antitrust debates, bloody labor strikes, and ‘Coxey’s Army’ of unemployed men 
marching on Washington” (Sandage 228). Robinson’s sonnet, “On the Night of a 
Friend’s Wedding,” from this collection reflects this sense of failure: 
If ever I am old, and all alone, 
I shall have killed one grief, at any rate; 
For then, thank God, I shall not have to wait 
Much longer for the sheaves that I have sown. 
The devil only knows what I have done, 
But here I am, and here are six or eight 
Good friends, who most ingenuously prate 
About my songs to such and such a one. 
 
But everything is all askew to-night, — 
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As if the time were come, or almost come, 
For their untenanted mirage of me 
To lose itself and crumble out of sight, 
Like a tall ship that floats above the foam 
A little while, and then breaks utterly. (1-14) 
 
This is a poem about the failure of lyric to craft and communicate the self. The sonnet 
begins with “I” looking forward to old age because then he will be closer to death, when 
he can finally reap what he has “sown.” In a play on words, “sheaves” both indicates 
harvest and stacks of pages, presumably pages of lyric poetry given the use of “songs” at 
the end of the stanza. Robinson’s double meaning denotes the dissemination of stacks of 
poems and the reaping of their public reception. But the next lines suggest that this will 
not be a rewarding harvest since “the devil only knows” what has been distributed. While 
the speaker is successful enough for his friends to know and prate about his “songs,” this 
positive reception of his works will not return to him the kind of recognition or 
understanding he desires. Hence he cannot wait to reclaim these works from the hands of 
his supposed friends. The spondee “Good friends” causes a break in the iambic 
pentameter; the caesura enforced by the comma literally and metaphorically gives us 
pause and renders the goodness of these friends ironic. Their prating indicates that they 
have not interpreted these songs accordingly; instead they make the work of “I” into 
trivial chatter. Because his friends artlessly babble, we recognize that “I” will only truly 
be known by the devil. This octave does not communicate lyric’s ability to construct 
selfhood through reflection and recognition. Instead, we experience Robinson’s 
nightmare of lyric failure. 
The sestet turns from the inadequacies of the speaker and his friends to the effects 
of these deficiencies. The friends’ inattention to the celebration at hand and their inability 
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as readers and critics seems to bode a final failure. The “untenanted mirage” that these 
friends perceive will finally “crumble.” Like the shipwreck imagery that has been 
employed by many of the poets in this project, the breaking apart of the symbolic ship 
signifies the collapse of this imaginary self. While the sonnet ends with the wreckage of 
his failure, it presents the possibility that false, fallen selfhood will disintegrate. Robinson 
does not indicate what will take the place of this improbable self, but the possibility exists 
for a revised selfhood recognizable by all, not just the devil, for what it is. At the very 
least, friends are brought together around the mirage of the self. The untenanted fantasy 
will finally “lose itself” but not before forging a social unity at the expense of the 
speaker. His failure offers a sad sacrifice in hope of the rejuvenantion of socially 
recognized and socially unifying selfhood. 
 Poems like this are not difficult to find in Robinson’s works, the difficulty is 
choosing among them. Robinson’s concern with failure stems from his historical 
circumstances, certainly, but this sense of failure inheres in the poetry of lyric selfhood. 
Robinson’s poems about limited, flawed characters, Crane’s poems about the universe’s 
indifference to the human condition, Millay’s poems about impossible and self-negating 
love, and Dunbar’s poems about masks without actors all reveal the failures of ideal 
selfhood at the turn of the century. These poets inherit the paradoxes and inherent 
impossibility of lyric subjectivity from their predecessors’ failures, but attempt to 
reassemble the self for a modern era by employing their fantasy of ideal selfhood. 
Robinson, like Crane, Millay, and Dunbar, explore, mourn, and re-vision the ideal 
selfhood Longfellow, Whitman, Osgood, and Horton communicated, hoping to forge the 
community they know this failed fantasy is capable of creating. 
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These poets contend with an impossible ideal of selfhood that nevertheless meant 
to encourage union through a shared vision of self-possession. The juxtapositions 
examined here create a variant of American exceptionalism in which failure to achieve 
the liberty, equality, and autonomy of liberal subjectivity constitutes the grounds of a 
national fraternity based on shared and unattainable beliefs. These poets articulate the 
defeat underpinning American exemplarity; yet the bravado of American liberal 
subjectivity constitutes a humble union of those courageous enough to admit failure. 
Lyric’s aspirations to its own impossibility create a productive tension that serves this 
purpose across the nineteenth century. 
The history of lyric in the nineteenth century has important ramifications for how 
we understand lyric in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Modern accounts of lyric, 
however, have largely been based on longstanding critical misinterpretations. Such 
scholarship situates nineteenth-century lyric in a position of overt idealism that permits 
its wholesale rejection by modernist poetics. This project revises such critical oversights 
by demonstrating that the turn-of-the-century lyric was continuous with the concerns of 
the modernist movement. Indeed, both modernists and turn-of-the-century poets look 
backward but differ in how they engage that inheritance; “even when modernist authors 
are making it new, they are inevitably grappling with the old: backwardness is a feature 
of even the most forward-looking modernist literature” (Love 6). 
Recent scholars recovering the history of lyric argue that by the turn of the 
century, contemporary literary editors and critics determined lyric poetry to be ideal and 
transcendent, sheltered from historical influences. Shira Wolosky points out that:  
. . . the notion of poetry as a self-enclosed aesthetic realm; as a formal object to be 
approached through more or less exclusively specified categories of formal 
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analysis; as metahistorically transcendent; and as a text deploying a distinct and 
poetically ‘pure’ language: these notions seem only to begin to emerge at the end 
of the nineteenth century, in a process that is itself peculiarly shaped in response 
to social and historical no less than aesthetic trends. “Claims” 14  
 
Citing Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads as an example, Jackson argues “at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, the process of lyricization was just underway” (“Poetess” 57). 
Like Wolosky, Jackson agrees that “the nineteenth century was the period in which the 
shift from many verse cultures articulated through various social relations gave way to an 
idea of poetry devoted to the transcendence of those relations (via beauty, say, or truth, or 
Literature, or Culture, or Poetry)” (“Poetess” 57). 
Wolosky and Jackson argue that lyric shifted into a “single abstraction” at the 
same time that American poetry is perceived as entering a period of twilight or death 
(Jackson “Poetess” 57). This turn-of-the-century temporal overlap suggests a causal 
connection between these two events in the history of lyric. Because lyric was perceived 
as aesthetically transcendent, and because all poetry was read as lyric, American poetry 
entered a period of twilight because it was thought to be so detached from reality as to be 
irrelevant. Indeed, this was the narrative of American poetry told by turn-of-the-century 
critics. Renker explains that “literary discourse in the period often simply assumed that 
the genre of poetry was inherently idealist. Since it presumably operated instead with 
reference to the better, higher, superior world of eternal and transcendent spirit rather 
than to material or actual fact, poetry was construed to be, by definition, antithetical to 
realism” (136). This assumption was bolstered by the popularity of Stedman’s twilight 
formulation, which became so widespread that it obscured any counter-examples. As 
Renker explains “after Edmund Clarence Stedman published the term in 1885, it spread 
rapidly through literary culture and became an almost instant catchphrase, a sensationalist 
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coin that writers enjoyed trading amidst their broader discussions about the degraded 
literary status, or status in general, of the modern era” (135). But when we recall that 
Stedman was lamenting the twilight of lyric’s idealized status, it becomes apparent that 
“Stedman was used against himself” (Renker 140).  
For Stedman, lyric had entered its twilight because it had ceased being ideal and 
genteel. In other words, lyric was in decline because it began adopting the practices of 
realism. Stedman criticizes the “new leaders” in poetry precisely because they abandoned 
the tradition of genteel idealizing, complaining “we do not ask for masterpieces, but how 
few the recent poems which approach in breadth and interest those of the veteran school” 
(794). He analyzes the psyche of “new leaders in poetry” in order to discern the reason 
for their disregard, asking “do they not share in a measure the sentiment which regards 
ideality as an amiable weakness, the relic of a Quixotic period, and thus feel half-
ashamed of their birthright?” (794). Despite these concerns, Stedman coined a 
characterization whose misinterpretation had important ramifications for how critics have 
since thought about nineteenth-century American poetry. 
The notion of poetry’s twilight, and later Santayana’s description of nineteenth-
century poetry as “genteel” and “grandmotherly” “has operated hegemonically to distort 
the history of the genre in the United States. . . the era itself had already generated a 
counter-poetics of realism. The twilight narrative has simply kept it in the shadows” 
(Santayana 73) (Renker 149). Indeed, Crane, Robinson, Millay, and Dunbar work to 
adapt lyric’s conservative tradition to a modern environment. By tracing liberal selfhood 
through the technology of lyric, these figures engage with the experience of the turn of 
the century just as their predecessors employed lyric to explore antebellum life. 
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The reality of lyric realism has been obscured by the misinterpretation of 
Stedman’s twilight and later, Santayana’s discussion of genteel poetry. While “before the 
middle of the nineteenth century, genteel had been a term of praise,” Stedman’s lament 
indicated a devaluation of gentility after the Civil War (Tomisch 2). But with Santayana 
and critics that followed him, the complicated history of lyric’s struggle with idealization 
was wiped out. As Tomisch argues “the twentieth-century critics who followed 
Santayana, however, were less interested in understanding the past than in creating a new 
and vital future. They were in no doubt about what had to be exorcised from American 
life to make that future possible, and they seized on Santayana’s phrase, the Genteel 
tradition, to describe it” (3). Santayana helps justify and pave the way for modernist’s 
self-conscious rejection of the nineteenth century. Modernism’s innovations have been 
viewed as “an escape from the crumbling center of culture” (Love 54). While this has 
been the dominant narrative of the movement, modernism can be considered another 
approach to the decline of lyric gentility. The poets examined here chose to work with the 
genteel tradition and the ideal notion of lyric, modernists self-consciously rejected it 
outright: both groups share the practice of recognizing that lyric had to adapt to the 
decline of gentility.  
While modernist innovation has been critically documented, the “counter-poetics” 
of the poets who retain nineteenth-century traditions has been overlooked due to the 
immediate aftermath following Stedman’s formulation of the “twilight” (Renker 149). 
Extending the “sensationalist coin” are recent reassessments of nineteenth-century 
poetry’s idealism that implicitly resurrect Stedman’s already misconstrued formulation 
(Renker 135). The critical aftermath of Stedman’s formulation provides the evidence for 
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conclusions about the history of lyric poetry reached by contemporary critics such as 
Wolosky and Jackson. But as we have discussed, this twilight indicated a decline in the 
genteel and conservative definition of poetry, precisely the same one that pursued a 
concept of poetry as idealized and detached. While Stedman lamented the rise of realist 
poetry, this realist strain has been overlooked by recent critics in their definitions of the 
transcendental lyric at the turn of the century. Rather, the idealized lyric contained its 
own strain of realist counter-poetics across the nineteenth century. 
The idealized lyric was disputed as early as Mill’s definition of poetry and 
continued to be disputed to the end of the century. In other words, contemporary critics 
and poets resisted what was already understood to be lyric poetry’s idealization. Herbert 
Tucker explains that “to the most ambitious and original young poets of the day, 
Browning and Alfred Tennyson, the sort of lyricism Mill admired must have seemed 
‘overheard’ in a sense quite other than Mill intended: heard overmuch, overdone, and 
thus in need of being done over in fresh forms” (227). Yopie Prins, building on Tucker’s 
discovery, argues that “Victorian verse” does not warrant reading “as an intensely 
subjective, personal utterance that is heard or overheard (pace Mill) but as the public 
performance of ‘voice inverse,’ an inversion of the figure on which lyric reading is 
predicated” (“Historical” 230). Marion Thain, discussing Decadent poetry, explains that 
in the figure “Michael Field’s” dual authorship, Katherine Bradley and Edith Cooper 
strove to avoid the single, solipsistic and gendered lyric speaker; their work “opposed 
post-Romantic lyric solitariness” “in favour of the regeneration of an older, and perhaps 
less solipsistic, form of Elizabethan lyric voice” (‘Michael Field’ 94, 93). 
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If nineteenth-century critics assumed that lyric was a kind of idealized and 
ahistorical genre, it is apparent that poets were busy resisting and disputing this 
definition. The existence of a kind of lyric fatigue across the nineteenth century 
demonstrates that, despite the perception of lyric as transcendent, poets and critics 
struggled with the lyric ideal by failing to achieve its perfection, rejecting it outright, or 
attempting to adapt its ideals to historical conditions of selfhood. This fatigue reveals that 
lyric was a troublesome ideal, one that was not coherent and one that often came up short. 
Thain argues “the Decadent lyric both acknowledged implicitly the impossibility of its 
unified vision in the modern world, even while it forged, at its best, a finely wrought 
artistic conceit that enabled reconciliations not quite possible in life. This gives lyric an 
undeniable energy as poetic form strains against impossible content” (“Poetry” 226). 
While Thain discusses the Decadent tradition in 1890s England, her comments articulate 
the notion of lyric that this project has illustrated. The perception of lyric as an idealized 
and transcendent form did not gradually grow over the century; its idealism was already 
implicit at the end of the century. But this ideal is important to lyric’s historical 
development, as lyric is a study in failure, a definition that is not coherent, a concept in 
conflict across the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. 
Stedman’s poetic twilight exemplifies lyric’s own poetics of failure: by the end of 
the century idealism was not sufficient to instruct people in higher pursuits. Instead lyric 
acknowledged the failure of ideals and turned to a pragmatic pursuit of liberal self 
formation. The turn-of-the-century poetry examined here shows lyrical strains in the 
sense of both failure to achieve and struggles against idealism. In fact, the poetry’s 
simultaneous aspiration and agitation demonstrates not that lyric was already a tired and 
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over-heard reading practice, not that it was an exhausted and exhausting collapse of 
discrete poetic genres, but that lyric contained these dynamic tensions within itself. 
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